Abstract
Theoretical models do not reach an unambiguous conclusion concerning the effects of natural resource endowment on the duration of dictatorial regimes. We assess empirically, for the first time, the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of autocratic leaders. Using a dataset comprising information for 106 dictators, our empirical analysis indicates that dictators in countries which are relatively better endowed in terms of oil tend to stay longer in office. The result is robust to changes in the definition of dictatorial regimes and in the specifications used in the econometric analysis.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2004). Alfred Marshall lecture: kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: a model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 162–192.
Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D., & Vindigni, A. (2010). A theory of military dictatorship. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 1–42.
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters, 80, 123–129.
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., Limongi, F., & Przeworski, A. (1996). Classifying political regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 3, 3–36.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 155–194.
Becker, G. S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 371–400.
Bellin, E. (2004). The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: exceptionalism in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, 36, 139–157.
Bhattacharyya, S., & Hodler, R. (2010). Natural resources, democracy and corruption. European Economic Review, 54, 608–621.
Bienen, H., & van der Walle, N. (1992). A proportional hazard model of leadership duration. Journal of Politics, 54, 685–717.
Caselli, F. (2006). Power struggles and the natural resource curse. Mimeo, Department of Economics, London School of Economics.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143, 67–101.
Cleves, M. A., Gould, W. M., & Gutierrez, R. G. (2004). An introduction to survival analysis using Stata (revised edn.). College Station: Stata Press.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 563–595.
Crespo-Cuaresma, J., Lutz, W., & Sanderson, W. (2008). The demography of educational attainment and economic growth. Science, 319, 1047–1048.
Easton, S. T., & Walker, M. A. (1997). Income, growth, and economic freedom. American Economic Review, 87, 328–332.
Freedom House (2008). Freedom in the world (Annual report). http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Gallego, M., & Pitchik, C. (2004). An economic theory of leadership turnover. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2361–2382.
Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R. (2009). Political terror scale 1976–2007. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.
Goemans, H., Gleditisch, K. S., & Chiozza, G. (2007). Archigos. A data set on leaders 1875–2004. Version 2.8.
Grossman, H. I. (1991). A general equilibrium model of insurrections. American Economic Review, 81, 912–921.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty. Economics of Governance, 3, 23–45.
Heritage Foundation (2009). 2009 index of economic freedom. http://www.heritage.org.
Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2006). Penn world table version. Version 6.2.
Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European Economic Review, 50, 1367–1386.
Islam, M. M., & Winer, S. L. (2004). Tinpots, totalitarians (and democrats): an empirical investigation of economic growth on civil liberties and political rights. Public Choice, 118, 289–323.
Kalbfleisch, J. D., & Prentice, R. L. (2002). The statistical analysis of failure time data (2nd edn.). New York: Wiley.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2005). Governance matters IV: governance indicators for 1996–2004. Policy Research Working Paper 3630, The World Bank, Washington, DC. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2000). The constitutional economics of autocratic succession. Public Choice, 103, 63–84.
Leite, C., & Weidmann, J. (2002). Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and economic growth. In G. Abed & S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, corruption, and economic performance (pp. 159–196). Washington: IMF.
Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political man: the social bases of politics. New York: Anchor Books.
Lutz, W., Goujon, A., Samir, K. C., & Sanderson, W. (2007). Reconstruction of population by age, sex and level of educational attainment. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, 2007, 193–225.
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2005). Polity IV project. Political regime characteristics and transition, 1800–2004. Version 2004.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 681–712.
McGuire, M. C., & Olson, M. C. (1996). The economics of autocracy and majority rule: the invisible hand and the use of force. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 72–96.
Morrison, K. M. (2007). Natural resources, aid, and democratization: a best-case scenario. Public Choice, 131, 365–386.
Olson, M. C. (1965). The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Olson, M. C. (1991). Autocracy, democracy and prosperity. In R. Zeckhauser (Ed.), Strategy and Choice (pp. 131–157). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Olson, M. C. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review, 87, 567–576.
Olson, M. C. (2000). Power and prosperity. New York: Basic Books.
Robinson, E. A. G. (1960). Economic consequences of the size of nations. London: St. Martin’s.
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006). Political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79, 447–468.
Ross, M. L. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53, 325–361.
Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2003). Addressing the natural resource curse: an illustration from Nigeria. NBER Working Paper Series 9804, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Smith, B. (2004). Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960–1999. American Journal of Political Science, 48, 232–246.
Tornell, A., & Lane, P. R. (1999). The voracity effect. American Economic Review, 89, 22–46.
Tsui, K. K. (2005). More oil, less democracy? Theory and evidence from crude oil discoveries. Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
Tullock, G. (1987). Autocracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Tullock, G. (2005). The social dilemma of: autocracy, revolution and coup d’état. Liberty Fund.
van der Ploeg, F. (2007). Africa and natural resources: managing natural resources for sustainable growth, Background paper. African Development Bank.
Wintrobe, R. (1990). The tinpot and the totalitarian: an economic theory of dictatorship. American Political Science Review, 84, 849–872.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Crespo Cuaresma, J., Oberhofer, H. & Raschky, P.A. Oil and the duration of dictatorships. Public Choice 148, 505–530 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9671-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9671-0