Abstract
Weary of costly on-the-ground military interventions, Western nations have increasingly turned to “Remote Warfare” to address the continued threat of terrorism. Despite the centrality of drone strikes to the practice of Remote Warfare, we still know relatively little about their effectiveness as instruments of coercion. This article offers a conceptual framework for assessing their coercive efficacy in counterterrorism. We argue that remote control drones are fundamentally different from traditional airpower, owing to changes in persistence, lethality, and relative risk. Critically, these technological characteristics produce weaker coercive effects than often assumed. While persistent surveillance combined with lethal, low-risk strikes renders armed drones highly effective at altering the cost–benefit calculations of terrorists, these same technological attributes cause them to be less effective at clear communication, credibility, and assurance—other key factors in coercion success. Overall, drone strikes are poor instruments of coercion in counterterrorism, underscoring some potential limitations of Remote Warfare.
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The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful feedback from Brig Gen Joseph "Knuckles" Campo, Col Max Bremer, Jim Forsyth, Michael Fowler, Tyrone Groh James Rogers, the anonymous reviewers of this journal, and participants of panels on this topic at the International Studies Association (ISA) and the Yale workshop on “Emerging Trends and Issues in Modern Western Warfare” workshop.
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Grieco, K.A., Hutto, J.W. Can drones coerce? The effects of remote aerial coercion in counterterrorism. Int Polit 60, 919–943 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00320-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00320-5