Abstract
One of the reasons for relativistic attitudes toward science is the impossibility of justifying scientists’ decisions in the face of alternative theories. According to this paper, an alternative theory can challenge scientific rationality only if the conditions of “methodological shortcomings of scientists” and the “existence of alternative theories” are met at a specific time. A commonly used technique to counter relativism is to try to supplement and equip scientists’ methodologies when confronted with alternative theories. However, this paper focuses on evaluating the possibility of “existence an alternative theory.” To this end, by referring to the different definitions of being alternative, we try to show that only “after the decision” and “the conversion of the scientific community” can a theory be considered justifiably “alternative.” Therefore, the relativistic claim is inconsistent because relativists must first accept the validity of scientists’ decisions to attribute being alternative to a theory. In this work, we provide evidence for our claim using a historical example. We also defend conservatism as a corollary of our discussion.
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Notes
These two conditions may be seen as a distinction between two types of relativism: relativism about rationality (based on the non-existence of meta-scientific values in the scientific method) and conceptual relativism (based on the possibility of existence of various justified theories) (Sankey 1993). However, even in relativism versus rationality, the issue of alternative theory is present. Because the “inadequacy of the methodology of scientists” becomes challenging only when scientists should decide between “alternatives.” As Kuhn himself states, “a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place (Kuhn 1970a, b, 77).” Therefore, it is still a fundamental issue to determine the conditions under which a different asserted hypothesis can be called an alternative theory.
This requirement for the necessity of clear-cut distinction of empirical/Theoretical parts in EEA could be extended to the distinction of casual/description parts in PRA.
For example, it took a century to invent a machine that could provide clear evidence for Newton’s second law (Kuhn 1961).
This concept seems to meet Davidson’s most important criterion: uninterpreted reality. Davidson (1974) explicitly mentions that to give objective meaning to the concept of difference, we need uninterpreted content or a neutral reality. He mentioned that it is impossible to have an alternative theory since we cannot check the correspondence of a theory with unconceptualized reality. However, the theory-neutral reality in the negative form can determine theory, though it needs to be completed by another criterion to serve as the meta-language in his account.
Friedman (2010) attempts to complete the critical theory research program on science—in the case of Cassirer, which he believes is a retrospective approach—with a prospective and transcendental approach. To do this, Friedman considers all philosophical and intellectual disputes and ideas, which finally makes theory B possible. He believes that only this complementary process responds to the doubts of Kuhn’s incommensurability and can prove the rational transition in the history of science. However, this project shows that we cannot deduce theory B from theory A through logical steps or the translation of predicates. However, this project cannot be considered independent from the retrospective view. Although filling the explanatory gap between theories (A to B) is very beneficial, it is a retrospective view, which makes it possible to formulate A’s position itself. In other words, retrospective analysis has a kind of epistemological priority rather than a prospective analysis.
Maybe it is better to call it, “stationary luminiferous ether”, as Einstein called it, that was an assumed “solid nature body” as an “inert medium filling up universal space” for light propagation (Renn 2007, 614).
Also for this line of argument look at Ruhmkorff (2011).
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Hajizadeh, A. Can Alternative Scientific Theories Challenge Scientific Rationality?. Axiomathes 32, 195–215 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09521-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09521-8