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Patriotism, taxation and international mobility

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Abstract

Patriotic citizens intrinsically prefer living in their native country compared to living in the Diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of such a “patriotic lock-in” in a world with international migration and redistributive taxation. One implication is that countries with more patriotic populations are associated with higher redistributive taxes. We then combine ISSP survey data with OECD taxation data and provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Our results provide a word of caution: the Treasury’s inherent interest in patriotic taxpayers may strengthen the political push for patriotism in an age of globalization and increased mobility.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Marstallplatz 1, 80539, Munich, Germany

    Salmai Qari & Kai A. Konrad

  2. Norwegian School of Management (BI), Nydalsveien 37, 0442, Oslo, Norway

    Benny Geys

  3. Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785, Berlin, Germany

    Benny Geys

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  1. Salmai Qari
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  2. Kai A. Konrad
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  3. Benny Geys
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Correspondence to Salmai Qari.

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The authors are given in reverse alphabetical order, and contributed equally.

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Qari, S., Konrad, K.A. & Geys, B. Patriotism, taxation and international mobility. Public Choice 151, 695–717 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9765-3

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