Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

What makes neurophysiology meaningful? Semantic content ascriptions in insect navigation research

  • Published:
Biology & Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In the course of investigating the living world, biologists regularly attribute semantic content to the phenomena they study. In this paper, I examine the case of a contemporary research program studying the navigation behaviors of ants and develop an account of the norms governing researchers’ ascriptions of semantic content in their research practices. The account holds that researchers assign semantic content to behaviors that reliably achieve a difficult goal-directed function, and it also suggests a productive role for attributions of semantic content in the process of animal behavior research.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Within the functions debate, some philosophers have argued the stronger claim that biological usage warrants a totally ahistorical theory of function, not just a non-etiological theory of function (Amundson and Lauder 1994; Walsh 1996, 558; Boorse 2002, 73). However, Garson (2019) has recently argued that there are no ahistorical theories of biological function on the grounds that purportedly ahistorical theories actually retain a historical dimension. Garson’s point that theories of function can reference history in nonobvious ways is well taken, and this paper addresses the question of how history figures into researchers’ ascriptions of content in “The stilts and stumps experiment justifies a goal-directed notion of function” section.

  2. Neander (2016) concedes that Kitcher’s hybrid account of function has the potential to ground the crucial function/malfunction distinction in objective phenomena, but she critiques Kitcher’s account for leaving important questions unanswered. Namely, how are adaptive capacities assigned to trait types? Within what environmental contexts must a trait type be adaptive? And how are those trait types individuated? A major point of this paper is that researchers do not require comprehensive answers to such questions for their ascriptions of content-bearing functions to play a productive role in the development of a successful research program. Still, as the next section demonstrates, the evidential norms governing researcher’s ascriptions of content-bearing functions suggest partial answers to such questions.

  3. Again, as with researchers’ individuation of trait types, researchers seem to lack an explicit, comprehensive account of how they individuate naturally-occurring contexts. Still, it is clear that researchers recognize the distinction between naturally-occurring and non-naturally occurring circumstances.

References

  • Allen C (1992) Mental content and evolutionary explanation. Biol Philos 7(1):1–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen C (2017) On (not) defining cognition. Synthese 194(11):4233–4249

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen C, Bekoff M (1997) Species of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen C, Hauser M (1991) Concept attribution in nonhuman animals: theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes. Philos Sci 58(2):221–240

    Google Scholar 

  • Amundson R, Lauder G (1994) Function without purpose: the uses of causal role function in evolutionary biology. Biol Philos 9(4):443–469

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel W (2016) Investigating neural representations: the tale of place cells. Synthese 193(5):1287–1321

    Google Scholar 

  • Bechtel W, Richardson R (1992/2010) Discovering complexity: decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research. MIT Press, Cambridge

  • Bergstrom C, Rosvall M (2011a) The transmission sense of information. Biol Philos 26(2):159–176

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergstrom C, Rosvall M (2011b) Response to commentaries on ‘the transmission sense of information’. Biol Philos 26(2):195–200

    Google Scholar 

  • Bigelow J, Pargetter R (1987) Functions. J Philos 84(4):181–196

    Google Scholar 

  • Boorse C (1976) Wright on functions. Philos Rev 85(1):70–86

    Google Scholar 

  • Boorse C (2002) A rebuttal on functions. In: Ariew A, Cummins R, Perlman M (eds) Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Clarendon Press, New York, pp 63–112

    Google Scholar 

  • Braithwaite R (1953) Scientific explanation: a study of the functions of theory, probability, and law in science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Buckner C (2013) Morgan’s Canon, meet Hume’s Dictum: avoiding anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons. Biol Philos 28(5):853–871

    Google Scholar 

  • Burghardt G (2007) Critical anthropomorphism, uncritical anthropocentrism, and Naïve nominalism. Comp Cogn Behav Rev 2:136–138

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett D (1988) Out of the armchair and into the field. Poet Today 9(1):205–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Duelli P, Wehner R (1973) The spectral sensitivity of polarized light orientation in Cataglyphis bicolor (Formicidae, Hymenoptera). J Comp Physiol A 86(1):37–53

    Google Scholar 

  • Garson J (2019) There are no ahistorical theories of function. Philos Sci 86(5):1146–1156

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (1993) Functions: consensus without unity. Pac Philos Q 74:196–208

    Google Scholar 

  • Gordon D (1992) Wittgenstein and ant-watching. Biol Philos 7(1):13–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould JL, Gould CG (1982) The insect mind: physics or metaphysics? In: Griffin D (ed) Animal mind—human mind. Springer, Berlin, pp 269–297

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffiths P, Stotz K (2013) Genetics and philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Heran H, Wanke L (1952) Beobachtungen über die Entfernungsmeldung der Sammelbienen. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Physiologie 34:383–393

  • Herrling P (1976) Regional distribution of three ultrastructural retinula types in the retina of Cataglyphis bicolor Fabr. (Formicidae, Hymenoptera). Cell Tissue Res 169(2):247–266

    Google Scholar 

  • Hinde RA (1982) Ethology: its nature and relations with other sciences. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P (1993) Function and Design. Midwest Stud Philos 18:379–397

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P (2016) Reply to Neander. In: Couch M, Pfeiffer J (eds) The philosophy of Phillip Kitcher. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 68–73

    Google Scholar 

  • Lehner PN (1996) Handbook of ethological methods. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Lenoir A, Aron S, Cerda X, Hefetz A (2009) Cataglyphis desert ants: a good model for evolutionary biology in Darwin’s anniversary year—a review. Isr J Entomol 39:1–32

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorenz K (1950) The comparative method in studying innate behaviour patterns. Symp Soc Exp Biol 4:221–254

    Google Scholar 

  • Love A (2009) Typology reconfigured: from the metaphysics of essentialism to the epistemology of representation. Acta Biotheor 57(1–2):51–75

    Google Scholar 

  • Maclaurin J (2011) Commentary on ‘The Transmission Sense of Information” by Carl T. Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall. Biol Philos 26(2):191–194

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan R (1989) An ambiguity in the notion ‘function’. Biol Philos 4(2):172–176

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan R (1990) Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics. Philos Top 18(2):151–161

    Google Scholar 

  • Neander K (2016) Kitcher’s two design stances. In: Couch M, Pfeiffer J (eds) The philosophy of Phillip Kitcher. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 44–67

    Google Scholar 

  • Neander K (2017) A mark of the mental: in defense of informational teleosemantics. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Newen A, Bartels A (2007) Animal minds and the possession of concepts. Philos Psychol 20(3):283–308

    Google Scholar 

  • Ronacher B (2008) Path integration as the basic navigation mechanism of the desert ant Cataglyphis fortis. Myrmecol News 11:53–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Ronacher B, Gallizzi K, Wohlgemuth S, Wehner R (2000) Lateral optic flow does not influence distance estimation in the desert ant Cataglyphis fortis. J Exp Biol 203(7):1113–1121

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossel S, Wehner R (1984a) Celestial orientation in bees: the use of spectral cues. J Comp Physiol A 155(5):605–613

    Google Scholar 

  • Rossel S, Wehner R (1984b) How bees analyse the polarization patterns in the sky. J Comp Physiol A 154(5):607–615

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar S (1996) Biological information: a skeptical look at some central dogmas of molecular biology. In: Sarkar S (ed) The philosophy and history of molecular biology: new perspectives. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 187–231

    Google Scholar 

  • Shea N (2011) What’s transmitted? Inherited information. Biol Philos 26(2):183–189

    Google Scholar 

  • Shea N (2018) Representation in the cognitive sciences. University of Oxford Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Skinner B (1977) Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism 5(2):1–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Sommerhoff G (1969) The abstract characteristics of living systems. In: Emery FE (ed) Systems thinking. Penguin Books, Baltimore, pp 147–202

    Google Scholar 

  • Steck K, Hansson BS, Knaden M (2009) Smells like home: desert ants, Cataglyphis fortis, use olfactory landmarks to pinpoint the nest. Front Zool 6(1):5

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterner B (2014) The practical value of biological information for research. Philos Sci 81(2):175–194

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson E, Piccinini G (2018) Neural representations observed. Mind Mach 28(1):191–235

    Google Scholar 

  • Tinbergen, N. (1963). On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift für tierpsychologie. 20(4):410-433.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Frisch K (1949) Die Polarisation des Himmelslichts als orientierender Faktor bei den Tänzen der Bienen. Experientia 5:142–148

    Google Scholar 

  • Walsh D (1996) Fitness and function. Br J Philos Sci 47:553–574

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson J (1913) Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychol Rev 20(2):158–177

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R (1987) ‘Matched-Filters’—neural models of the external world. J Comp Physiol A 161(4):511–531

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R (1997) The ant’s celestial compass system: spectral and polarization channels. In: Lehrer M (ed) Orientation and communication in arthropods. Birkhäuser, Basel, pp 145–185

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R (2013) Life as a cataglyphologist—and beyond. Annu Rev Entomol 58:1–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R (2016) Early ant trajectories: spatial behavior before behaviourism. J Comp Physiol A 202(4):247–266

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R (2020) Desert navigator: the journey of the ant. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R, Müller M (2006) The significance of direct sunlight and polarized skylight in the ant’s celestial system of navigation. Proc Natl Acad Sci 103(33):12575–12579

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R, Rössler W (2013) Bounded plasticity in the desert ant’s navigational tool kit. In: Menzel R, Benjamin PR (eds) Handbook of behavioral neuroscience, vol 22. Elsevier, San Diego, pp 514–529

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R, Srinivasan M (1981) Searching behaviour of desert ants, genus Cataglyphis (Formicidae, Hymenoptera). J Comp Physiol 142(3):315–338

    Google Scholar 

  • Wehner R, Bernard G, Geiger E (1975) Twisted and non-twisted rhabdoms and their significance for polarization detection in the bee. J Comp Physiol 104(3):225–245

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittlinger M, Wehner R, Wolf H (2006) The ant odometer: stepping on stilts and stumps. Science 312(5782):1965–1967

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittlinger M, Wehner R, Wolf H (2007) The desert ant odometer: a stride integrator that accounts for stride length and walking speed. J Exp Biol 210(2):198–207

    Google Scholar 

  • Wouters A (2003) Four notions of biological function. Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 34:633–668

    Google Scholar 

  • Wynne CD (2004) The perils of anthropomorphism. Nature 428:606

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This paper has greatly benefited from feedback provided by Beckett Sterner and Steve Elliot. Alan Love, Colin Allen, Max Dresow, Yoshinari Yoshida, and Jeremy Wideman also provided helpful comments on later versions of the paper. I researched and wrote this paper while funded by the Ford Foundation’s Pre-doctoral and Dissertation Fellowships.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Biology and Society, School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA

    Kelle Dhein

  2. Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis, USA

    Kelle Dhein

Authors
  1. Kelle Dhein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kelle Dhein.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Dhein, K. What makes neurophysiology meaningful? Semantic content ascriptions in insect navigation research. Biol Philos 35, 52 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09768-w

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09768-w

Keywords

Search

Navigation