Notes
As a side note: Railton's (1986) paper, “Moral Realism,” which is sometimes cited as an example of an informed desire satisfaction theory, is really a meta-ethical analysis of ‘the good for’ that makes such goods attitude-dependent. When we write about well-being, underlying meta-ethical commitments are not usually the focus, but I suspect that many subjectivists about well-being have meta-ethical views closer to Railton’s.
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Tiberius, V. Facing the Facts and Living Well: Comments on Neera Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life . J Value Inquiry 50, 219–226 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9546-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9546-9