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(Nonstandard) lessons of world-switching cases

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  1. University of Kentucky, 40506-0027, Lexington, KY, USA

    Sanford Goldberg

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  1. Sanford Goldberg
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Goldberg, S. (Nonstandard) lessons of world-switching cases. Philosophia 32, 93–129 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02641618

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