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Nonlethal Weapons, Noncombatant Immunity, and Combatant Nonimmunity: A Study of Just War Theory

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Abstract

Frequently, the just war principle of noncombatant immunity is interpreted as morally prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants. Apparently, many just war theorists assume that to target means to (intend to) kill. Now that effective nonlethal weapons have been envisaged, it should be evident that there is no conceptual connection between intentionally targeting and intentionally killing. For, using nonlethal weapons, there could be intentional targeting without intentional killing. This paper explores the question of whether the noncombatant immunity principle should be revised, so as to allow uses of nonlethal weapons. Preliminary to answering this question, some other questions are explored, among which are the following. Why should a noncombatant immunity principle be accepted? Why is it morally permissible to intentionally target enemy combatants? Are noncombatants grievously harmed when they are incapacitated by nonlethal weapons? Is it morally permissible to intentionally incapacitate enemy combatants with nonlethal weapons, while knowingly but not intentionally incapacitating noncombatants? In order to focus on moral questions involving nonlethal weapons, questions about their effectiveness or legality are set aside. Instead of the idea of noncombatant immunity as expressed above, a delimited principle of noncombatant immunity is proposed—namely, that, in the conduct of war, the intentional grave injuring or killing of noncombatants is morally prohibited. Also proposed is a principle of noncombatant targeting, which would allow some uses of nonlethal weapons to intentionally incapacitate noncombatants.

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Notes

  1. The labyrinth of noncombatant immunity has many corridors, only some of which can be investigated here. Some recent writings that discuss noncombatant immunity more generally are Coady 2008, Kasher 2007, and McMahan 2009. Other writings about noncombatant immunity are cited below.

  2. Available at www.jnlwp.com/.

  3. Concerning the idea of specification, see Beauchamp and Childress 2009: 16–19.

  4. Cf. W. D. Ross’s (1988) conception of prima facie duties.

  5. This claim is controversial. James Turner Johnson claims that proportionality “suggests using the least force necessary” (1984: 145).

  6. I am presupposing here a conception of overriding a human right. I think that such a conception can be explicated without endorsing the idea of forfeiting rights. The idea of rights-forfeiture is contested by Kasher (2007: 164) and qualified by McMahan (2009: 10).

  7. For the words ‘liberty’ and ‘autonomy’, see Mayer 2007: 222, 226. A broader noncombatant immunity principle is also supported by Kaurin 2008.

  8. Originally, this paper was written as the basis for a talk at the conference ‘Emerging military technologies, ethics and leadership: Moral Implications for command, control and communication’, The Netherlands Defence Academy, Amsterdam, 6 November 2008. Subsequently, a talk based on it was delivered at a conference of the International Society for Military Ethics (ISME 2009), University of San Diego, 30 January 2009. I want to thank members of the audiences for their stimulating and insightful comments. I also want to thank the anonymous referees for very pertinent remarks that helped me to improve this paper.

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Lango, J.W. Nonlethal Weapons, Noncombatant Immunity, and Combatant Nonimmunity: A Study of Just War Theory. Philosophia 38, 475–497 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9231-3

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