Skip to main content
Log in

Reply to Marks

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Austin, J. L.: 1950, ‘Truth’, inPhilosophical Papers, Oxford University Press 1990, 117–133.

  • Barwise, Jon and Etchemendy, John: 1987,The Liar, Oxford University Press.

  • Burge, Tyler: 1978, ‘Belief and Synonymy’,The Journal of Philosophy 75, 119–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, Hartry: 1984, ‘Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge?’,The Philosophical Review 93, 509–552.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forbes, Graeme: 1985,The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press.

  • Forbes, Graeme: 1987, ‘Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective’,The Philosophical Review 96, 3–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forbes, Graeme: 1989,Languages of Possibility, Basil Blackwell.

  • Forbes, Graeme: 1990, ‘The Indispensability ofSinn’,The Philosophical Review 99, 535–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forbes, Graeme: 1992, ‘What Speech Reports Mean’, unpublished manuscript.

  • Kaplan, David: 1989, ‘Demonstratives’, inThemes from Kaplan edited by J. Almoget al., Oxford University Press, 481–566.

  • Lewis, David: 1983,Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Oxford University Press.

  • Quine, W. V. O.: 1961, ‘Reference and Modality’, inFrom a Logical Point of View, Harper and Row, 139–59.

  • Salmon, Nathan: 1986,Frege's Puzzle, The MIT Press.

  • Schweizer, Paul: 1992, ‘A Syntactic Approach to Modality’,The Journal of Philosophical Logic 21, 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yagisawa, Takashi: 1984, ‘The Pseudo-Mates Argument’,The Philosophical Review 93, 407–418.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Forbes, G. Reply to Marks. Philos Stud 69, 281–295 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00990090

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00990090

Navigation