Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Are qualified majority rules special?

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This essay provides a formal justification for qualified majority rules. Specifically, within an uncertain dichotomous choice framework, in which individual preferences are identical but actual judgments may differ, special majority rules emerge as decision rules that maximize the probability of making correct decisions. The main result specifies the optimal special majority as a function of a priori bias in favor of the status quo, ability, and size of the decision-making body. The analysis of the relationships among these three variables in generating certain common qualified majority rules is then pursued.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Black, D. (1958). The theory of committees and elections. London: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Condorcet, N.C. de (1986). Essai sur l'application de l'annalyse a la probabilité des décisions rendue à la pluralité des voix. Paris.

  • Fishburn, P.C. (1973). The theory of social choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn, P.C., and Gehrlein, W.V. (1977). Towards a theory of elections with probabilistic preferences. Econometrica 45: 1907–1924.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grofman, B. (1978). Judgemental competence of individuals and groups in a dichotomous choice situation: Is a majority of heads better than one? Journal of Mathematical Sociology 6: 47–60.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kazmann, R. (1973). Democratic organization: A preliminary mathematical model. Public Choice 16: 17–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rae, D.W. (1969). Decision rules and individual values in constitutional choice. American Political Science Review 63: 40–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N.J. (1972). Is majority rule special? In R.G. Niemi and H.F. Weisberg (Eds.), Probability models of collective decision making. Columbus, Ohio: Merill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A.K. (1970). Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden Day.

    Google Scholar 

  • Straffin Jr., P.D. (1977). Majority rule and general decision rules. Theory and Decision 8: 351–360.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    Shmuel Nitzan

  2. Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan

    Jacob Paroush

Authors
  1. Shmuel Nitzan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jacob Paroush
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

We would like to acknowledge the particularly helpful suggestions of Peter Aranson. We are also indebted to the anonymous referees for their comments.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Nitzan, S., Paroush, J. Are qualified majority rules special?. Public Choice 42, 257–272 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124945

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124945

Keywords

Search

Navigation