Abstract
In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’. According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise.
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Tierno, J.T. On the alleged connection between Moral Evil and human freedom: Response to Nagasawa and Trakakis. SOPHIA 43, 115–126 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02782441
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02782441