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Repeated games simulating exchange auction and recursive sequences

  • Systems Analysis and Operations Research
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Abstract

A simplified model of multistage bidding between two differently informed agents (insider and uninformed participant) is described using repeated games with asymmetric information. The solutions for these games are obtained in the explicit form for the case of three possible bids. The game value (the maximal guaranteed insider’s payoff) and the optimal players’ strategies are expressed using a second-order recursive sequence.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. St. Petersburg Economical-Mathematical Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, ul. Chaikovskogo 1, St. Petersburg, 191187, Russia

    V. L. Kreps

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  1. V. L. Kreps
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Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.L. Kreps, 2009, published in Izvestiya Akademii Nauk. Teoriya i Sistemy Upravleniya, 2009, No. 4, pp. 109–120.

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Kreps, V.L. Repeated games simulating exchange auction and recursive sequences. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. Int. 48, 604–615 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230709040145

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230709040145

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