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Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, 97403-1284, Eugene, OR

    William C. Mitchell

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Mitchell, W.C. Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science. Public Choice 56, 101–119 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00115751

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