Abstract
Four theoretical approaches to the study of organizations that can be identified in the relevant literature are compared: Thegoal paradigm, theexchange paradigm, thenexus of contracts paradigm, and theconstitutional paradigm. It is argued that the latter provides the more fruitful theoretical perspective in that it reconciles an individualist methodology with an account of organisations as corporate actors, as units of collective action.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adelstein, R. P. (1991) “The Life and Times of the Corporate Person.”Constitutional Political Economy 2: 7–30.
Alchian, A. A. (1987) “Property Rights.”The New Palgrave Vol. III: 1031–1034.
Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972) “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.”American Economic Review 62: 777–795.
Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1973) “The Property Right Paradigm.”Journal of Economic History: 16–27.
Alchian, A. A. and S. Woodward (1987) “Reflections on the Theory of the Firm.”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 110–136.
Alchian, A. A. and S. Woodward (1988) “The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm—A Review of Oliver E. Williamson'sThe Economic Institutions of Capitalism.”Journal of Economic Literature 26: 65–79.
Aram, J. D. (1976)Dilemmas of Administrative Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Barnard, C.I. (1938)The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Butler, H.D. and B.D. Baysinger (1983) “Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory.”Emory Law Journal 32: 1009–1109.
Blau, P. M. (1964)Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York.
Boudreaux, D.J. and R.G. Holcombe (1989) “Government by Contract.”Public Finance Quarterly 17: 264–280.
Buchanan, J. M. (1960)Fiscal Theory and Political Economy. Selected Essays. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1966) “An Individualistic Theory of Political Process.” In: D. Easton (ed)Varieties of Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall: 25–37.
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962)The Calculus of Consent—Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor.
Coase, R. H. [1988 (1937)] “The Nature of the Firm.” In: Coase, R.H.The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press: 33–55.
Coleman, J. S. (1974)Power and the Structure of Society. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Coleman, J. S. (1986)Individual Interests and Collective Action. Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coleman, J. S. (1990)Foundations of Social Theory Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Cyert, R. M. and J.G. March (1963)A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall.
Donaldson, L. (1985)In Defence of Organization Theory—A Reply to the Critics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Emerson, R. M. (1969) “Operant Psychology and Exchange Theory.” In: R.L. Burgess and D. Bushell (eds)Behavioral Sociology. New York and London: Columbia University Press: 379–405.
Emerson, R. M. (1972) “Exchange Theory, Part II: Exchange Relations and Network Structures.” In: J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr. and Bo Anderson (eds)Sociological Theories in Progress II. Boston: 58–87.
Etzioni, A. (1968)The Active Society. New York: Free Press. (Reference in text to German translation (1974):Die aktive Gesellschaft. Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen.)
Farma, E. F. (1980) “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.”Journal of Political Economy 88: 288–307.
Georgiou, P. (1973) “The Goal Paradigm and Notes Towards a Counter Paradigm.” In:Administrative Science Quarterly 18: 291–310.
Gifford, A. Jr. (1991) “A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm.”Public Choice 68: 91–106.
Goldberg, V. P. (ed) (1989)Readings in the Economics of Contract Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gross, E. (1969) “The Definition of Organization Goals.”The British Journal of Sociology 20: 277–294.
Hall, R. H. (1980) “Organizational Goals.” In: M. Lockett and R. Spear (eds)Organizations as Systems. Milton Keynes: 88–96.
Hall, R. H. (1987)Organizations: Structure, Processes, and Outcomes. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Hayek, F. A. (1978)New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Homans, G. C. (1961)Social Behavior—Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt Brace. (Revised edition 1974).
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling [1986 (1976)] “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.” In: J.B. Barney and W. G. Ouchi (eds) (1986)Organizational Economics. San Francisco and London: Jossey-Bass Publishers: 214–275.
Klein, B. (1983) “Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership-and Control.”Journal of Law and Economics 26: 367–374.
Klein, B., R. G. Crawford and A. A. Alchian (1978) “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.”Journal of Law and Economics 21: 297–326.
March, J. G., and H. A. Simon (1958)Organizations. New York.
Moe, T. M. (1984) “The New Economics of Organization.”American Journal of Political Science 28: 739–777.
Nelson, R. R. and S. G. Winter (1982)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Perrow, Ch. (1972a) “Organizations: Organizational Goals.” In:International Encyclopedia of the Social Science 11. New York, London: 305–311.
Perrow, Ch. (1972b) “Organizational Goals.” In: K. Azumi and J. Hage (eds)Organizational Systems—A Text-Reader in the Sociology of Organizations. Lexington, Toronto, London: 440–463.
Porter, L. W., Lawler III, E. E., Hackman, J. R. (1975)Behavior in Organizations. Tokyo.
Salisbury, R. (1969) “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.”Midwest Journal of Political Science XIII: 1–32.
Schmitt, D. R. and G. Marwell (1977) “Cooperation and the Human Group.” In: R.L. Hamblin and J. H. Kunkel (eds)Behavioral Theory in Sociology, Essays in Honor of George C. Homans. New Brunswick, N.J.: 171–191.
Scott, W. R. (1987)Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall International.
Simon, H. A. (1964) “On the Concept of Organizational Goals.”Administrative Science Quarterly 9: 1–22.
Simon, H. A. [1986 (1951)] “A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship.” In: L. Putterman (ed)The Economic Nature of the Firm—A Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 103–110.
Simon, H. A. (1991) “Organizations and Markets.”The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 25–44.
Stolte, J.F. and Emerson, R.M. (1977) “Structural Inequality: Positions and Power in Network Structures.” In: R.L. Hamblin and J.A. Kunker (ed)Behavioral Theory in Sociology, Essays in Honor of George C. Homans. New Brunswick, N.J.: 117–138.
Vanberg, V. (1982)Markt und Organisation—Individualistische Sozialtheorie und das Problem korporativen Handelns. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Vanberg, V. and J. M. Buchanan (1986) “Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt.”Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2: 215–227.
Weingast, B. R. and W. J. Marshall (1988) “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.”Journal of Political Economy 96: 132–163.
Williamson, O., M. Wacher and J. Harris (1986) “Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange.” In: L. Putterman (ed)The Economic Nature of the Firm—A Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 135–155.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I would like to thank Richard E. Wagner for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vanberg, V.J. Organizations as constitutional systems. Constit Polit Econ 3, 223–253 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393121
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393121