Abstract
Philosophical discussions of prioritarianism, the view that we ought to give priority to those who are worse off, have hitherto been almost exclusively focused on cases involving a fixed population. The aim of this paper is to extend the discussion of prioritarianism to encompass also variable populations. I argue that prioritarianism, in its simplest formulation, is not tenable in this area. However, I also propose several revised formulations that, so I argue, show more promise.
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Brown, C. Prioritarianism for Variable Populations. Philos Stud 134, 325–361 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-0897-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-0897-5