Abstract
Conceived as a cornerstone of the European integration process, the Loyalty Clause (today enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU) has been significantly revisited by the Lisbon Treaty. Aside from repositioning the clause, which has wisely been incorporated into the TEU, the Reform Treaty has introduced other innovations to the pre-Lisbon Loyalty Clause, starting from the express recognition, for the very first time in primary law, of the existence of a general principle of loyal cooperation. In light of the pivotal role of EU loyalty and the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the question arises as to whether the new formulation of loyalty can serve as a basis on which to effectively deal with the challenges the Union is facing today. This chapter examines the role loyalty can play in this regard, with a view to assessing whether a further revision of loyalty mechanisms is desirable. The analysis is organised as follows. I first consider the mainstream dimension of loyalty. Then I turn to the position of EU institutional actors as concerns their duties of loyalty, focusing in particular on the mutual nature of these duties and their interaction with the imperative to respect national identities, an imperative that today is set out in the same Treaty provision (Article 4 TEU) which contains the Loyalty Clause. With that done, I discuss the interaction and distinction between loyalty and the legal concept of solidarity, the latter often mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty as a structural feature of the EU constitutional dimension, and it has recently entered EU legal discourse on emergencies (natural, economic, financial, and social).
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Notes
- 1.
ECJ, Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission of the European Communities v France [1969] ECR 523, para 16. Pursuant to Article 5 TEEC (that became Article 10 of the Treaty establishing the European Community), ‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.’ The language of Article 5 TEEC is now reproduced in Article 4(3) TEU. See infra.
- 2.
It is useful to recall, for the sake of clarity, that the expressions ‘principle of loyal cooperation’, ‘loyalty principle’, and ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ are deemed synonymous by the ECJ and other EU actors, and they will accordingly be used without distinction in this chapter.
- 3.
- 4.
On the foundations of the loyalty principle, see Costantinesco (1987)
- 5.
Article 26 VCLT famously reads as follows: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’
- 6.
On the international-law foundations of the Community legal order, see Pellet (1994).
- 7.
Halberstam (2004), p. 104.
- 8.
ECJ, Case C-2/88 J. J. Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR I-03365, para 17.
- 9.
- 10.
ECJ, Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585, 594 [emphasis added].
- 11.
- 12.
ECJ, Case 79/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, para 26 [emphasis added].
- 13.
ECJ, Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-02433, para 19 [emphasis added].
- 14.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-01029, para 39 [emphasis added].
- 15.
ECJ, Case C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) [1997] ECR I-04025, para 27.
- 16.
For Neframi (2010), p. 359, the ‘effectiveness of EU law can […] be considered as the tangible facet of the duty of loyalty, specified through obligations of loyal cooperation incumbent on the national authorities, including the national courts.’
- 17.
- 18.
ECJ, Case 14/88 Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 3677, para 20.
- 19.
ECJ, Case 230/81 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255, para 37.
- 20.
See infra Sect. 5.2.
- 21.
See infra Sect. 5.2.
- 22.
- 23.
ECJ, Case C-105/93 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-05285, paras 42–43.
- 24.
On the relation between Community and EU legal orders, see ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-06351, para 202.
- 25.
Looking at the matter from this angle, it is probably not just coincidence that the first case where the Court expressly recognised the loyalty principle as having a general status was in a judgment delivered in June 2009, and so after the Lisbon Treaty was signed: ECJ, Case C-429/07 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v X BV [2009] ECR I-04833, para 21. Before the Lisbon era, the Court simply referred to the ‘cooperation principle’ without specifying its general nature: see, for instance, ECJ, Case 14/88 Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 18.
- 26.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 24, para 304.
- 27.
- 28.
Van Elsuwege and Merket (2012), p. 54.
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
See also Wouters and Ramopoulos’s Chap. 9 in this volume.
- 32.
Articles 32 and 34(1) TEU.
- 33.
Articles 16 and 19(1) TEU (Nice version).
- 34.
Article 40 TEU: ‘The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.’
- 35.
Article 351 TFEU: ‘The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties. To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude […]’
- 36.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 24, para 293 [emphasis added].
- 37.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 24, para 304.
- 38.
ECJ, Case C-124/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-00081, para 56. See also Klabbers (2009), pp. 157–158.
- 39.
Lavranos (2009), p. 619. This reading of the Court’s judgment also applies to the most recent Kadi IV case, decided by the Court in 2013: ECJ, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] nyr. For a first comment on this last judgment, see Tzanakopoulos (2013).
- 40.
Eckes (2012), p. 130.
- 41.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 24; opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 23 January 2008, para 32.
- 42.
[Emphasis added].
- 43.
See, for example, Ronzitti (2008), p. 91.
- 44.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, supra n. 24; opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 23 January 2008, paras 39 and 44.
- 45.
Contrast that with Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), p. 41, who remark that ‘Union loyalty in the CFSP and CSDP domains is of an entirely political nature, since the ECJ has no jurisdiction over this field, except for the protection of the dividing line between the application of the intergovernmental method and the “Community method”.’
- 46.
See also Eeckhout (2011), p. 265.
- 47.
- 48.
The practice in question is mainly focused on the relations between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. A first example is given by a judgment delivered by the Court in 2012 on the proper legal basis for targeted sanctions against the Al-Qaeda network: ECJ, Case C-130/10 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2012] nyr. Another example deserving to be mentioned is the pending judgment in Case C-658/11, concerning the validity of the CFSP decision on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the EU-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer (OJ 2012 C 58/6). See the further discussion in Bosse-Platière (2013), p. 85.
- 49.
See supra Sect. 5.1.
- 50.
EU tasks are also mentioned in the third sentence of the provision, which—echoing the pre-Lisbon Loyalty Clause (i.e., Article 10 TEC)—refers to their facilitation by Member States.
- 51.
It is apparent from other authentic-language versions (missions in the French-language version, compiti in the Italian-language version, Aufgaben in the German-language version, misiones in the Spanish-language version) that this is exactly the meaning to be ascribed to that expression.
- 52.
See the survey in Senden (2004), pp. 348–350.
- 53.
See again Senden (2004), p. 351.
- 54.
[Emphasis added].
- 55.
- 56.
A similar conclusion can of course be reached with regard to other soft-law policy mechanisms that have been used in the EU legal order, starting from the open method of coordination introduced in social and educational matters.
- 57.
See also Chalmers et al. (2010), p. 223.
- 58.
- 59.
See, for instance, ECJ, Case 325/82 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany [1984] ECR 777, para 11: ‘[…] a Member State cannot, in any circumstances, plead the principle of reciprocity and rely on a possible infringement by another Member State in order to justify its own default. Nor, therefore, can a Member State rely on the principle of reciprocity to contest the admissibility of an action brought against it for failure to fulfil its obligations.’
- 60.
See ECJ, Joined Cases 52 and 55/65 Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Economic Community [1966] ECR 159, 172: ‘Any possible failure by the Commission to fulfil its obligations towards other Member States cannot exempt one of them from performing the obligations which are legitimately placed upon it by measures taken in application of the Treaty.’
- 61.
ECJ, Joined Cases 90/63 and 91/63 Commission of the European Economic Community v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom of Belgium [1963] ECR 623, 631. On the possibility of considering the EU legal order a self-contained regime in light of this case law, see Simma and Pulkowski (2006), p. 516, and Gradoni (2009), p. 227.
- 62.
Dero (2006), p. 401.
- 63.
See also Boutayeb (2011), p. 14, highlighting the need for reciprocity in implementing loyalty duties.
- 64.
Infra Sect. 5.4.
- 65.
ECJ, Case 235/87 Annunziata Matteucci v Communauté française of Belgium and Commissariat général aux relations internationales of the Communauté française of Belgium [1988] ECR 5589, para 19. The absence of loyalty among Member States may indeed eventuate in the violation of loyalty duties to EU institutions or in an undermining of the European integration process. In the very recent Hungary v Slovak Republic case, concerning the Slovak authorities’ refusal to allow the Hungarian President Sólyom entry into the territory of the Slovak Republic for security reasons, Advocate General Bot has recalled that ‘[o]nly a situation of persistent paralysis in diplomatic relations between two Member States, contrary to their commitment to maintain good-neighbourly relations consubstantial with their decision to join the Union, would be covered by EU law, if only because, in accordance with the last paragraph of Article 4(3) TEU, Member States must refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’ Cf. ECJ, Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovak Republic [2012] nyr; opinion delivered on 6 March 2012, para 59. Surprisingly enough, the Advocate General seems to suggest that only serious violations of good neighbourly relations between Member States can lead to a breach of Article 4(3) TEU. Even more surprising is the position adopted by the Court in the case at issue: the Luxembourg judges have simply ignored the mutual loyalty duties between the States concerned. The approach taken by the Court has rightly been criticized by Symon, who poses the following embarrassing question: ‘cette affaire n’aurait-elle pas été l’occasion pour la Cour de justice de formuler en termes plus solennels le principe de loyauté horizontale entre États membres, à la manière des conséquences dégagées par le droit fédéral du principe de “Bundesfreundliches Verhalten”?’ Cf. Symon (2012), p. 14. See also Aloupi (2013), pp. 20–23, arguing that it would also have been possible to resort to the solidarity principle (infra Sect. 5.4), and Rossi (2013a).
- 66.
ECJ, Case 230/81 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg v European Parliament, supra n. 19, para 37. See also Due (1992), p. 31.
- 67.
Clearly exemplifying the commitment to loyal cooperation between EU institutions are interinstitutional agreements. See in this regard the speech delivered by Maroš Šefčovič, vice president of the European Commission and responsible for ‘Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration’, on the occasion of the plenary debate on the revised Framework Agreement between the Commission and Parliament, 18 October 2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-569_en.htm (accessed 25 July 2013). More generally, loyalty is brought into play to govern the application of the principle of institutional balance: see Jacqué (2004).
- 68.
ECJ, Case C-339/00 Ireland v Commission of the European Communities [2003] ECR I-11757, para 71 [emphasis added].
- 69.
- 70.
Namely, the duty to adopt all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfilment of EU obligations, the duty to assist EU institutions and facilitate their action in carrying out EU tasks, the duty to abstain from measures jeopardising EU objectives, and the duty of mutual assistance.
- 71.
Only in regard to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), aside from a few other cases, has such specification been provided. See ECJ, Case C-25/94 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union [1996] ECR I-01469. However, even here, interinstitutional duties had for the most part been already codified, by means of an interinstitutional arrangement on the participation in the activities of the FAO.
- 72.
- 73.
ECJ, Case C-2/88 J. J. Zwartveld and others, supra n. 8, para 23.
- 74.
ECJ, Case C-2/88 J. J. Zwartveld and others, supra n. 8, para 21.
- 75.
- 76.
See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-266/03 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-04805, and ECJ, Case C-433/03 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany [2005] ECR I-06985.
- 77.
See, for instance, ECJ, Case C-246/07 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden [2010] ECR I-03317.
- 78.
ECJ, Case C-45/07 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic [2009] ECR I-00701.
- 79.
ECJ, Case C-45/07 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, supra n. 78, opinion of Advocate General Bot, 20 November 2008, paras 40–42.
- 80.
Cf. Michel (2009), p. 11.
- 81.
Case C-45/07 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, supra n. 78, paras 24–25.
- 82.
See Hillion (2009), p. 35.
- 83.
von Bogdandy (2006), p. 51 [emphasis added].
- 84.
See infra Sect. 5.4.2.
- 85.
Missiroli (2011).
- 86.
Van Elsuwege and Merket (2012), p. 39.
- 87.
The provision reads as follows: ‘The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.’
- 88.
European Convention, Final report of Working Group V on Complementary Competencies, CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, 4 November 2002, 10.
- 89.
Doc. CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, supra n. 88, 11.
- 90.
von Bogdandy and Schill (2011).
- 91.
Ibid., p. 1418.
- 92.
Martinico (2013), p. 97.
- 93.
This idea has been expressed, for instance, in Burgorgue-Larsen (2013).
- 94.
- 95.
This view is expressed in Guastaferro (2012), among others.
- 96.
Doc. CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, supra n. 88, 11 [emphasis added]. For a very detailed survey of the European Convention’s travaux préparatoires, see Guastaferro (2012), pp. 271–284.
- 97.
See also Claes (2013), p. 122.
- 98.
Doc. CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, supra n. 88, 11.
- 99.
See also Claes (2013), p. 123.
- 100.
Doc. CONV 375/1/02 REV 1, supra n. 88, 11.
- 101.
See von Bogdandy and Schill (2011), pp. 1448–1452. Claes (2013), p. 123, speaks of a ‘mirroring mechanism’: ‘The interpretation of Article 4(2) TEU is ultimately for the CJEU, but since the CJEU has no jurisdiction to interpret national law, it can only do so with reference to national law, and by invoking national actors, including national courts.’ The mirror metaphor is also used by Besselink (2012), p. 687, arguing that the potential overlap Article 4(2) TEU sets up between the competences of the ECJ and those of the national constitutional courts is such that the work of ‘translating’ the national constitutional identities into the EU legal framework can be considered ‘a sort of “vetting” […]. It is the mirror image of the guards of the national constitutional identity keeping a watch on EU law entering the national legal order: the national constitutional courts.’
- 102.
On this reading of the Identity Clause, see Burgorgue-Larsen (2013), p. 275.
- 103.
It is interesting to note that even before the Identity Clause was adopted, some scholars argued that the loyalty principle imposed on EU institutions an obligation to respect the fundamental principles of the Member States’ constitutions. See, for instance, Blanquet (1994), p. 411: ‘La Communauté violerait la fidélité communautaire si elle portait atteinte aux principes fondamentaux des Constitutions des Etats membres. En cas de doute, il faudrait donc interpréter le droit communautaire dans un sens compatible avec ces principes fondamentaux.’
- 104.
On the interplay between the Lisbon Treaty and national constitutional law, see Constitutional Court of Latvia, Case No. 2008-35-01, 7 April 2009, http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/upload/judg_2008_35.htm (accessed 2 August 2013); Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08, 26 November 2008, http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=484&cHash=621d8068f5e20ecadd84e0bae0527552 (accessed 2 August 2013); German Constitutional Court (BVerfGE), 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, http://www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/es20090630_2bve000208.html (accessed 2 August 2013); Polish Constitutional Court, Ref. No K 32/09, 24 November 2010, http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_32_09_EN.pdf (accessed 2 August 2013). On this case law, see Rideau (2013), p. 243. More recently, some Constitutional Courts have taken position on the possibility to consider EU law inconsistent with constitutional fundamental principles as ultra vires. See Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 5/12, 31 January 2012, http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37&cHash=911a315c9c22ea1989d19a3a848724e2 (accessed 2 August 2013); and Portuguese Constitutional Court, Acórdão No 187/2013, 5 April 2013, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20130187.html?impressao=1 (accessed 2 August 2013); BVerfGE, 1 BvR 1215/07, 24 April 2013, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20130424_1bvr121507.html (accessed 2 August 2013). On this case law, see also, in this volume, Chap. 1, by Rossi.
- 105.
ECJ, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR I-13693; ECJ, Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others [2011] ECR I-03787; ECJ, Case C-51/08 European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-04231; ECJ, Case C-393/10 Dermod Patrick O’Brien v Ministry of Justice [2012] nyr.
- 106.
ECJ, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, supra n. 105.
- 107.
ECJ, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, supra n. 105, para 93. The ECJ took a similar approach in the notaries case, concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, holding that ‘[a]s to the need relied on by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to ensure the use of the Luxemburgish language in the performance of the activities of notaries, it is clear that the first head of claim in the present dispute relates exclusively to the nationality condition at issue. While the preservation of the national identities of the Member States is a legitimate aim respected by the legal order of the European Union, as is indeed acknowledged by Article 4(2) TEU, the interest pleaded by the Grand Duchy can, however, be effectively safeguarded otherwise than by a general exclusion of nationals of the other Member States’. See ECJ, Case C-51/08 European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, supra n. 105. See also Besselink (2012), p. 692.
- 108.
German Constitutional Court (BVerfGE), 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, supra n. 104.
- 109.
See, in particular, Besselink (2012), p. 689, who evaluates the relaxed version of the proportionality test the ECJ applied in Sayn-Wittgenstein.
- 110.
- 111.
This is in line with the philosophy of cooperative federalism described by Schütze (2009). A further opportunity for the Luxembourg judges to consider and interpret Article 4(2) TEU will come with Joined Cases C-58/13 and C-59/13 Torresi (OJ 2013 C/147/5), still pending, concerning the interpretation and validity of Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC to facilitate the practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained (OJ 1998 L 77/36).
- 112.
von Bogdandy and Schill (2011), p. 1430.
- 113.
von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 491.
- 114.
See, in this regard, the speech delivered by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, before the European Parliament on 5 July 2011, http://www.orbanviktor.hu/in_english_article/speech_in_the_european_parliament_ (accessed 2 August 2013).
- 115.
See the European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013, ‘The situation of fundamental rights: standards and pratices in Hungary’, doc. P7_TA(2013)0315, where it is stated that ‘a violation of the Union’s common principles and values by a Member State cannot be justified by national traditions nor by the expression of a national identity when such a violation results in the deterioration of the principles which are at the heart of European integration, such as democratic values, the rule of law or the principle of mutual recognition, with the consequence that a referral to Article 4(2) TEU is applicable only in so far as a Member State respects the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU’.
- 116.
Source: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1945-MK-speech-hearing-on-Hungary_09-02-12.Brussels.pdf (accessed 2 August 2013).
- 117.
Ibid., 2. See also Rossi (2013b), p. 2.
- 118.
Speech by Morten Kjaerum, supra n. 116, 2.
- 119.
ECJ, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, supra n. 105.
- 120.
ECJ, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, supra n. 105, para 89 [emphasis added].
- 121.
Supra Sect. 5.2.
- 122.
See also Xuereb (2005), p. 19, holding that the Loyalty Clause’s ‘emphasis appears to be on making decisions in such a way that all Members are able not only “to live with them”, but also to participate wholeheartedly in implementing them, because those States’ identities will have been respected’.
- 123.
A first assessment of the legal and political implications of the EU’s involvement in global emergencies can be found in Antoniadis et al. (2011).
- 124.
Although the Energy Solidarity Clause is conceived in general terms, its insertion in primary law was emphatically advocated by a group of Member States in the aftermath of the energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine (Andoura (2013), p. 30). Thus, this clause is intended in the first place as a tool for dealing with energy crises affecting Member States.
- 125.
See the address ‘The Need for European Solidarity’, delivered by the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak on 13 March 1948, http://www.cvce.eu (accessed 7 August 2013). See also the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, where the founding father states that ‘Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’ Text available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/ (accessed 7 August 2013). Of course, solidarity continues to inform the development of the integration process and is a key factor in its future development. Recently, the Reflection Group on the future of the EU 2030 has remarked that ‘[f]or the EU to become an effective and dynamic global player, it will also need to shift solidarity to the heart of the European project. Solidarity is not an unconditional entitlement—it depends on individual and collective responsibility. As such, it can and must inform EU policymaking and relations at all levels and between localities, regions and Member States’. See Project Europe 2030—Challenges and Opportunities, report to the European Council, May 2010, 13–14, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/en_web.pdf (accessed 7 August 2013). For further discussion, see Oliva (2005), Stjernø (2005), Ross (2010), and Boutayeb (2011).
- 126.
ECJ, Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission of the European Communities v France, supra n. 1, para 16.
- 127.
- 128.
See also, in this regard, Berramdane (2011), p. 67: ‘Nul doute que la solidarité est un principe constitutionnel figurant dans l’article 2 TUE […]. Toutefois, il n’est pas certain qu’il ai acquis la qualité de principe général de droit, source du droit de l’Union, en raison de son contenu insaisissable et de son champ d’application imprécis.’
- 129.
Article 2 TEU further specifies that solidarity is an intrinsic component of society in the Member States.
- 130.
Tridimas (2006), p. 16.
- 131.
Here a distinction can be drawn between de facto and normative solidarity: while the former hinges on a factual interdependence among EU actors, the latter implies the existence of specific legal duties to achieve common goals and/or to protect common interests (see the further discussion in Borger (2013), pp. 10–11). Of course, this latter meaning of solidarity is also applicable under international law. For instance, the UN Independent expert on human rights and international solidarity has recently held that ‘[i]nternational solidarity and international cooperation are based on the foundation of shared responsibility. In the broadest sense, solidarity is a communion of responsibilities and interest between individuals, groups and States, connected by the ideal of fraternity and the notion of cooperation’ (doc. A/HRC/9/10, 15 August 2008, para 6). That said, however, it remains a fact that the level of solidarity achieved through the European integration process is far from being replicated in other international fora or organizations. See also Coicaud (2008), p. 297.
- 132.
For an in-depth analysis of solidarity duties stemming from the right to healthcare, see, in this volume, Chap. 8, by Di Federico.
- 133.
For further discussion, see Picheral (2011).
- 134.
- 135.
For further discussion, see Berramdane (2011).
- 136.
Berramdane (2011), pp. 74–75, and Boutayeb (2011), p. 13. See also Bieber and Maiani (2012), pp. 296–297, arguing that the principle of solidarity has so far been elaborated by the ECJ mainly in terms of ‘solidarity-loyalty’. This allows the authors to conclude that the praetorian version of the principle of solidarity de facto largely corresponds to the obligations flowing from the Loyalty Clause enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.
- 137.
Boutayeb (2011), pp. 11–18.
- 138.
Supra Sect. 5.2.
- 139.
Berramdane (2011), p. 65.
- 140.
Supra Sect. 5.3.1.
- 141.
[Emphais added]. See also Kuijper and Paasivirta (2013), p. 40. Similarly, Article 31(1) combines solidarity with the negative duties stemming from the loyalty principle, for it provides that Member States abstaining from a CFSP vote shall ‘[i]n a spirit of mutual solidarity […] refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action’ based on that vote.
- 142.
- 143.
It will suffice, in this regard, to recall the criticisms the Italian government advanced against the approach the Union and other Member States took in dealing with the 2011 migratory movements from North Africa. See Carrera et al. (2011). More recently, a rusty cargo ship closer to Malta than to any other Member State was seeking to disembark the irregular migrants on board, and when Maltese authorities for the umpteenth time denied that request, EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström posted a message on Twitter saying, ‘Relocation of asylum seekers is a way to show solidarity in Europe. Would be great if all 28 EU members would help and not only the same [referring to Italy in the case at hand].’
- 144.
This is particularly the case with the Treaty provisions on economic cooperation: see Bieber and Maiani (2012), pp. 304–311.
- 145.
This is the case, for instance, with the Solidarity Clause enshrined in Article 222 TFEU. Only at the end of 2012 did the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission present a proposal for a decision containing arrangements for implementing the clause: JOIN (2012) 39, 21 December 2012.
- 146.
Borger (2013), p. 14.
- 147.
ECJ, Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission of the European Communities v France, supra n. 1, para 16.
- 148.
The only exception lies in the Solidarity Clause enshrined in Article 222 TFEU. See Gestri (2012), pp. 109–115.
- 149.
For a contrary view, see Blanquet (1994), p. 233.
- 150.
It is precisely from this perspective that Bieber and Maiani (2012), p. 297, refer to the substantive nature of the solidarity duties stemming from the TFEU. See also, on the reference to solidarity in Article 80 TFEU, McDonough and Tsourdi (2012), p. 10; Gestri (2011), p. 922; and Toso (2012), p. 200.
- 151.
It goes without saying that this scenario does not apply to the Solidarity Clause, insofar as its implementation is inherently dependent on there being an emergency situation. On the interplay between solidarity and loyalty duties under this clause, see Gestri (2012), p. 114.
- 152.
Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/130731.pdf (accessed 7 July 2013).
- 153.
OJ 2003 L 50/1. The Regulation has been recently recast: see Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ 2013 L 180/31.
- 154.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. et al. [2011] nyr.
- 155.
ECJ, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. et al., supra n. 154, para 94.
- 156.
See Jacqué’s Chap. 6 in this volume.
- 157.
Significantly, in the N.S. judgment the Court observes that ‘[w]ith regard to the situation in Greece, the parties who have submitted observations to the Court are in agreement that that Member State was, in 2010, the point of entry in the European Union of almost 90% of illegal immigrants, that influx resulting in a disproportionate burden being borne by it compared to other Member States and the inability to cope with the situation in practice.’ ECJ, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. et al., supra n. 154, para 87. See also paragraph 93 of the judgment, where the Court explicitly mentions the principle of solidarity.
- 158.
- 159.
Available at http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/304649/st00tscg26_en12.pdf (accessed 7 August 2013).
- 160.
Available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esm_treaty_en.pdf (accessed 7 August 2013).
- 161.
- 162.
Article 125(1) TFEU reads as follows: ‘The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.’
- 163.
ECJ, Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, supra n. 127, paras 142–144.
- 164.
- 165.
However, see also the reading given by McDonnell’s Chap. 4 in this volume.
- 166.
See, for instance, Maduro et al. (2012), and Leino and Salminen (2013). However, see also de Witte (2013), p. 9, arguing that ‘there is no evidence of a deliberate strategy of the member state governments to assert “total control” of the economic governance reform process and to sideline the European Union institutions or marginalize the “Community method”.’ Cf. also Besselink’s Chap. 2 in this volume, claiming that a constitutional change is already occurring by means of ‘substantive constitutional arrangements beyond the constitutional texts [i.e. the EU Treaties] themselves.’
- 167.
See Rossi’s Chap. 1 in this volume, and European Commission, Communication from the Commission ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union—Launching a European Debate’, COM (2012) 777, 28 November 2012.
- 168.
[Emphasis added].
- 169.
ECJ, Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, supra n. 127.
- 170.
ECJ, Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, supra n. 127, para 148.
- 171.
ECJ, Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, supra n. 127, para 151.
- 172.
Supra Sect. 5.3.
- 173.
Supra Sect. 5.4.2.
- 174.
Supra Sect. 5.4.2.
- 175.
Supra Sect. 5.3.1.
- 176.
Supra Sect. 5.4.2.
- 177.
de Boissieu et al. (2013), p. 13.
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Casolari, F. (2014). EU Loyalty After Lisbon: An Expectation Gap to Be Filled?. In: Rossi, L., Casolari, F. (eds) The EU after Lisbon. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04591-7_5
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