As we write the year 2020, a century has gone by since one of the greatest legends in psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), has passed away. This centennial is well-suited for a time travel back to psychology’s early days, to re-visit and remember some of Wundt’s achievements as the founding father of modern psychology, and to reflect upon his general orientation to the study of human psychology, as well as what occurred to his school in the aftermath of his departure.

Since the mid-1970s, Wundt has slowly started to receive some renewed and well-deserved attention after decades of his ideas having been laying dormant, especially during the times in US psychology, while behaviorism (or derivatives thereof) was supreme ruler of psychological doctrine. Yet even today, in the twenty-first century, we find many US textbooks (especially undergraduate university introduction to psychology textbooks) still providing misleading statements that would leave the reader—the student—to falsely understand Wilhelm Wundt to be a structuralist akin to Edward Titchener (1867–1927). In fact, the two are often inseparably linked when brought up in the texts as having done pretty much the same, with Wundt perhaps receiving an additional sentence or two indicating that his primary approach involved reaction time studies. Nevertheless, the two are typically highlighted as pioneers advocating a failed attempt, relying on introspection as the primary method at trying to come up with the mental elements that make up the structure of the mind.

It is nothing short of stunning that this largely misconstrued image of Wundt still persists. And yet, here we are, 100 years after Wundt’s death, and the many voices (e.g., Blumenthal 1975, 1979; Danziger 1980, 1983; Rieber and Robinson 2001, etc.) who have tried to educate us about what Wundt really stood for seem to have fallen largely on deaf ears when it comes to books designed for undergraduate students in the USA. Thus, the time may be right to take a renewed stroll down memory lane to re-visit Wilhelm Wundt’s general orientation toward the discipline of psychology and pay tribute to some of his major ideas. In doing so, I will be by-passing how Wundt developed his ideasFootnote 1 and instead focus on what he actually advocated toward the very end of his life some 100 years ago. This will allow us to take some extra steps beyond Wundt’s doctrine to see its transformation by his successors at Leipzig. This transformation would mark a new beginning for the Leipzig School of Psychology, a shift in fundamental orientation that led to the growth of Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie (aka “Developmental Holistic Psychology”).

Wundt’s General Approach to Psychology

One of Wundt’s many legacies is that he has gone down in history as the founding father of modern psychology. However, in making this declaration, we often overlook the many other predecessors and contemporaries of Wundt who had been equally devoted to investigating what is typically considered today to be part of the field of psychology (e.g., see Valsiner 2012). However, it is not the aim here to examine predecessors or contemporary approaches to Wundt. In general, Wundt rejected those approaches on the grounds that they either followed an outdated metaphysical model that assumed some kind of internal substance (such as having a “soul”) or they were empiristic to the degree that they took inner experiences to follow the same empirical dictates as outer experiences. Outer experiences relate to tangible things like a stone, a plant, a tone, or a light beam. These objects are of interest to the disciplines of mineralogy, botanics, or physics. When it comes to psychology, Wundt (1922) saw the main objective of psychology to examine our immediate experiences, that is, consciousness as it occurs. However, in doing so, we must be careful not to think of psychology being the science of inner experiences as opposed to outer experiences, the latter focusing on everything found within nature. According to Wundt (1922, p. 8), the psychology of immediate experience does not see a real difference between inner and outer experiences per se but rather sees their difference only as a matter of differing perspectives. One, the outer experience (such as seeing a flower growing in the garden), contains the object, and the other (my perception of that flower) is the experiencing subject. Nevertheless, both are intimately intertwined since what lies outside our consciousness can only be understood through consciousness. In other words, the outer domain is based on a mediated experience (e.g., the perception of an object, such as a flower). Yet our immediate experiences bring with them attributes not contained in the domain of traditional natural sciences (e.g., where the flower solidly grows). Our inner experiences are more than just a representation of what lies outside of the person (the flower). That is, our representations (Vorstellungen) of objects also bring with them feelings, affects, etc. These processes become part of the psychological content and are not additive in nature. As such, approaches based on pure associations (e.g., behaviorism based on British philosophy, or consciousness based on Friedrich Herbart’s Psychic-Mechanics model), which have taken to task a model based on the exact natural sciences, miss their goal because such a mortar and stone approach aimed at building the whole via a mosaic like structure overlooks that the laws of association do not account for the entirety of the processes governing consciousness (Wundt 1922, p. 12). These mechanistic approaches typically try to build an additive or aggregate model where the sum of the components equals the totality of the investigated object (e.g., in Herbart’s case, the metaphysical assumption about some kind of mental substance, like a soul). In short, association psychology (e.g., behaviorism or Herbart’s psychic mechanics) places the objective content of mental experiences at the core of their investigations and gives the subjective components, like feelings and affects, a role of lesser importance, or see these things as phenomena that are to be derived out of those objective representations. Wundt (1922, p. 13) saw these approaches as a form of intellectualism because they largely place emphasis on a rational (or logical) model that is void of emotionality to the degree that feelings and affects are treated as appendixes.

Such points of view assume an incorrect understanding as reification of mental content, i.e., that our mental representations are the direct result or manifestations of objects (such as a flower) in nature. In other words, an assumption is made that the outer world is simply and relatively unchanged (sometimes weaker and unclear, sometimes strong and clear) entered into our consciousness. But Wundt (1922, pp. 14-15) points out that if we take reality to be nothing other than the totality of our inner experiences, and these being more specifically the immediate experiences, then this is nothing other than the totality of experiences within the unmediated subjective reality. Representations of things are—just like affects and volitions—in a constant state of change. Nothing ever “is,” but rather everything is in a never-ending flow of happenings, changes, and becomings. It is therefore fruitless to want to build a science of psychology that merely differentiates between inner and outer, so that the focus can be placed on how outer becomes represented in the inner domain (such as the mind). Since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between inner and outer, emphasis should not be placed on the objects themselves being represented in the subject but rather on the processes involved in experiencing the world.

Herefore, psychology can use two empirical methods aimed at understanding immediate experiences. First, it can apply an experimental approach in order to understand the exact nature of how psychical processes take shape. This, however, only gives insight to the immediate conscious processes based on natural occurrences as dictated by the science approach being utilized. In other words, such an approach only gives insight into occurrences relating to immediate experiential content. But what about experienced mental content that is not based on an actual object in the traditional sense (such as a flower), but rather only has the character of a psychical object whose origins seem somewhat independent of the observer? The language I use to think or the laws, customs, and morals I follow are not natural objects per se, but their core attributes nevertheless have an independent existence from me, the observer, and moreover, are themselves the products of many cognitive processes by mankind. In order to be able to gain an understanding of generalized mental creation, such as language, mythological imaginations, the norms of customs, laws, and morals, psychology must draw upon the products of these collective creations. This second approach falls within the discipline of Völkerpsychologie (Diriwächter 2004, 2012) and relies more on naturalistic observations following a historical-comparative examination rather than traditional experimental methodologies.

Wundt’s School of Psychology: Voluntarism

Wundt’s experimental, or physiological, psychology as well as his Völkerpsychologie were part of his program toward investigating psychological processes pretty much from the very beginning of his career: the former essentially dealing with the lower psychological processes and the latter approach with the higher, more complex processes. Pragmatically speaking, the two approaches ran in parallel to each other. However, both were united in being governed by Wundt’s “emotional will theory” (emotionale Willenstheorie). Unfortunately, the term will is quite loaded with philosophical baggage, and therefore, it is important to address Wundt’s conceptualization of will. As I have already explained elsewhere (see Diriwächter 2009a), the will did not stand for some independent metaphysical substrate that makes decisions and then acts upon them. Such a conceptualization of will would give the impression that something—such as a soul—is inside of us that makes decisions, which in turn would only push psychology back into the flawed Cartesian theater of endless debates about how this metaphysical substrate is connected to the body. While Wundt was a religious man, personally attributing a pivotal moment in the manifestation of his Weltanschauung to a deeply religious, near-death experience he had at age 25 (see Wundt 1920, pp. 116–127), he did not see it necessary to squeeze a metaphysical concept (such as a soul) into the scientific domain of psychology.

Instead, he saw that the mind-body problem is overcome via his principle of actuality. There is not an independent physical and psychical world, rather the two need to be seen as one. That is, from a scientific vantage point, we can only rely on known relationships. To this day, we cannot yet explain the qualitative gap between the purely physical and the mental realm. For Wundt (1922), there is just one experience (i.e., the physical and mental as one). If we examine this experience, scientific analysis can follow two paths of examinations: The first examines how the contents of our representations in objective reality relate to one another (this is a mediated path), while the other examines how the experiencing subject (the person as a whole) recognizes and deals with the characteristics of the objective world (which takes the path of immediate experiences). His conceptualization of physical (body) and psychical (mental) was one of double aspectism, which he referred to as “psychophysical parallelism,” thereby paying homage to Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’ (1646–1716) coining of said term. Regardless of the applied terminology, Wundt’s underlying premise was that experiences are not a matter of a dualistic (mind-body) construct but rather a matter of a holistic experiencing in which there is a physical and psychological world together as one. To use an Aristotalian example, just like it does not make sense to ask whether the shape of a figure is separate from the figure, when it comes to our experiences, the mind and body are part of the holistic complex of experiencing. They are like two sides of the same coin.

Therefore, under the principle of actuality, the will does not belong to one side or the other but rather is part of the totality of the processes. Since the principle of actuality only deals with what is known to us (i.e., the known relationships), the concept of will (just like any other psychological term) becomes an abstraction of the holistic (ganzheitlicher) complex. The term will is utilized to indicate the direction of psychological development as the person acts upon the environment.

There are several ways in how the will manifests itself. According to Wundt (1922, p. 252), in the condition characterized by unique feelings (typically involving the qualities of strain and excitement) that capture mental content (psychischen Inhalt), we speak of attention (Aufmerksamkeit). This process, whereby mental content is brought to a clearer comprehension, involves apperception (Apperzeption) and can have several avenues depending on the situation. For example, if an environmental stimulus (such as a loud sound) unexpectedly grabs our attention, we speak of passive apperception. In contrast, if we are prepared and selectively focus on a given stimulus (such as our flower growing in the garden), then we speak of active apperception. Both passive and active apperceptions are processes of the will, the former being an unprepared act where a single impression provides the deciding motive, and the latter being a prepared act stemming from the willful actions that can have a number of motives.

It is these actions through will that provide the connecting properties of our consciousness, and together with the relatively stable content comprise a feeling complex. Thus, apperceptions, together with their connected feelings, become the main carrier of self-consciousness. We are able to look at our own body (e.g., its physical aspects) as a differentiated object from other things and thereby investigate its attributes. Recognizing the body as “mine” is the result of an apperceptive process leading to the concept of the “I” (das ich). This process related to self-consciousness is the end result of a developmental process (ending in “I”), and not the starting point (where we start with the assumption of an “I” doing or even causing something).

Similarly, terms like “personality”, “intelligence”, or “interest” are auxiliary terms that do not have causal inferences. Attributing causation to such labels would, according to Wundt, amount to a form of “vulgar-psychology” (Vulgärpsychologie). Instead, it is the willful processes that lead to complexes which may then be given certain labels. The will directs our attention to the processes that comprise our motives and affects. It is the affects in particular that often provide the unitary character of the totality of experiencing and as such allow this experiencing to be examined in terms of content or quality.

Because of the centrality of will in all of this, Wundt chose the term “voluntarism” to describe the core ingredient of his school that would later be referred to as the “First Leipzig School of Psychology.” The term “voluntarism” was not chosen to indicate a belief in a free will (far from that!) but rather because it highlights an active, goal-oriented (or directional) consciousness and differentiated Wundt’s approach with other approaches that took feelings and processes of the will to be nothing other than the sensations of our muscles or organs.

From the First to the Second Leipzig School of Psychology

There are two facets of Wundt’s general orientation (as he saw things toward the end of his life) that are all too often overlooked: development and holism. At first, this may be a surprise to those who have only thought of Wundt in terms of his physiological psychology and of course to those people who still incorrectly assumed that Wundt was taking a structuralist approach to gain access to the mental elements of consciousness. Yet, if we re-examine his views as expressed at the end of his long career, we find Wundt (1922) explaining that his studied “elements” are merely abstractions for the purposes of studying the unitary whole. Wundt’s holistic orientation probably becomes most clearly articulated through his principle of creative synthesis (schöpferische Synthese). This principle had been part of Wundt’s program from early on and declares that out of all the studied elements arise something new, something creative, something that is different and not contained in its parts themselves (Diriwächter 2008). As Wundt (1894, p. 112) put it:

Under the principle of creative synthesis I understand the fact that psychical elements, through their causally related interactions (Wechselwirkungen) as well as the resulting consequences thereof, create connections which may be psychologically explained through their components, but at the same time those connections contain new characteristics which are not contained in the elements.

This definition of creative synthesis is important for several reasons. For one, it highlights the novel character contained in a totality (the whole or Ganzheit) that is not found on the elementary level. That is, to see the creative novelty resulting from a synthesis, one must emphasize the resulting totality and its “over-summative” character. Furthermore, it implicitly highlights a developmental process needed for a synthesis to occur. Using the traditional methods of summing up a series of associations that result in an aggregate of elements as the traditional associationist approach to psychology entails would never be able to account for the qualitative gap between the summing up of elements and the novel, creative character of the whole (Diriwächter 2009a). Instead, Wundt’s idea comes closer akin to a genetic process of blending or melting, a concept he even applies to areas of Völkerpsychologie where, among other things, he tries to examine the developmental progression of human mentality (the true psychogenesis, see Diriwächter 2012). Former student and associate of Wilhelm Wundt and one of the co-founders of the second Leipzig School of Psychology, Hans Volkelt (1886–1964), saw Wundt’s notion of melting (as opposed to mere summation or aggregation) of elements as one of Wundt’s most fruitful ideas. In that regard, Volkelt (1962a, p. 18) stated, “…it is in this idea of melting where associationist psychology dies, and Ganzheitspsychologie is born…”.

It is here where we now enter the domain of Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie (Genetische Ganzheitspsychologie) or developmental holistic psychology of the second Leipzig School of Psychology. While Wundt’s focus emphasized the genetic priority of the analytically derived elementary processes for mental experiences, the Ganzheitspsychologie tradition would highlight holistic primitive complexes that develop into new Ganzheiten (wholes). Volkelt (1922, p. 88) points out that synthesis had two meanings for Wundt: First, synthesis is the reversal of psychological analysis. It is the task in which psychologists take the abstracted products of their analysis and place them together again.

The second meaning for synthesis was that it is a real genetic process of “melting” together originally unrelated elements. Wundt (1894, p. 113) provided the following example to make this more clear. When looking at our sensory perceptions, every conscious perception (Wahrnehmung) can be divided (zerlegt) into elementary sensations. However, our perception is never just the sum of these sensations, i.e., through the connections of the sensations something novel emerges – something with unique characteristics that were not evident in the sensations alone. For example, we create spatial forms (räumliche Gestalten) through numerous light impressions (Lichteindrücken). No matter how nativistic our philosophical orientation may be, this conscious perception is something creative as opposed to the sum of all the light shades or impressions, which would be the substratum of the perceptive act. Thus, while we can abstract elements from a phenomenon, attempting to put these elements together again will not result in the original phenomenon (Diriwächter 2009a).

This is where the all-important, fundamental notion of the Ganzheitspsychologie doctrine presents itself. It has become the rallying cry for all schools of Ganzheitspsychologie (and Gestalt psychology)—the whole is more (or different) than the sum of its parts. This principle, largely called out in response to the associationist camps in psychology, needs to be understood from the perspective of the experiencing organism. As the Ganzheitspsychologist, Walter Ehrenstein (1934, p. 12) further explains:

Certain relationships of independently variable composition of consciousness form (as an ensemble) qualities, that are different from the sum of qualities that the variables independently would claim for themselves. These qualities are called complex qualities (Komplexqualitäten).

It is here where the first and the second Leipzig School of Psychology part ways. Wundt was never willing to completely abandon the concept of psychic elements, even though he vehemently rejected any attempt to therefore classify his approach as one of atomism. Wundt (1908) explains that the psychic elements are thought of to determine the elementary psychological processes, not to build up a metaphysical substance (soul or mind) that is comprised out of said elements. In the psychological analysis of consciousness, the psychic elements are nothing other than immediate, no longer reducible components of the experienced reality (Wundt 1908, p. 418). In this regard, Wundt further elaborates:

These final components, which based on the conditions of their occurrences can no longer be further dismantled, are called psychical elements (psychische Elemente). Based on the mentioned conditions of their separation out of the complexes of psychical processes it is therefore clear that they are on the one hand pure, empirical elements, and on the other hand they are in their isolated and unchanging nature, that has come about due to the fixed nature of assigned terminology, something that does not exist in reality; partially because they are always connected with other elements, and partially because they are continuously taking part in the flow of psychical happenings. Thus, psychical elements are pure products of terminological abstractions that, due to their isolated and persistent state which has been created out of the purposes for the investigation of their fundamental properties, do not possess any reality.

(Wundt 1908, pp. 400-401)

Yet, for what would become the founders of the Leipzig Ganzheitspsychologie school of thought, this admission that psychical elements on their own do not possess any reality outside of the psychological analysis did not go far enough (Volkelt 1963). Already back in 1915, Felix Krueger rejected Wundt’s dealings with psychic elements, citing among other reasons that Wundt neglected to see that our perceptions and imaginations flow from the disposition of feeling states, coined “Gemüt.Footnote 2” The concept of Gemüt cannot be found in psychic elements, or in Wundt’s tridimensional theory of feelings,Footnote 3 as it represents a holistic complex.

Wundt himself at the end of his career saw the need to take on a more explicit holistic outlook (Volkelt 1962b, 1963). He therefore personally recommended that his former student and associate, Felix Krueger (1874–1948), takes over the leadership position at the Leipzig School of Psychology. And so it came that when Wilhelm Wundt retired after the summer semester in 1917, his successor, Felix Krueger, began to transform the Leipzig School of Psychology’s core orientation to one of developmental holism, thereby launching what became known as the second Leipzig School of Psychology (Diriwächter 2008).

In some sense, the developmental holistic core orientation of the second Leipzig School of Psychology was, in the eyes of the Genetic Ganzheitspsychologists, the logical evolution (by transformation) of Wundt’s program (Volkelt 1962b, 1963). What needed to be implemented was a departure from the last remnants of elementaristic theoretical conceptions by focusing on what mattered: totalities and how they transform.

Psychic (seelische) development does not proceed from scattered/unrelated elements to a synthetic whole, rather it proceeds from one whole to another. Psychical synthesis (as evident in Wundt’s creative synthesis) is never created entirely new, rather it merely represents transformed relationships (Volkelt 1922). Thus, what became known as Wundt’s successors of the second Leipzig School of Psychology—Felix Krueger, Hans Volkelt, Friedrich Sander, Albert Wellek, and others—were united in the belief that Wundt’s principle of creative synthesis needed to be replaced by the principle of creative synthesis transformation: it is not originally unrelated elements that connect to form a totality which is more (or different) from the sum of its parts but rather how primitive totalities transform into more developed totalities (or how old syntheses transform into new ones). Thus, the genetic elemental synthesis (the melting of unrelated elements) was replaced with genetic totality transformation in which each higher totality is in relationship to the totalities out of which it emerged. This emergence represents a creative novelty. The totality, which includes the creative novel character, would be referred to as complex quality (Komplexqualität). This term was deliberately chosen by Felix Krueger to keep the definition broad (Volkelt 1963, p. 23). That is, without any specific indication about the type of totality, but yet with emphasis that the totality is not a result of a synthetic temporal process leading to connections of elements, rather that the selective perception of the totality is already a given thing that include specific qualities. Therefore, the term complex quality acknowledges that there are sub-totalities (e.g., the quality of thinking while acting), which can be highlighted, within a given holistic complex. The term holistic quality (or Ganzqualität) pays exclusive emphasis on the diffuse nature of a whole, that is, the overarching quality of a totality without highlighting any sub-totalities. On the other hand, terms like gestalt quality (Gestaltqualität) would then be used to specify totalities of a more concrete nature.

The Second Leipzig School of Psychology: Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie

It would be incorrect to claim that the second Leipzig School of Psychology naturally and gradually evolved from the first Leipzig School of Psychology. Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie is founded upon a number of predecessors vital to its unique approach. Important theorists, such as Johannes Nikolaus Tetens (1736–1807), William James (1842–1910), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1910), as well as the legacies of individuals like Ernst Mach (1838–1916), Hans Driesch (1867–1941), Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932), Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), and Hans Cornelius (1863–1947), all provided important contributions to the development of the core fabric that would bind the Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie doctrine. It is not the place here to provide a detailed account on how these various contributions led to the founding of Genetic Ganzheitspychologie.Footnote 4 Instead, the aim here is to outline the general doctrine of Genetic Ganzheitspychologie in order to show what became of Wilhelm Wundt’s school at Leipzig after his departure.

Broadly speaking, there are a few basic assumptions of Ganzheits ideology. First and foremost, in living nature, the whole has a genetic and functional primacy toward its parts. Without regard to the whole, parts are artificial and meaningless. That is, they are sterile and void of life. While living matter and organisms in particular are prototypes of holistic happenings and organization, the primacy of the whole reaches far beyond the individual. That is, the primacy of the whole does not only apply to the experienced subject and for the living individual but also for social processes and configurations, whereby social configurations are to be seen as communities (Gemeinschaften) and are to be differentiated from pure social aggregates (see Dürkheim-Montmartin 1934 for a Ganzheits overview of Gemeinschaft).

Since individual and social life and experiences do not purely follow mechanical laws, it is necessary to take an organic world view (organische Weltanschauung) that follows a thought pattern along the lines of biological instead of technical or physical categories. Thinking in terms of Pepper’s (1942) four world-hypotheses, the organicist world hypothesis to a large degree is best suited to be illustrative of the core axioms through which Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie is anchored, namely, that an understanding of the world relies on discovering how it functions as a unified whole and how its parts are integrated into the functioning of the whole, whereby the focus is placed largely on the underlying structure and the developmental processes leading to a series of transformations.

The Ganzheitspsychologie doctrine’s central emphasis on an underlying whole cannot be understated. But what is the whole? Krueger (1926/1953a, p. 92) criticized any attempt to define the whole as that of which one cannot take away a part without the whole losing its essence/entity (Wesen) on the grounds that such a view of the whole not only pertains to an ideal but further leads to a finite, quantifiable perspective. Such a perspective could be seen as more in line with Pepper’s (1942) mechanistic world hypothesis. Instead, preference is given to define the whole through the lack of obvious parts, that is, through the non-reducibility of the whole. In other words, instead of focusing on assimilation (or dissimilation), it is better to take on a genetic perspective and define the whole in terms of the processes (or development, Entwicklung) of a particular configuration (Gliederung). Following in the footsteps of Wundt, yet at the same time beginning to plow a new path, the most relevant aspect for Ganzheitspsychologie is the human experience and the functional and structural (Struckturgefüge) whole, whereby it needs to be stressed that the former has to be clearly distinguished from the latter two which are mediated and removed from the immediate experience (Diriwächter 2008). As a reminder, the view is held that the whole of the psyche is not based on logical correlations of isolated or actual “parts” that make up the totality, i.e., “parts” are not independent of one another and do not merely relate to each other, rather they are interwoven into each other. As a result, it is not uncommon to observe experiences that lack concrete configurations and appear to be unstructured. Feeling states in particular are examples of this. Therefore, we can take a given (such as a feeling) and qualify it as a whole and furthermore differentiate it from what does not seem to belong to that given, thereby examining it based on immediate similarities that exist. In the case of feeling states, it needs to be remembered that each whole is nested within a greater whole, thereby making the former a sub-totality of the later. In the end, the type of totality being studied is determined by the researcher.

The axiomatic centrality and overall importance of the whole represent the first of four central tenets or principles advocated by the second Leipzig School of Psychology (Wellek 1950). This tenet is followed by the genetic orientation of the said school, namely that humans and their experiences constantly transform and develop. Thus, the second tenet—that of development—stresses the axiom that humans never stay the same. To use William James’ (1893, p. 154) words, “No state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before.” Krueger (1915, pp. 166-171) recommended that three approaches be always incorporated while implementing the tenet of development; that is, the study of the transformation of synthesis—or development of totalities:

  1. 1.

    There needs to be a consistent questioning of the developmental changes that occur.

  2. 2.

    There needs to be a rigorous examination of how these changes are dynamically linked and integrated in a uniform whole with qualitatively different, interactive components.

  3. 3.

    The researcher needs to be aware of the overarching “drivenness” of the totality into a certain direction, whose changes are understood genetically and whose terminology is based on functional conditions that lead to the laws of occurrences (especially structural laws pertaining to the structure of the totality).

The third tenet—structure—of Ganzheitspsychologie highlights the structural nature of the whole. As Krueger (1924/1953b, p. 135) points out, structure consist of lasting joints/linkages, hierarchical layers, and holistically related forces which are lawfully dependent on a totality and which give that totality its frame. The totality of a person entails both the structured buildup and developmental potential of his/her biology as well as what we typically understand as consciousness or the human psyche. In other words, both the objective and subjective sides are linked together into a dispositional whole (hence, the organic approach mentioned above) that is a uniform or undivided complex (einheitlicher Komplex) of constant conditions that underly all human expressions. Nevertheless, we can still look at partial structures (Teilstrukturen), such as perceptions, memory, or productive thought since they are dispositional states of affairs which display in various degrees their inner layers and linkages. However, we may not forget their dependence on an embeddedness into a greater, overarching whole, through which these partial structures come to fruition. Because of the primary tenet of holism, any partiality desired for investigation needs to constitute a totality in itself. As such, these partialities are sub-wholes or sub-totalities (Unterganzes). Wellek (1950, p. 12) provides some very broad examples of this. We can examine a particular organism (e.g., for humans in terms of the unity of mind and body), which is embedded in a community, which in turn is embedded in a civilization, which is embedded in nature. Thus, structure is not to be equated with experiences but rather structure represents the conditions in which experiences emerge. Therefore, structural laws are also developmental laws and become the precondition for any form of analysis. Furthermore, development proceeds on several levels simultaneously (e.g., phylogenetic development, ontogenetic development, or microgenetic development). The dynamic whole with all its processes is the unit of measurement. This totality is not just additive (i.e., an amorphous unit). It is a synthetically living form, a structure that must be understood in terms of its dynamic components since any structure already implies that it has a history and has undergone development (Diriwächter 2013). In order to look at any organization of such kind, Krueger (1926/1953a) suggested that we must first thoroughly describe (in their entirety) the given qualities and, if available, include the greater complexities (Hauptkomplexe) to which our investigative focus belongs.

“In the beginning was the complex quality.” This fundamental conviction by the members of the second Leipzig School of Psychology stresses that the person, as an emotional creature, experiences through the structural qualities of his/her world (Wellek 1950, p. 14). Not logos, but feeling; not the concrete, but the diffuse; not the person, but the world (environment) takes precedence. The holistic complex is primarily experienced through feelings and affects, which constitute the fourth major tenet of Ganzheitspsychologie.

Following the dictates of this fourth major tenet, feelings are typically always present and therefore are not to be treated as simple secondary accessories. In this sense, feelings are at the center of our experiences and in essence are the experiential qualities of a totality. As such, feelings help define our experiences. It is therefore vital that any experience be described in full detail in order to maintain the qualitative richness (Qualitätenreichtum) of said event. Krueger’s (1928/1953c, p. 212) law of holistic experience states that any psychical partial function that is highlighted by the researcher necessarily loosens the total functionality of our disposition, thereby endangering the unity of it. Thus, the more completely we describe a personal experience, the more vivid and stronger we find the qualities of emotionality in its inventory. On the other hand, the less complete our descriptions about personal experiences are, the more intellectualized the qualities become (Volkelt, 1934/1962b, p. 51).

For Wundt, the centrality of feelings had ultimately become reduced to a three-dimensional model that pointed toward the direction of the qualities of an experience: pleasant-unpleasant, strain-relaxation, and excitement-calm (see Fig. 1). Feelings of seriousness or jolliness, as they may appear when hearing deep or high-pitched tones, or as they emerge from dark or light colors, are perceived as unique qualities which may lie on the dimension of pleasantness/unpleasantness, as well as on the excitement/calm dimension (Wundt 1922, p. 100). As I already mentioned elsewhere (Diriwächter 2008), Wundt emphasized that we must remember that these feeling dimensions are not singular qualities. Instead, they are pointing in the direction of an indeterminable amount of simple qualities. For example, the unpleasant feeling of seriousness is not only different from when we experience pain (such as when we burn ourselves while cooking something for dinner) rather the condition of seriousness itself differs in qualities depending on the event in which that feeling takes place.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Wundt’s (1922) three-dimensional model of Feelings

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For the Ganzheitspsychologists, feelings were much more all-encompassing and possessed qualities that went far beyond the simple directions suggested by Wundt’s model. In fact, Krueger’s (1928/1953c, p. 211) first law of feelings states: “Any change in a holistic (ganzheitlicher) complex will be more readily noticed than changes in its parts.” The German, as well as English language, possesses terms that allude to a qualitative richness of emotionality not included by Wundt’s reasoning. For example, terms like “depth” or “heartiness” point toward a direction that reaches beyond Wundt’s model (see Reuning (1941) for a full discussion on emotional depth and intensity reflected in German and English words). We can talk about greater (or lesser) depth when looking at art, thoughts, and of course feelings. Krueger (1918/1953d) had long ago advocated for science to accept terminology that would address the differences of types/kinds of feelings (Artverschiedenheit der Gefühle), such as feelings along dimensions of depth. Deep feelings, such as those experienced during a religious ceremony or when loving someone, are not one-dimensional (e.g., pleasantness-unpleasantness), rather they encompass the total experience. Depth experiences point toward a general direction, namely that of our values. The more faithful we are toward our value system, the deeper we feel. As I already further pointed out elsewhere (Diriwächter 2009b), shallow feelings are uniform directional, whereas deep feelings may be multidirectional: “Good news comforts on a much deeper level, when at the same time a serious fear is alive within the totality of our experience” (Krueger, 1918/1953d, p. 191).

Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie Post Leipzig

The four central tenets would guide the Ganzheitspsychologists’ efforts in subsequent years as foundational pillars of orientation. Be it in the field of general developmental psychology (see Thomae 1958), art (see Sander 1962), pedagogy (see Volkelt 1962c), or perceptual processes (e.g., Wohlfahrt 1932), the second Leipzig School of Psychology flourished until the collapse of Germany due to World War II. Although there were notable branches active after World War II—such as Heinz Werner’s (1890–1964) program at Clark University in Massachusetts (see Valsiner 2005)—with the death of the last original Genetic Ganzheitspsychologists in the early 1970s, the discipline finally went into full hibernation during which it all but became forgotten and was replaced by other currents in psychology.

Yet, after the renewed attention given to Wilhelm Wundt, that attention gradually also shifted to his successors. As the light of inquiry began to shine on the old dormant Leipzig school from a century ago, a gradual awakening of its developmental holistic traditions began to occur. Most notably, the field of cultural psychology under the leadership of Jaan Valsiner has gradually embraced the Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie basic tenets. Modern cultural psychology (not to be confused with cross-cultural psychology!) is of course a vast field built upon many intellectual traditions that were never part of the second Leipzig School of Psychology. Nevertheless, the developmental systemic approach of cultural psychology as advocated by Valsiner (e.g., see Valsiner 2000) and his many collaborators, which sees culture not as a “thing” to which people belong but rather a dynamic system of organized psychological functions through which humans create meaning via semiotic mediation, has buried deep within it the broad general outlook of the Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie doctrine as the beating heart. It is these efforts by cultural psychologists who have inadvertently given a new breath of life to Ganzheitspsychologie, so that it may shed the dust it had gathered over the decades and with renewed rigor and newly infused ideas tackle the new problems presented by what the twenty-first century has brought humanity.

Final Thoughts

While this centennial remembrance of Wilhelm Wundt, and the subsequent efforts by his successors, was by no means comprehensive, I do hope to have at least put to rest any lingering thoughts of Wundt’s school being one of structuralism through which efforts were made to construct a mind that consists of an aggregate sum of elementary building blocks. My hope extends to there not being another Wundt centennial at which point US introductory textbooks are still listing Wundt next to Titchener as having led schools of structuralism in psychology. Instead, we need to highlight Wundt’s approach as he understood things toward the end of his career, and that was process oriented. As Wundt (1922, p. 26) once put it, “The content of psychology is formed exclusively through processes, not lasting objects.” While Wundt was not willing or able to completely shed an elementaristic outlook, his perspective was certainly more geared toward developmental holism than previously acknowledged. It therefore only made sense that his successors—the next generation of psychologists—would take the logical next step in transforming the Leipzig School of Psychology into one that took developmental holism as a central premise for investigation.

While much progress was made in constructing a general theory of psychology, the ideas and accomplishments by that next generation of psychologists remain far from perfect. As that second generation of Leipzig psychologists has disappeared from the active participants toward the advancement of psychology, it now becomes necessary that a new generation of psychologists fill the ranks left vacant. It is my assertion that this is now starting to happen in several arenas, most notably in the field of twenty-first century cultural psychology as advocated by Jaan Valsiner and many of his collaborators. Their general approach is developmental and holistic in orientation and mirrors the same kind of enthusiasm seen in the hay days of the second Leipzig School of Psychology. But more importantly, the twenty-first century cultural psychology has long surpassed the original theoretical credo associated with Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie by incorporating many new ideas so that we are actually speaking of a cultural, Genetic Ganzheitspsychologie V2.0. It now remains to be seen what new discoveries await. So, let us raise our glasses to the next 100 years in our field: may Wilhelm Wundt look down upon us with a smile and sense of pride.