Conclusion
I have shown as promised that Reichenbach did not refute either thesis (I) or thesis (II). I have also shown that an argument of Lewis's may be used to establish a weakened version of (I) that has two interesting consequences: if we are to assign probabilities with any justification at all, we must have either certainties or intrinsic probabilities; and if we are frequentists, we must have certainties.
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Van Cleve, J. Probability and certainty: A reexamination of the Lewis-Reichenbach debate. Philosophical Studies 32, 323–334 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368686
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368686