Abstract
Long-term care (LTC) is one of the largest uninsured risks facing the elderly. In this paper, we first survey the standard causes of what has been dubbed the LTC insurance puzzle and then suggest that a possible way out of this puzzle is to make the reimbursement formula less threatening for those who fear a too long period of dependence. We adopt a reimbursement formula resting on Arrow’s theorem of the deductible, i.e. that it is optimal to focus insurance coverage on the states with largest expenditures. It implies full self-insurance for the first years of dependency followed by full insurance thereafter. We show that this result remains at work with ex post moral hazard.
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Notes
Using questionnaire data together with a structural model of decision-making in the face of late-in-life risks, Ameriks et al. (2018) try to elicit on whether the lack of demand for LTC insurance reflects individual preferences, individual circumstances, or defects in the products available in the market. They conclude that these three factors contribute to explaining the puzzle.
Boyer et al. (2018) show on the basis of a survey conducted in Canada that ignorance explains part of the non take up of LTC insurance.
Nordman (2018).
In a study of health plan choices made by the employees of an American firm, Bhargava et al. (2017) find that deductibles are not popular, but this reflects clear behavioural biases.
Note also that we are assuming an additive utility function which is the sum of the utilities of consumption, level of autonomy and bequest. If the utility function is not additive, we will still have the result that the marginal utilities of consumption, level of autonomy and bequest are equalized in each state of nature and that they are the same in all the states with long and severe dependency (i.e. states \(s>\bar{s}\)). The levels of the variables in that case may be state-dependent as long as the equality of the marginal utilities is satisfied.
While we assume that the individual chooses both \(D_{s}\) and \(b_{s}\) after observing the state of nature, another possibility could be to suppose that financial decisions (the insurance rate and the level of bequest) are made first and only health decision (the amount of care) is chosen after observing the state. In that case, the conclusions regarding insurance would not change, but we would have some changes concerning the choice of bequests. In particular, in the states of nature with \(\alpha _{s}>0\), it would be optimal to choose a higher bequest than the one which implies \(u'(c_{s})=v'(b_{s})\) because a higher \(b_{s}\) would reduce \(D_{s}\) (which is too high due to moral hazard) and would allow to save on the insurance premium. In the states of nature with \(\alpha _{s}=0\), it would still be optimal to choose bequests which equalize \(u'(c_{s})\) and \(v'(b_{s})\) because LTC expenditure in these states does not affect the premium.
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Acknowledgements
Financial support from the Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO) research Project CRESUS and the Chaire “Marché des risques et création de valeur” of the FdR/SCOR is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Jacques Drèze, Erik Schokkaert and two anonymous referees for excellent remarks and suggestions.
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Appendix: Model with several periods
Appendix: Model with several periods
In this appendix, we show why the states of nature used in the above model can be viewed as periods of dependency. We do so using a simple example. Assume 3 periods consisting of the three sequences:
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AAA, with probability \(p_{0}=(1-p)^{2}\)
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AAD, with \(p_{1}=(1-p)p\)
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ADD with \(p_{2}=p\)
where A stands for autonomy and D for dependence. We assume that the probability of dependence p is constant and that the state of dependance is irreversible. We want to show that the above model of one period and different states of nature is a reduced form of a multiple period model. We assume no time preference and a zero rate of interest and constant income per period equal to y. People can freely save (s in the first period and \(\sigma\) in the second period).
We can now write the lifetime utilities corresponding to these 3 sequences.
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Klimaviciute, J., Pestieau, P. Insurance with a deductible: a way out of the long term care insurance puzzle. J Econ 130, 297–307 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00700-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00700-0