Abstract
This paper examines the effect of antidumping duties on the restructuring activities of protected plants. Using a dataset that contains the full population of U.S. manufacturers, I find that protected plants increase their capital intensities modestly relative to unprotected plants, but only when antidumping duties have been in place for a sufficient duration. I find little effect of antidumping duties on a proxy for the skilled labor intensity of protected plants.
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Notes
See Pierce and Schott (2012) for more details.
See Bown (2012).
The table reports means and standard deviations for all continuous variables that are employed in this paper. The Census Bureau does not permit release of minimum and maximum data, as they represent survey responses of individual establishments. Review of minimum and maximum data by the author did not reveal any anomalous observations.
In the time period examined in this paper, five of the 148 antidumping investigations completed ended with suspension agreements as the only form of protection. Under this arrangement, foreign firms agree to stop dumping, in exchange for suspension of the antidumping investigation. Because data on the effective duty rate—considered later in the paper—are unavailable for these investigations, they have been excluded from this analysis.
These two sources of bias were first discussed in Konings and Vandenbussche (2008).
The level of the Dur variable, as well as its interactions with Treatment and Post, individually, are not in the specification as they cannot be separately identified from the other covariates and fixed effects.
Note that the reported standard errors are adjusted to control for clustering at the product level.
See, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
See Becker and Gray (2009).
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Acknowledgments
I thank Bob Feinberg and Larry White for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.
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Pierce, J.R. Antidumping Duties and Plant-Level Restructuring. Rev Ind Organ 42, 435–447 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9386-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9386-8