Abstract
We analyze optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, using a linear duopoly supergame with product differentiation. The security level in the punishment phase is reached only under extreme supermodularity, i.e., when products are perfect substitutes and firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behavior and strong demand complementarity between products.
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Lambertini, L., Sasaki, D. Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation. Zeitschr. f. National#x00F6;konomie 69, 173–188 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01232420
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01232420