Abstract
Do we need behavioral economics to explain law? I analyze Judge Guido Calabresi’s claim that we do. I find that, actually, we don’t; traditional economic theory can explain law just fine.
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I thank Paola Suarez, the Editors, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
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This paper was prepared for the Conference on the Future of Law and Economics at Boston University School of Law, June 1–2, 2017.
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Leeson, P.T. Do we need behavioral economics to explain law?. Eur J Law Econ 48, 29–42 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-017-9573-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-017-9573-4
Keywords
- Calabresi
- Behavioral economics
- Rent-seeking
- Merit goods
- Altruism
- Organ sales
- Conscription
- Minneapolis 5% tradition
- The Future of Law and Economics