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The Meseberg Initiative 2010: Germany as a Deal-Maker

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Germany’s Role in European Russia Policy

Part of the book series: New Perspectives in German Political Studies ((NPG))

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Abstract

The Meseberg initiative was the most ambitious German policy initiative in the area of security policy with Russia: Germany concluded a bilateral memorandum on behalf of the EU, yet without the EU’s formal endorsement, encouraged by the context of a seemingly reform-minded President Medvedev and a pro-European government in Moldova. This demonstrated Germany’s confidence that it could grasp a win-win opportunity: Solving a conflict in the neighbourhood and at the same time proving that Russia can be a constructive actor in the neighbourhood. To that end, Germany applied a more assertive approach through issue linkage to incentivise the EU and Russia to make progress in relations. However, the Meseberg initiative became an example of only minor German influence on EU policy: Neither has the initiative been implemented by the EU, nor was the conflict in Transnistria solved with Russia’s support. The Meseberg initiative demonstrated the limits of Germany’s approach: Germany was criticised for its bilateral “deal-making” with Russia and member states were reluctant to take ownership. Instead of advancing the EU-Russia relationship, the initiative contributed to frustration on both sides.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Erich Reiter (ed.), Problemlage und Lösungsansätze im Transnistrienkonflikt, Schriftenreihe zur internationalen Politik, 5 (Vienna, Cologne, Weimar: Böhlau, 2012).

  2. 2.

    Here and in the following, the Romanian spelling is used, as in the Meseberg agreement itself.

  3. 3.

    Dmitry Medvedev, The Draft of the European Security Treaty, 29 November (2009) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152 [accessed 12 March 2019].

  4. 4.

    Interview with German official in Berlin, 01.08.2016. Cf. also Manfred Huterer, The Russia Factor in Transatlantic Relations and New Opportunities for U.S.-EU-Russia Cooperation, Working Paper, The Brookings Institution 4 (Washington, DC, 2010) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_us_eu_russia_huterer.pdf [accessed 14 April 2019].

  5. 5.

    Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, Memorandum (Meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Medvedev, 4–5 June 2010) (Meseberg, 2010) https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/656928/389532/da09e7a21880fb55dfd2d868996295ce/2010-06-05-meseberg-memorandum-data.pdf [accessed 27 September 2017];

    For German version, see: Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, Memorandum (Treffen zwischen Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und Präsident Dmitri Medwedew, 4. und 5. Juni) (Meseberg, 2010) https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/656928/452948/9e765ba1c0f63f45787cd6eb06a28968/2010-06-07-meseberg-memorandum-deutsch-data.pdf [accessed 12 March 2019];

    For Russian version, see: Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, Меморандум по итогам встречи Президента России Д.Медведева и Федерального канцлера Германии А.Меркель, 4–5 июня (Meseberg, 2010) http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/575 [accessed 13 April 2019].

  6. 6.

    Manfred Grund, Hans M. Sieg and Kristin Wesemann, ‘Transnistria and the Future Security Architecture in Europe: KAS International Reports (2011)’ pp. 60–90 (p. 60).

  7. 7.

    Cf. Miskimmon, Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, 2007; Harnisch and Wolf, Germany’s Changing, 2009.

  8. 8.

    Vladimir Socor, Meseberg Process: Germany Testing EU-Russia Security Cooperation Potential, Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation 191 (2010) https://jamestown.org/program/meseberg-process-germany-testing-eu-russia-security-cooperation-potential/ [accessed 27 September 2017].

  9. 9.

    Interview with former Moldovan official and expert, 06.12.2016.

  10. 10.

    Interview with German diplomat in Warsaw, 20.05.2016.

  11. 11.

    Philip Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad: Russia, Germany, and Crossed Communications, Carnegie Europe (2013) http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/08/21/negotiation-gone-bad-russia-germany-and-crossed-communications-pub-52712 [accessed 27 September 2017].

  12. 12.

    Interview with Moldovan expert in Berlin, 26.05.2016.

  13. 13.

    Interview with European Commission official in Brussels, 30.05.2016.

  14. 14.

    Meister, New Start, 2011, p. 12.

  15. 15.

    Translations by the author. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, “Wir Europäer müssen mit einer Stimme sprechen”: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4. Februar (2009) http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sicherheitskonferenz-merkel-und-sarkozy-wir-europaeer-muessen-mit-einer-stimme-sprechen-1.473581 [accessed 28 September 2017].

  16. 16.

    Merkel and Sarkozy, Wir Europäer, 2009.

  17. 17.

    Medvedev, Draft Treaty, 2009; Cf. also Bobo Lo, Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture, Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform (2009) https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pbrief_medvedev_july09-741.pdf [accessed 12 March 2019]; Layton, ‘Reframing European Security’, 2013; Marcel de Haas, ‘Medvedev’s Alternative European Security Architecture’, Security and Human Rights, 21.1 (2010), 45–48.

  18. 18.

    Medvedev, Speech at Meeting, 2008.

  19. 19.

    Interview with German official, 01.08.2016.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Restoring Trust: The Corfu Process, 1 December (2010) http://www.osce.org/mc/87193 [accessed 13 April 2019]; Werner Hoyer, ‘A German View on the OSCE Corfu Process: An Opportunity to Strengthen Cooperative Security in Europe’, Security and Human Rights, 21.2 (2010), 114–18.

  21. 21.

    Merkel and Sarkozy, Wir Europäer, 2009.

  22. 22.

    Cf. Wolfgang Zellner (ed.), Die Zukunft konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa = The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, 194, 1st edn (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); Wolfgang Richter, Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control, Deep Cuts Working Paper 11 (Hamburg, 2017) http://deepcuts.org/images/PDF/DeepCuts_WP11_Richter.pdf [accessed 14 April 2019].

  23. 23.

    Interview with French diplomat in Paris, 25.11.2016.

  24. 24.

    Anneli U. Gabanyi, ‘Der Konflikt in Transnistrien im Kontext der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik’, Strategie und Sicherheit, 2012.1 (2012), 357–68 https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/sus.2012.2012.issue-1/sus.2012.2012.1.357/sus.2012.2012.1.357.pdf (p. 358).

  25. 25.

    Romania has been a strong supporter of Moldova’s European integration and has founded the group of friends of Moldova within the EU in 2010. Cf. Octavian Milevschi, ‘Romania: From Brotherly Affection with Moldova to Disillusionment and Pragmatism’, in Moldova: Arena of International Influences, ed. by Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 159–182.

  26. 26.

    The format includes representatives of the conflict parties, mediators and observers: Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the US.

  27. 27.

    For an overview of the EU’s engagement in conflict resolution efforts in Transnistria, cf.: Popescu, EU Foreign Policy, 2011, pp. 38–65; Florian Küchler, The Role of the European Union in Moldova ‘s Transnistria Conflict, Soviet and post-Soviet politics and society, 78 (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2008). For an overview of the conflict’s origins and the role of the OSCE, cf.:Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, Protracted Conflicts in the OSCE Area: Innovative Approaches for Co-Operation in the Conflict Zones, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (Hamburg, 2016) http://osce-network.net/file-OSCE-Network/documents/Protracted_Conflicts_OSCE_WEB.pdf [accessed 14 April 2019]; Andrew Williams, ‘Conflict Resolution after the Cold War: The Case of Moldova’, Review of International Studies, 25.1 (1999), 71–86 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/conflict-resolution-after-the-cold-war-the-case-of-moldova/58308F770325D67DFBF05AA2A1FD90BE#fndtn-information; Claus Neukirch, ‘From Confidence Building to Conflict Settlement in Moldova?’, in OSCE Yearbook 2011: Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ed. by Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), 1st edn (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), pp. 137–50 (p. 144); William H. Hill, ‘The OSCE and the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict: Lessons in Mediation and Conflict Management’, Security and Human Rights, 24.3–4 (2014), 287–97; Stefan Wolff, The OSCE in Moldova: from confidence building to conflict settlement? (2018) https://events.uta.fi/experiencesandopportunities2018/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/11/Wolff_The-OSCE-in-Moldova-From-confidence-building-to-conflict-settlement.pdf [accessed 14 April 2019].

  28. 28.

    Cf. Popescu, EU Foreign Policy, 2011, pp. 66–94.

  29. 29.

    Gabanyi, ‘Konflikt in Transnistrien’, 2012, 359f.

  30. 30.

    Cf. Dareg A. Zabarah, ‘Germany: Increased Attention towards Moldova?’, in Moldova, ed. by Kosienkowski and Schreiber, pp. 87–104.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Stefan Wolff, ‘A Resolvable Frozen Conflict?: Designing a Settlement for Transnistria’, Nationalities Papers, 39.6 (2011), 863–70.

  32. 32.

    Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad, 2013.

  33. 33.

    Interview with German diplomat in Berlin, 09.08.2016.

  34. 34.

    Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad, 2013.

  35. 35.

    Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad, 2013 takes this quote from the following Wikileaks source: WikiLeaks, National Security Advisor Heusgen on Afghanistan, Middle East, Iran, Detainees, Russia, Nukes and Balkans, 12 November (2012) https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BERLIN1433_a.html [accessed 13 March 2019].

  36. 36.

    Interview with German official in Berlin, 15.07.2016.

  37. 37.

    Catherine Ashton, A 77/10: Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Moldova /Transnistria , 17 May (Brussels, 2010) https://euronest.blogspot.de/2010/05/statement-by-high-representative_18.html [accessed 28 September 2017].

  38. 38.

    Cf. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Ukraine Supports the Russian Position on Transnistria , Analyses (2010) https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-05-19/ukraine-supports-russian-position-transnistria [accessed 28 September 2017].

  39. 39.

    Interview with former European diplomat, 28.12.2016.

  40. 40.

    Interview with former Moldovan official and expert, 06.12.2016.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.

  42. 42.

    Translations by the author. Angela Merkel and Vladimir Filat, Pressestatement Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und der Ministerpräsident der Republik Moldau, Vladimir Filat, 12. Mai (Berlin, 2010) https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2010/05/2010-05-12-filat-merkel.html [accessed 28 September 2017].

  43. 43.

    Translations by the author. Vlad Filat and Lavinia Pitu, ‘“Deutschland gehört zu unseren Freunden”: Interview mit Vlad Filat’, Deutsche Welle, 14 May 2010.

  44. 44.

    Grund, Sieg and Wesemann, ‘Transnistria’, p. 60.

  45. 45.

    Interview with German diplomat in Berlin, 15.07.2016.

  46. 46.

    Interview with German diplomat in Berlin, 09.08.2016.

  47. 47.

    The initial Russian proposal for conflict resolution, the Kozak memorandum, has been rejected in 2003 after intervention of the EU and the US, and led to a worsening of the relationship between the EU and Russia in this policy area. Cf. William H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova -Transdniestria Conflict (Washington, DC, Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

  48. 48.

    Cf. Andrew Rettman, ‘Germany and Russia Call for New EU Security Committee’, EUobserver, 7 June 2010.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Stefan Kornelius, ‘Der Russland-Test’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 July 2010.

  50. 50.

    Merkel and Medvedev, Memorandum eng., 2010.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Interview with German official in Berlin, 15.07.2016. Cf. Andrey Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy toward Transnistria: Between Multilateralism and Marginalization’, Problems of Post-Communism, 59.3 (2012), 53–62 [accessed 29 October 2017] (p. 57).

  53. 53.

    Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad, 2013.

  54. 54.

    Cf. Socor, Meseberg Process, 2010.

  55. 55.

    For German transcript, see Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und dem Präsidenten der Russischen Föderation, Dmitri Medwedew, 5. Juni (Meseberg, 2010) https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/dokumente/pressestatements-von-bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel-und-dem-praesidenten-der-russischen-foederation-dmitri-medwedew-am-5-juni-2010-in-meseberg-846802 [accessed 13 April 2019]; For Russian transcript, see: Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, Совместная пресс-конференция с Федеральным канцлером Германии Ангелой Меркель по итогам российско-германских переговоров, 5 июня (Meseberg, 2010) http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/7973 [accessed 13 April 2019]; For English translation of the Russian transcript, see: Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev, Joint News Conference with German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel following Russian-German Talks, 5 June (Meseberg, 2010) http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/7973 [accessed 28 September 2017].

  56. 56.

    English translation of the Russian transcript. Merkel and Medvedev, Joint News Conference, 2010.

  57. 57.

    Translations by the author from the German transcript. Merkel and Medvedev, Pressestatements, 2010.

  58. 58.

    Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Rettman, ‘Germany and Russia Call’, 2010.

  61. 61.

    Interview with Moldovan expert in Berlin, 26.05.2016.

  62. 62.

    Interview with German diplomat in Brussels, 30.05.2016.

  63. 63.

    Meister, New Start, 2011, pp. 8–9.

  64. 64.

    Cf. Wolff, ‘Resolvable Frozen Conflict’, 2011.

  65. 65.

    Interview with German diplomat in Berlin, 09.08.2016.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Interview with European Commission official in Brussels, 30.05.2016.

  69. 69.

    Interview with European Council official in Brussels, 31.05.2016.

  70. 70.

    European Parliament, New Momentum in EU-Moldova Relations, 21 October (Brussels, 2010) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20101020IPR89508/new-momentum-in-eu-moldova-relations [accessed 28 September 2017].

  71. 71.

    Cf. Vladimir Socor, Moscow Signals Interest in Berlin Initiative on Transnistria , Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation 63 (2011) https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-signals-interest-in-berlin-initiative-on-transnistria/ [accessed 28 September 2017].

  72. 72.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference after Meeting of Weimar Triangle Foreign Ministers, June 23 (Paris, 2010) http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/244486 [accessed 13 March 2019].

  73. 73.

    Cf. for an overview of Polish-Moldovan relations: Marcin Kosienkowski, ‘Poland: Rediscovering Moldova’, in Moldova, ed. by Kosienkowski and Schreiber, pp. 143–58.

  74. 74.

    Cf. ‘Poland joins Western World’s Policy of Détente towards Russia’, Newsweek Polska, 24 May 2010.

  75. 75.

    Meister, New Start, 2011, p. 10.

  76. 76.

    Interview with French diplomat in Paris, 25.11.2016.

  77. 77.

    Cf. Florent Parmentier, ‘France: Unfulfilled Potential as Major Partner’, in Moldova , ed. by Kosienkowski and Schreiber, pp. 77–86 (p. 85); David Rinnert and Florent Parmentier, Finding Common Denominators in the Eastern Partnership Region: Towards a Strategic French-German Cooperation in the Transnistrian Conflict, Policy Brief, The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Chisinau, Paris, Berlin, 2013), p. 9 http://www.fes-moldova.org/media/pdf/Policy_Policy_Brief_2013_1.pdf [accessed 28 September 2017].

  78. 78.

    Interview with French official in Paris, 23.11.2016.

  79. 79.

    Robert Marquand, ‘Facing a Rising China, Russia Looks to Boost Europe Ties’, The Christian Science Monitor, 18 October 2010.

  80. 80.

    Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitry Medvedev, Déclaration finale: Rencontre Allemagne-France-Russie, 19 Octobre (Deauville, 2010) https://uk.ambafrance.org/Rencontre-Allemagne-France-Russie [accessed 13 April 2019]; Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitry Medvedev, Pressekonferenz Merkel, Sarkozy und Medwedew, 19. Oktober (Deauville, 2010) https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2010/10/2010-10-19-pk-deauville.html [accessed 28 September 2017].

  81. 81.

    Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, ‘Sarkozy to Propose New Bond With Russia’, The New York Times, 1 October 2010.

  82. 82.

    ‘French-German-Russian Summit: Sarkozy Dreams of a European Security Council’, Spiegel Online, 18 October 2010.

  83. 83.

    Meister, New Start, 2011, p. 9.

  84. 84.

    Grund, Sieg and Wesemann, ‘Transnistria’, 60, 65.

  85. 85.

    Angela Merkel and Emil Boc, Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und dem Premierminister von Rumänien, Emil Boc, 12. Oktober (Bucharest, 2010) https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2010/10/2010-10-12-pk-bk-bukarest.html [accessed 28 September 2017].

  86. 86.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Romania and Republic of Moldova sign Treaty on State Border Regime, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Border Matters, 8 November (2010) https://mae.ro/en/node/5904 [accessed 13 March 2019].

  87. 87.

    Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad, 2013; Interview with former European diplomat, 28.12.2016.

  88. 88.

    European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, Reply, 25 January (Brussels, 2011) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-8055&language=MT [accessed 28 September 2017].

  89. 89.

    Manfred Grund, Hans M. Sieg and Kristin Wesemann, Transnistrien und die künftige Sicherheitsarchitektur in Europa, KAS Auslandsinformationen 9/10 (2011), p. 64 http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_28726-544-1-30.pdf?110908153915 [accessed 27 September 2017].

  90. 90.

    Interview with German diplomat in Berlin, 09.08.2016.

  91. 91.

    As quoted from Russian news agency Interfax by Socor, Moscow Signals Interest, 2011.

  92. 92.

    ‘Лавров: РФ выступает за особый статус Приднестровья в единой Молдавии’, Ria Novosti, 29 March 2011.

  93. 93.

    Cf. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Russia’s Superficial Concession on Transnistria , Analyses (2011) https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-04-06/russias-superficial-concession-transnistria [accessed 13 March 2019].

  94. 94.

    Cf. Hans M. Sieg, Der Transnistrien-Konflikt: Voraussetzungen für eine Konfliktlösung, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 51 3 (2011).

  95. 95.

    Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy toward Transnistria’, 2012, p. 57.

  96. 96.

    Socor, Moscow Signals Interest, 2011, Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy toward Transnistria’, 2012, pp. 58–59.

  97. 97.

    Andrey Devyatkov, ‘Russia: Relations with Moldova under a Paradigm of Ambiguity’, in Moldova, ed. by Kosienkowski and Schreiber, pp. 183–204 (p. 196).

  98. 98.

    ‘Идея независимости Приднестровья не поддерживается какой-либо международной структурой’, Interfax, 5 June 2011.

  99. 99.

    Neukirch, Confidence Building, 2012, p. 144.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    Cf. Andrei Zagorski, ‘Russland und der Transnistrienkonflikt’, in Problemlage und Lösungsansätze im Transnistrienkonflikt, ed. by Reiter, pp. 77–102.

  102. 102.

    Neukirch, Confidence Building, 2012, pp. 146–47.

  103. 103.

    Neukirch, Confidence Building, 2012, p. 142.

  104. 104.

    Neukirch, Confidence Building, 2012, p. 139.

  105. 105.

    Socor, German Diplomacy Tilts, 2011.

  106. 106.

    Hans M. Sieg, The EU’s Role or Absence in “Frozen Conflicts” in Transnistria and Caucasus (Berlin), p. 3 http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-394784 [accessed 29 September 2017].

  107. 107.

    Federal Chancellor, Erste Schritte in Richtung EU: Staatsbesuch in der Republik Moldau, 22. August (Chisinau, 2012) https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reiseberichte/moldau-2012-08-22-merkel.html [accessed 29 September 2017].

  108. 108.

    Andrey Makarychev and Sergunin Alexander, ‘The EU, Russia and Models of International Society in a Wider Europe’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9.2 (2013), 313–29 https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/506/408 (p. 324).

  109. 109.

    German Bundestag, Drucksache 18/1745: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sevim Dağdelen, Dr. Alexander S. Neu, Heike Hänsel, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE, 12. Juni (Berlin, 2014) https://www.bundesanzeiger-verlag.de/fileadmin/Betrifft-Recht/Dokumente/edrucksachen/pdf/1801745.pdf [accessed 13 April 2019] (p. 10).

  110. 110.

    Devyatkov, ‘Russian Policy toward Transnistria’, 2012; Andrey Makarychev, A Farewell to Meseberg ?, PONARS Eurasia (2012) http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/farewell-meseberg [accessed 29 September 2017].

  111. 111.

    Neukirch, Confidence Building, 2012, p. 146.

  112. 112.

    Interview with former European diplomat, 28.12.2016; Grund, Sieg and Wesemann, Transnistrien, 2011, p. 62.

  113. 113.

    German Bundestag, Drucksache 17/8239, 2011.

  114. 114.

    German Bundestag, Drucksache 17/8239, 2011, p. 2.

  115. 115.

    German Bundestag, Drucksache 17/8239: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Viola von Cramon-Taubadel, Volker Beck (Köln), Marieluise Beck (Bremen), weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Stand des Meseburg-Memorandums, 21. Dezember (2011) http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/082/1708239.pdf [accessed 27 September 2017].

  116. 116.

    Vladimir Socor, German Diplomacy Tilts toward Russia on Transnistria Negotiations, Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation 108 (2011) https://jamestown.org/program/german-diplomacy-tilts-toward-russia-on-transnistria-negotiations/ [accessed 28 September 2017].

  117. 117.

    German Bundestag, Drucksache 18/1745, 2014, p. 11.

  118. 118.

    Cf. Hiski Haukkala, ‘From Cooperative to Contested Europe?: The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23.1 (2015), 25–40.

  119. 119.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Makes a Speech and Answers Questions Following His Talks with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 18 November (Moscow, 2014) http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/790869 [accessed 28 September 2017].

  120. 120.

    Remler, Negotiation Gone Bad, 2013; Neukirch, Confidence Building, 2012, p. 146.

  121. 121.

    Katinka Barysch, The EU and Russia: All Smiles and No Action?, Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform (2011), p. 6 https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_russia_april11-157.pdf [accessed 14 April 2019].

  122. 122.

    European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, 2011.

  123. 123.

    Interview with Moldovan expert in Berlin, 26.05.2016; Vladimir Socor, Meseberg Process: Germany Testing EU-Russia Security Cooperation Potential, Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation 191 (2010) https://jamestown.org/program/meseberg-process-germany-testing-eu-russia-security-cooperation-potential/ [accessed 27 September 2017].

  124. 124.

    Socor, Moscow Signals Interest, 2011.

  125. 125.

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Fix, L. (2021). The Meseberg Initiative 2010: Germany as a Deal-Maker. In: Germany’s Role in European Russia Policy. New Perspectives in German Political Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68226-2_4

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