Israel Scheffler begins his book, The Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education, by stating that “the development and transmission of knowledge are fundamental tasks of education (1965, p. 1).” This makes clear the deep and important connection between epistemology and education and, even more specifically, between testimony and education. When education develops and transmits knowledge, this is often done through teaching, and teaching crucially involves testimony. (For views about the nature of testimony itself, see Ross (1975), Sosa (1991), Coady (1992), Fricker (1995), Audi (1997), Graham (1997), and Lackey (2006, 2008).) Educators use books and articles, slides, verbal instruction, and even gestures to communicate information to students, all of which involve testimony. The epistemology of testimony is, therefore, central to understanding education. As Harvey Siegel notes, “the epistemology of testimony, in all of its social glory, addresses the...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
Adler, J. E. (1994). Testimony, trust, knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, 91, 264–275.
Adler, J. E. (2002). Belief’s own ethics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Audi, R. (1997). The place of testimony in the fabric of knowledge and justification. American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 405–422.
Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge. London: Routledge.
Austin, J. L. (1979). “Other minds,” in his philosophical papers (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bergmann, M. (1997). Internalism, externalism and the no-defeater condition. Synthese, 110, 9–417.
Bergmann, M. (2004). Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 11, 709–727.
BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist theories of epistemic justification. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 53–73.
BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
BonJour, L., & Sosa, E. (2003). Epistemic justification: Internalism vs. externalism, foundations vs. virtues. Oxford: Blackwell.
Burge, T. (1993). Content preservation. The Philosophical Review, 102, 457–488.
Burge, T. (1997). Interlocution, perception, and memory. Philosophical Studies, 86, 21–47.
Chisholm, R. M. (1989). Theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Coady, C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A philosophical study. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Coady, C. A. J. (1994). Testimony, observation and ‘autonomous knowledge’. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 225–250). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Dummett, M. (1994). Testimony and memory. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 251–272). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Faulkner, P. (2000). The social character of testimonial knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 97, 25–601.
Faulkner, P. (2002). On the rationality of our response to testimony. Synthese, 131, 353–370.
Faulkner, P. (2006). On dreaming and being lied to. Episteme, 3, 149–159.
Foley, R. (1994). Egoism in epistemology. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing epistemology: The social dimensions of knowledge (pp. 53–73). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Fricker, E. (1987). The epistemology of testimony. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61, 57–83.
Fricker, E. (1994). Against gullibility. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 125–161). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Fricker, E. (1995). Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. Mind, 104, 393–411.
Fricker, E. (2006). Knowledge from Trust in testimony is second-hand knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73, 592–618.
Goldberg, S. C. (2006). Reductionism and the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 127–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, S. C. (2008). Testimonial knowledge in early childhood, revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76, 1–36.
Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Graham, P. J. (1997). What is testimony? The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 227–232.
Graham, P. J. (2006). Liberal fundamentalism and its rivals. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 93–115). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic Dependence. The Journal of Philosophy, 82, 335–349.
Hardwig, J. (1991). The role of trust in knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 88, 693–708.
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume, D. (1977). In E. Steinberg (Ed.), An enquiry concerning human understanding. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Insole, C. (2000). Seeing off the local threat to irreducible knowledge by testimony. The Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 44–56.
Lackey, J. (1999). Testimonial knowledge and transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 47–90.
Lackey, J. (2005). Testimony and the infant/child objection. Philosophical Studies, 126, 163–190.
Lackey, J. (2006). Learning from words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73, 77–101.
Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from words: Testimony as a source of knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lehrer, K. (2006). Testimony and trustworthiness. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 145–159). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lipton, P. (1998). The epistemology of testimony. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29, 1–31.
Lyons, J. (1997). Testimony, induction and folk psychology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75, 163–178.
McDowell, J. (1994). Knowledge by hearsay. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 195–224). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Millgram, E. (1997). Practical induction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.
Owens, D. (2000). Reason without freedom: The problem of epistemic normativity. London: Routledge.
Owens, D. (2006). Testimony and assertion. Philosophical Studies, 130, 105–129.
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.
Reed, B. (2006). Epistemic circularity squared? Skepticism about common sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73, 186–197.
Reid, T. (1983). Essay on the intellectual powers of man. In R. E. Beanblossom & K. Lehrer (Eds.), Thomas Reid’s inquiry and essays. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Reynolds, S. L. (2002). Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies, 110, 139–161.
Ross, J. (1975). Testimonial evidence. In K. Lehrer (Ed.), Analysis and metaphysics: Essays in honor of R.M. Chisholm (pp. 35–55). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Ross, A. (1986). Why do we believe what we are told? Ratio, 28, 69–88.
Rysiew, P. (2002). Testimony, simulation, and the limits of Inductivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 269–274.
Scheffler, I. (1965). The conditions of knowledge: An introduction to epistemology and education. Chicago: Scott, Foresman.
Schmitt, F. F. (1999). Social epistemology. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. 354–382). Oxford: Blackwell.
Schmitt, F. F. (2006). Testimonial justification and Transindividual reasons. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 193–224). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Siegel, H. (2004). Epistemology and education: An incomplete guide to the social-epistemological issues. Episteme, 1, 129–137.
Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. (2006). Knowledge: Instrumental and testimonial. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 116–123). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stevenson, L. (1993). Why believe what people say? Synthese, 94, 429–451.
Strawson, P. F. (1994). Knowing from words. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 23–27). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Van Cleve, J. (2006). Reid on the credit of human testimony. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The epistemology of testimony (pp. 50–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Webb, M. O. (1993). Why I know about as much as you: A reply to Hardwig. The Journal of Philosophy, 110, 260–270.
Weiner, M. (2003). Accepting testimony. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 256–264.
Welbourne, M. (1979). The transmission of knowledge. The Philosophical Quarterly, 29, 1–9.
Welbourne, M. (1981). The community of knowledge. The Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 302–314.
Welbourne, M. (1986). The community of knowledge. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Welbourne, M. (1994). Testimony, knowledge and belief. In B. K. Matilal & A. Chakrabarti (Eds.), Knowing from words (pp. 297–313). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Williams, M. (1999). Groundless belief: An essay on the possibility of epistemology (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Williamson, T. (1996). Knowing and asserting. The Philosophical Review, 105, 489–523.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this entry
Cite this entry
Lackey, J. (2020). Education and Testimonial Knowledge. In: Peters, M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_709-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_709-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-287-532-7
Online ISBN: 978-981-287-532-7
eBook Packages: Springer Reference EducationReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Education