From the Anglo-Russian Entente to the Balkan Wars

Abstract

It might have seemed a source of hope and encouragement when delegates assembled for the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 that the European powers should have avoided war among themselves for no less than 36 years. The main participants, however, were interested at best in marginal additions to such constraints on war as already existed. Even the visiting Americans were anxious to give no impression of weakness. The British feared German plots to reverse their ententes with France and Russia, while the Austrians believed that Britain was bent on causing Germany the maximum of embarrassment. The Germans objected to anything that threatened their naval or military freedom of action. As for the moves which led to the Declaration of London (1909) on neutral rights and contraband, key British policy-makers saw the ‘agreements … as mere words to be interpreted in the light of circumstances if Britain found herself a belligerent’.¹ This was confirmed in the first year of the war when such restraint as accompanied the British blockade was inspired by the need to avoid giving offence to the Americans. The Germans were taken aback by the speed with which the British broke the Hague Convention on private property.

‘… if we once allow Germany to defeat France, our expeditionary force would be valueless and the duration of our naval predominance could be measured in years.’ (British General Staff memorandum, 13 August 1911)