Abstract
Contributing to the literature on government suppliers’ market risk and liquidity, we document a negative association between the government customer concentration and suppliers’ stock liquidity risk. Our further analysis implies that the gathering of long-horizon institutional investors is an important channel through which government customers help to lower the suppliers’ stock liquidity risk. Long-horizon institutional investors prefer firms with safety net characteristics and transparent information environment. The procurement of government customers creates low-risk, long-term, cost-plus pricing contracts that enable suppliers to achieve stable growth and better performance. Government scrutiny also helps suppliers to attenuate information asymmetry. We also find that the negative association between the government customer concentration and suppliers’ stock liquidity risk is stronger during the financial crisis period. This implies that government customers lead to greater stock liquidity for suppliers during economic times when it is most valuable.
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Notes
Per Lou and Sadka (2011), “During the financial crisis of 2008–2009, stocks with high liquidity betas underperformed.”.
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Appendix: Government supplier industry distribution
Appendix: Government supplier industry distribution
In this appendix (Table 13), we report the sample distribution of government supplier observations across industries.
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Boscaljon, B., Feng, H., Jia, Y. et al. Government customers, institutional investment horizons, and liquidity risk. Rev Quant Finan Acc 56, 273–296 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-020-00894-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-020-00894-w