Abstract
Gilbert Ryle and a number of other philosophers have argued that Descartes’ claim his senses could always deceive him is false. Ryle’s argument is the well-known ‘counterfeit coins’ argument. A similar argument, featuring forged paintings, has been advanced by Jay Rosenberg. Both Ryle’s and Rosenberg’s arguments are refutations by logical analogy. In this paper, their arguments are exposed and reconstructed, and it is shown and how and why their refutations by logical analogy fail. It is then noted that, even so, they could be right about the invalidity of Descartes’ argument. A close examination of Descartes’ argument, however, shows that there is nothing wrong with it.
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Notes
A number of other philosophers have also invested in counterfeit coins. They include Passmore (1961: 108), Grant (1963: 272), Kenny (1971: 216), and Blackburn (1999: 22). Hamlyn (1970: 18-19) rejects Ryle’s argument as it stands but accepts a modified version of it. Not all of the philosophers just mentioned follow Ryle in thinking that the counterfeit coins argument provides a refutation by logical analogy of Descartes’ argument. Blackburn, however, follows Ryle closely.
In this context, ‘refutation by logical analogy’ refers only to a species that falls under the genus denoted by the same term. Abstract as this remark is, a helpful comparison may be the way that ‘feline,’ in some contexts, refers only to a species (of relatively small and domesticated animals) that falls under the genus denoted by the same term. In this narrow species sense, a (successful) refutation by logical analogy is: (a) an argument by analogy that (b) draws an analogy between two arguments, X and Y, both of which (c) are deductive and (d) have the same form, and (d) one of which, Y, is (successfully) argued to be formally invalid, (e) on the grounds that, even if its premises are assumed to be true, its conclusion could be false, (f) from which it is concluded that the other argument, X, is also formally invalid. ‘Refutation by logical analogy’ need not be understood so narrowly. Although all refutations by logical analogy satisfy (a), in a loose sense of the term a refutation by logical analogy need not even satisfy (b). Rather, it could aim at simply refuting a claim, or showing that a statement is false. And even if a refutation by logical analogy does satisfy (a) and (b), it need not satisfy (c), since it could compare two inductive arguments, not two deductive ones. Moreover, even a refutation by logical analogy that does compare two deductive arguments need not focus on formal invalidity, for (i) not all validity/invalidity is formal validity/invalidity, and (ii) a refutation by logical analogy could aim at showing that the underlying problem with argument X is not a bad inference but a false premise, or a false principle underlying a premise. (d), therefore, also need not be satisfied. Finally, given that even a refutation by logical analogy that does analogize arguments need not analogize deductive arguments, much less deductive arguments considered as formal structures, neither (e) nor (f) need be satisfied. In the genus sense of the term, then, ‘refutation by logical analogy’ covers a large number of arguments that differ from one another in a wide variety of ways. Such arguments can also fail to provide strong evidence for their conclusions for a wide variety of reasons.
That said, two points are worth noting. The first is that it is refutation by logical analogy in the very narrow sense identified above that Ryle and Rosenberg have in mind. The second is that it is this species sense of refutation by logical analogy that is emphasized in standard logic texts. For example, Copi and Cohen employ “the method of logical analogy” as a way to demonstrate the formal invalidity of certain categorical syllogisms and other deductive arguments (205: 223–225, 385–386). Most logic texts also recognize, in addition, broader and narrower forms--various species--of refutation by logical analogy, though usually without explicitly noting as much. Copi and Cohen do, for instance (2005: 221–225, 385–386, 463–465), as does Govier (1988: 217-218). For more on refutation by logical analogy, see Juthe’s nice paper (2008).
Put in terms of the defining conditions of a successful refutation by logical analogy identified in fn. 2, the principal problem is that (e) isn’t satisfied. Thus, respecting (f), it cannot be “concluded that the other argument… is also… invalid.”
References
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Grant, C. K. (1963). Polar concepts and metaphysical arguments. In H. D. Lewis (Ed.), Clarity is not enough (pp. 255–277). Allen and Unwin.
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Kenny, A. (1971). The verification principle and the private language argument. In O. R. Jones (Ed.), The private language argument. Macmillan.
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Acknowledgements
My thanks to an anonymous referee for a close and careful reading of this paper and a number of helpful comments and suggestions.
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Wreen, M. ‘My Senses Couldn’t Always Deceive Me’. Philosophia 50, 353–360 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00387-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00387-7