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Rott, H. (2009). Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. In: Huber, F., Schmidt-Petri, C. (eds) Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library, vol 342. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_12
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