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The ontological argument

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References

  1. William Rowe, “The Ontological Argument’ inReason and Responsibility, 5th ed., Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif., 1981), pp. 16–17 and “The Ontological Argument and Question-Begging’,International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 7, (1976), pp. 425–27.

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  2. Ibid. William Rowe, ‘The Ontological Argument’ inReason and Responsibility, 5th ed., Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif., 1981), p. 21 and p. 431 respectively.

  3. ‘The Ontological Argument and Question-Begging’ and ‘Comments on Professor Davis “Does the Ontological Argument Beg the Question?”‘, both inInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 7 (1976), pp. 431–32 and pp. 444–47, respectively.

  4. See, William J. Wainwright, ‘Unihorses and the Ontological Argument’, Sophia,vol. 17 (1978) pp.27–32 and ‘The Ontological Argument, Question-Begging, and Professor Rowe’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 9 (1978), pp. 254–57. See also, Stephen T. Davis, ‘Does the Ontological Argument Beg the Question?’,International Journal for Philosophy of Religion vol. 7 (1976, pp. 433–42.

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  5. In Section II I argue that it is reasonable to believe that ‘God is a possible being’ is true only if that is taken to mean ‘The concept of God is coherent’. That latter I take to be equivalent to: it is possible that: God exists' is true. That is why I say that for 2 in Rowe's argument to be plausible, ‘x might have existed in reality’ must be takren to mean ‘it is possible that “x exists” is true’.

  6. I am indebted to William Rowe who in correspondence pointed out weaknesses in my criticism of (8a), gave the two interpretations of ‘x exists in the understanding’ that I have employed and said that while the ontological argument requires the second interpretation, only the first can be confidently asserted. I have tried to explain why the second interpretation is required and why only the first can be confidently asserted.

  7. But the arguments William J. Wainwright gives in his two papers (see note 4, above) are meant to at least cast doubt on whether it (or the concept of a unihorse) is a coherent concept. A unihorse (or unicornex) is by definition an existing unicorn. Rowe introduces the notion of a unicornex in his, ‘Comments on Professor Davis’ … ’ (see note 3), pp. 445–46 and Wainwright employs the concept of a unihorse in his two papers (see note 4) on Rowe's work on the ontological argument,

  8. ‘Unihorses and the Ontological Argument’.Sophia, vol. 17 (1978), pp. 28–29. In the article, ‘not’ is mistakenly omitted after ‘do’ in premise 2.

  9. Ibid. ‘Unihorses and the Ontological Argument’.Sophia, vol. 17 (1978), pp. 29–31.

  10. William Rowe, ‘The Ontological Argument’, (see note 1) inReason and Responsibility, 5th ed., Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif., 1981), p. 18.

  11. I am indebted to William Wainwright for objections to my attempt in an earlier version of this paper to revive Guanilo's objection. His objections caused me to substantially revise that earlier attempt

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  1. Wayne State University, Detroit, U.S.A.

    Bruce Russell

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Russell, B. The ontological argument. SOPH 24, 38–47 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02910607

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