Skip to main content
Log in

A prolegomenon to nonlinear empiricism in the human behavioral sciences

  • Published:
Biology & Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We propose a general framework for integrating theory and empiricism in human evolutionary ecology. We specifically emphasize the joint use of stochastic nonlinear dynamics and information theory. To illustrate critical ideas associated with historical contingency and complex dynamics, we review recent research on social preferences and social learning from behavioral economics. We additionally examine recent work on ecological approaches in history, the modeling of chaotic populations, and statistical application of information theory.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Akaike H. (1973). Information theory as an extension of the maximum likelihood principle. In: Petrov B.N., Csaki F. (eds), Second International Symposium on Information Theory. Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, pp. 267–281

    Google Scholar 

  • Alvard M.S. (2004). The ultimatum game, fairness, and cooperation among big game hunters. In: Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H. (eds), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford, Oxford University Press, PP. 413–435

    Google Scholar 

  • Barro R.J., Sala-i-Martin X. (2004). Economic Growth. 2nd ed., Cambridge, The MIT Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Baum W., Richerson P.J., Efferson C.M., Paciotti B.M. (2004). Cultural evolution in laboratory microsocieties including traditions of rule giving and rule following. Evol. Human Behav. 25:305–326

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolton G.E., Ockenfels A. (2000). ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. Am. Econ. Rev. 90:166–193

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowles S. (2004). Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. New York, Russell Sage

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowles S., Gintis H. (2000). Walrasian economics in retrospect. Quart. J. Econ. 115:1411–1439

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R., Richerson P.J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago, University of Chicago Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R., Richerson P.J. (2005). The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford, Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R., Richerson P.J. (1992). How microevolutionary processes give rise to history. In: Nitecki M.H., Nitecki D.V. (eds), History and Evolution. Albany, SUNY Press, pp. 178–209

    Google Scholar 

  • Burnham K.P., Anderson D.R. (2002). Model Selection and Multi-Model Inference: A Practical Information-Theoretic Approach 2nd ed. New York, Springer-Verlag

    Google Scholar 

  • Camerer C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton, Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Camerer C., Ho T. (1999). Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica 67:827–874

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cavalli-Sforza L.L. and Feldman M.W. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton UP, Princeton

  • Charness G., Rabin M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quart. J. Econ. 117:817–869

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cushing J.M., Costantino R.F., Dennis B., Desharnais R.A. and Henson S.M. 2003. Chaos in Ecology: Experimental Nonlinear Dynamics. Academic Press

  • Diamond J. (1997). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York, W. W. Norton

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond J. (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York, Viking

    Google Scholar 

  • Efferson C., Richerson P.J., McElreath R., Lubell M., Edsten E., Waring T., Paciotti B. and Baum W.M. Learning, noise, productivity: an experimental study of cultural transmission on the Bolivian altiplano (submitted)

  • Ensminger J. (2004). Market integration and fairness: evidence from ultimatum, dictator, and public goods experiments in East Africa. In: Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H. (eds), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford, Oxford UP, pp. 356–381

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank R.H., Cook P.J. (1995). The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest of Us. New York, Penguin

    Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E., Gächter S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415:137–140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature 425:785–791

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2004). Social norms and human cooperation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8:185–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econ. 114:817–868

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forster M., Sober E. (1994). How to tell when simpler, more unified or less ad hoc theories will provide more accurate predictions. Br. J. Philos. Sci. 45:1–35

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gurney W.S.C., Nisbet R.M. (1998). Ecological Dynamics. Oxford, Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasting A. (2004). Transients: the key to long-term ecological understanding. Trends Ecol. Evol. 19:39–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J. (2001). Cultural transmission and the diffusion of innovations: adoption dynamics indicate that biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in behavioral change. Am. Anthropol. 103:992–1013

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J. (2004). Demography and cultural evolution: how adaptive cultural processes can produce maladaptive losses—the Tasmanian case. Am. Antiq. 69:197–214

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H. (2004a). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford, Oxford UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R. (2004b). Overview and synthesis. In: Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H. (eds), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 8–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J., Gil-White F.J. (2001). The evolution of prestige: freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evol. Human Behav. 22:165–196

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J., Smith N. (2004). Comparative experimental evidence from Machiguenga, Mapuche, Huinca, and American populations. In: Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H. (eds), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 125–167

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagel J.H., Roth A.E. (1995). The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • McElreath R., Lubell M., Richerson P.J., Waring T.M., Baum W., Edsten E., Efferson C. and Paciotti B. 2005. Applying evolutionary models to the laboratory study of social learning. Evol. Human Behav. 26: 483–508

  • Murdoch W.W., Briggs C.J., Nisbet R.M. (2003). Consumer-Resource Dynamics. Princeton, Princeton UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Nisbet R.M., Gurney W.S.C. (1982). Modeling Fluctuating Populations. New York, Wiley

    Google Scholar 

  • Richerson P.J., Boyd R. (2005). Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago, University of Chicago Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Richerson P.J., Boyd R., Bettinger R.L. (2001). Was agriculture impossible during the Pleistocene but mandatory during the Holocene?: a climate change hypothesis. Am. Antiq. 66:387–411

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J., Cosmides L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In: Barkow J., Cosmides L., Tooby J. (eds), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York, Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Tracer D.P. 2004. Market integration, reciprocity, and fairness in rural Papua New Guinea: results from a two-village ultimatum game experiment. In: Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E. and Gintis H. (eds.), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, Oxford UP, Oxford, pp. 232–259

  • Turchin P. (2003). Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall. Princeton, Princeton UP

    Google Scholar 

  • Watts D.J. (2003). Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age. New York, W. W. Norton

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following individuals for comments on an earlier draft of this paper: Kim Sterelny, Brian Paciotti, William Baum, Ed Edsten, Mark Lubell, Richard McElreath, and Tim Waring.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Charles Efferson.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Efferson, C., Richerson, P.J. A prolegomenon to nonlinear empiricism in the human behavioral sciences. Biol Philos 22, 1–33 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-9013-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-9013-7

Keywords

Navigation