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Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations

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Abstract

In this article, we investigate the implications of the philosophical considerations presented in Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by examining group formation in a laboratory setting where subjects engage in both cooperative and conflictual interactions. We endow participants with a commodity used to generate earnings, plunder others, or protect against plunder. In our primary treatment, we allow participants to form groups to pool their resources. We conduct a baseline comparison treatment that does not allow group formation. We find that allowing subjects to organize themselves into groups does not lead to more cooperation and may in fact exacerbate tendencies towards conflict.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MSN 3G4, Fairfax, VA, 22030-4444, USA

    Adam C. Smith

  2. Department of Political Science, Perkins Library, Duke University, Box 90204, Durham, NC, 27707, USA

    David B. Skarbek

  3. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA, 92866, USA

    Bart J. Wilson

Authors
  1. Adam C. Smith
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  2. David B. Skarbek
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  3. Bart J. Wilson
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Correspondence to Adam C. Smith.

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Smith, A.C., Skarbek, D.B. & Wilson, B.J. Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations. Soc Choice Welf 38, 325–353 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0534-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0534-5

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