Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Preemption and a counterfactual analysis of divine causation

  • Article
  • Published:
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper aims to outline a counterfactual theory of divine atemporal causation that avoids problems of preemption. As a result, the presentation of the analysis is structured such that my counterfactual analysis directly addresses preemption issues. If these problems can be avoided, the theist is well on her way to proposing a usable metaphysical concept of atemporal divine causation. In the first section, I outline Lewis’ original counterfactual analysis as well as how these cases of preemption cause problems for his analysis. In particular, two cases of preemption have proven problematic for counterfactual analyses: late preemption and trumping preemption. In the second section, I propose a counterfactual analysis of divine causation that is not subject to these problems of preemption. I present a counterfactual analysis of timeless divine causation, supplemented by a definition of what it means for God to allow an event to happen. In the third section, I argue this analysis is not prey to problems of preemption.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This proposal may be a good place to start in rebutting Davis’ (2012, 68) argument that causal relations are necessarily temporal and Swinburne’s (1994, 81) argument (at least, Helm’s (2010, 240) interpretation of Swinburne) that “temporal notions are parasitic upon causal notions.”

  2. Lewis (1986) attempts to deal with late preemption in his “Postscripts to ‘Causation,’” with an appeal to the notion of quasi-dependence. A definition of quasi-dependence runs as follows: “Let c and e be distinct events that both occur. e quasi-depends upon c iff e causally depends upon c in most intrinsic duplicates of the c–e process” (Hitchcock 2015, 301). For reasons why quasi-dependence might not solve all problems of late preemption, see (Paul 1998).

  3. Leftow (1991, 294) introduces clauses similar to (i) to his analysis of divine sustaining that also rule out cases of reverse dependence. Evan Fales (1997, 181–183) and Quinten Smith (1996, 174) argue that a counterfactual analysis of divine causation is impossible due to reverse dependence. I set aside their objections for now since it is not within the scope of the present thesis.

  4. All that is required for (iii) is that God is omnipotent in the sense that God can do all things logically possible. For some definitions of God’s omnipotence that work well with the ideas here, see Wierenga (1983) and Leftow (2011, 190–191).

  5. There is precedence for cause by omission in the philosophy of science—see Schaffer (2004)—and in the free will literature—see Sartorio (2016).

  6. For helpful discussion and correspondence, I am indebted to Evan Fales, Bruce Marino, David Limbaugh, Robert Kelly, and Jonathan Vajda. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her helpful comments.

References

  • Davis, Stephen. (2012). Temporal eternity. In Louis Pojman & Michael Rea (Eds.), Philosophy of religion: An anthology (6th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning.

    Google Scholar 

  • Enns, Paul. (2014). The moody handbook of theology. Chicago: Moody Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fales, Evan. (1997). Divine intervention. Faith and Philosophy, 14(2), 170–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grudem, Wayne. (1994). Systematic theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helm, Paul. (2010). Eternal god: A study of god without time (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hitchcock, Christopher. (2015). Lewis on causation. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (Eds.), A companion to David Lewis (pp. 295–311). Oxford: Wiley.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Leftow, Brian. (1991). Time and eternity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leftow, Brian. (2011). Omnipotence. In Thomas Flint & Michael Rea (Eds.), The oxford handbook of philosophical theology (pp. 167–191). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, David. (1973). Causation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 556–567.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986). Postscripts to ‘Causation’. In Philosophical papers (Vol. 2, pp. 172–213). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Paul, L. A. (1998). Problems with late preemption. Analysis, 58(1), 48–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sartorio, Carolina. (2016). Causation and free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, Jonathan. (2000). Trumping preemption. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(4), 165–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, Jonathan. (2004). Causes need not be physically connected to their effects: The case for negative causation. In Christopher Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science (pp. 197–216). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Quentin. (1996). Causation and the logical impossibility of a divine cause. Philosophical Topics, 24(1), 169–191.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swinburne, Richard. (1994). The christian god. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wierenga, Edward. (1983). Omnipotence defined. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43(3), 363–375.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, Columbia, USA

    Ryan Kulesa

Authors
  1. Ryan Kulesa
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ryan Kulesa.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kulesa, R. Preemption and a counterfactual analysis of divine causation. Int J Philos Relig 89, 125–134 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09774-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09774-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation