Abstract
We formalize Jeffrey's (1983) notion of ratifiability and show that the resulting formal structure can be obtained more directly by means of a theory of counterfactual beliefs. One implication is that, under the appropriate formalizations, together with certain restrictions on beliefs, Bayesian decision theory and causal decision theory coincide.
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Shin, H.S. A reconstruction of Jeffrey's notion of ratifiability in terms of counterfactual beliefs. Theor Decis 31, 21–47 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134131
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134131