Abstract
Consider bargaining situations with two persons, where both have a specific idea of what would be an equitable outcome. In case these ideas differ, a procedure is needed which leads to a compromise between the different views. In the present paper the axioms of restricted homogeneity and of relative monotonicity are introduced, each of which, together with other standard conditions, allows one to determine a solution for this class of bargaining problems. An extension of this solution to bargaining problems with more than two persons is formulated.
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Brunner, J.K. Bargaining with reasonable aspirations. Theor Decis 37, 311–321 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079913
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079913