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Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions

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Abstract

We propose a Bayesian approach to inference in repeated oral English auctions. The model allows for a dynamic behavior of the sequence of selling prices. We apply the technique to a sale of antiques and find a clear evidence of dynamic effects.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université de Lille 3 and CORE, Lille, France

    Frédéric Jouneau-Sion

  2. Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgie

    Frédéric Jouneau-Sion

  3. Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, WC1E 6BT, London, UK

    Gian Luigi Albano

Authors
  1. Gian Luigi Albano
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  2. Frédéric Jouneau-Sion
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Correspondence to Gian Luigi Albano.

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Albano, G.L., Jouneau-Sion, F. Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions. Test 13, 193–211 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02603006

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02603006

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