Abstract
This article argues that contemporary accounts of justice miss a relational dimension of justice, which focuses on the terms private individuals’ interactions must meet for them to constitute relationships among equal, self-determining persons. The article develops the argument that the justice requirement to respect others as substantively free and equal individuals can sometimes be adequately discharged only if the relevant private persons are held responsible for its realization. It further elaborates the normative framework of relational justice to explain the generic structure, content, and scope of such a requirement.
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Dagan, H., Dorfman, A. Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework. Law and Philos 37, 171–201 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9309-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9309-1