Skip to main content
Log in

Major and minor groups in evolution

  • Published:
Biology & Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Kerr and Godfrey-Smith argue that two mathematically equivalent, alternative formal representations drawn from population genetics, the contextualist and collectivist formalisms, may be equally good for quantifying the dynamics of some natural systems, despite important differences between the formalisms. I draw on constraints on causal representation from Woodward (Making things happen, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003) and Eberhardt and Scheines (Philos Sci 74(5):981–995, 2006) to argue that one or the other formalism will be superior for arbitrary natural systems in which individuals form different types of groups.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Waters characterizes dynamically adequate equations as empirically sufficient for bookkeeping (Waters 2005, 315). Keeping good books is different, writes Waters, from correctly representing causal structures.

  2. The reality of sickle-cell disease and the causal influence of sickle-cell alleles is much more complex than the sketch here would suggest, but consideration of a simplified version of the sickle-cell case has become standard in arguments over formal representations (see Sober and Lewontin 1982; Sober 1987; Maynard Smith 1987a, b; Kitcher and Sterelny 1988; Kitcher et al. 1990; Lloyd 2005; Lloyd et al. 2005; Waters 2005).

  3. Other genes may affect organism phenotypes by means of gamete phenotypes; in these cases, the organisms are not major groups of gametes differentiated by such genetic variations.

  4. The collective/particle contrast follows Okasha (2006).

  5. It worthwhile to note, too, that in the collectivist formalism, the f(i)t parameters take particle frequencies as inputs. They must do so for the equations to have a recursive structure. Thus, not only do fitness parameters quantifying differential genetic effects appear weighting collective frequencies, they do so in equations featuring particle frequencies that are not weighted by fitness parameters. Even though particle frequencies could be weighted by fitness parameters, they are not, clearly implying that the differential genetic effects are effects on collectives rather than effects on particles.

  6. The f(i)t parameters quantify group formation rates: they are set by the Hardy–Weinberg equation for the gamete-to-zygote lifecycle transition. The i and n parameters are just counts of population members.

  7. See Lloyd (2005, 306) for the dynamical insufficiency of contextualist models for cases where particles are sorted into genotypes non-randomly, as occurs as a result of gametic selection; she credits the point to Lewontin.

  8. Waters (2005, §2) does an excellent job distinguishing the various positions in the monism versus pluralism debate; he disavows genic pluralism as an appropriate label for his (2005) view, though he acknowledges that “all selective episodes (or, perhaps, almost all) can be interpreted in terms of genic selection” (2005, 314).

References

  • Cohen J, Dupas P (2008) Free distribution or cost-sharing? Evidence from a randomized malaria prevention experiment. On-line working paper series

  • Eberhardt F, Scheines R (2006) Interventions and causal inference. Philos Sci 74(5):981–995

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glymour C, Scheines R, Spirtes P (1993) Causation, prediction, and search. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P, Kerr B (2012) Gestalt-switching and the evolutionary transitions. Br J Philos Sci 0:1–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerr B, Godfrey-Smith P (2002) Individualist and multi-level perspectives on selection in structured populations. Biol Philos 17(4):477–517

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P, Sterelny KIM (1988) The return of the gene. J Philos 85:339–361

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher P, Sterelny KIM, Kenneth Waters C (1990) The illusory riches of Sober’s monism. J Philos 87(3):158–161

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D (2000) Causation as influence. J Philos 97:182–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd E (2005) Why the gene will not return. Philos Sci 72(2):287–310

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd E, Dunn M, Cianciollo J, Mannouris C (2005) Pluralism without genic causes. Philos Sci 72(2):334–341

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd E, Lewontin RC, Feldman MW (2008) The generational cycle of state spaces and adequate genetical representation. Philos Sci 75:140–156

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J (1987a) How to model evolution. In: Dupre J (ed) The latest on the best. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J (1987b) Reply to Sober. In: Dupre J (ed) The latest on the best. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J, Szathmáry E (1995) The major transitions in evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Okasha S (2006) Evolution and the levels of selection. Oxford University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pearl J (2000) Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Scudo FM (1967) Selection on both haplo and diplophase. Genetics 56:693–704

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober E (1984) The nature of selection: evolutionary theory in philosophical focus. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober E (1987) Comments on Maynard Smith. In: Dupre J (ed) The Latest on the best: essays on evolution and optimality. MIT Press, Cambridge, p 359

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober E, Lewontin RC (1982) Artifact, cause and genic selection. Philos Sci 49(2):157–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober E, Wilson DS (1998) Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny K (2001) The evolution of agency and other essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Waters KC (2005) Why genic and multilevel selection theories are here to stay. Philos Sci 72(2):311–333

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson DS (1975) A theory of group selection. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 72(1):143–146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J (2002) What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account. Philos Sci 69(S3):S366–S377

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J (2003) Making things happen. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Gildenhuys.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Below are equations appropriate for a haplo-diplont model (Scudo 1967), suitable for a system featuring genetic effects on viability at both the gamete and zygote lifecycle phases, along with coefficient k quantifying meiosis. The haplo-diplont model contains three separate sets parameters, v’s, w’s, and k, which quantify differential genetic effects on gametes, zygotes, and meiosis, respectively. The genotypic selection model is a determination of the haplo-diplont model in which v 1 and v 2 are set to the same value and k = ½.

  • Pre-selection A1 gametes = p

  • Pre-selection A2 gametes = q = (1 − p)

  • Post-selection A1 gametes = P = ν 1 p

  • Post-selection A2 gametes = Q = ν 2 q

  • Average gamete fitness = V = P + Q

  • Mature A1 gametes = \(P^{\prime } = \frac{P}{V}\)

  • Mature A2 gametes = \(Q^{\prime } = \frac{Q}{V}\)

  • Pre-selection A1A1 organisms = \(d = (P^{\prime } )^{2}\)

  • Pre-selection A1A2 organisms = \(h = (Q^{\prime } )^{2}\)

  • Pre-selection A2A2 organisms = \(r = 2P^{\prime } Q^{\prime }\)

  • Post-selection A1A2 organisms = D = w D d

  • Post-selection A1A2 organisms = H = w H h

  • Post-selection A2A2 organisms = R = w R r

  • Average organism fitness = W = D + H+R

  • Mature A1A2 organisms = \(D^{\prime } = \frac{D}{W}\)

  • Mature A1A2 organisms = \(H^{\prime } = \frac{H}{W}\)

  • Mature A2A2 organisms = \(R^{\prime } = \frac{R}{W}\)

  • Next-generation A1 gametes = \(p^{\prime } = D^{\prime } + {\text{k}}^{\prime }\)

  • Next-generation A2 gametes = \(q^{\prime } = R^{\prime } + {\text{k}}H^{\prime }\)

Reduced to a pair of equations, the haplo-diplont model is this:

$$\begin{gathered} \bar{p}(t + 1) = \frac{{w_{D} \left( {v_{1} p} \right)^{2} + w_{H} 2v_{1} pv_{2} qk}}{{w_{D} \left( {v_{1} p} \right)^{2} + w_{H} 2v_{1} pv_{2} qk + w_{R} \left( {v_{2} q} \right)^{2} }} \hfill \\ \bar{q}(t + 1) = \frac{{w_{H} 2v_{1} pv_{2} q(1 - k) + w_{R} \left( {v_{2} q} \right)^{2} }}{{w_{D} \left( {v_{1} p} \right)^{2} + w_{H} 2v_{1} pv_{2} q + w_{R} \left( {v_{2} q} \right)^{2} }} \hfill \\ \end{gathered} $$
(13)

Here is a causal graph for this sort of system (Fig. 10):

Fig. 10
figure 10

Causal graph of a haplo-diplont model

Note how the v 1 and v 2 variables, which quantify genetic effects on gametes prior to zygote formation, impact zygote frequencies. The contextualist formalism cannot quantify genetic effects on gametes prior to zygote formation by means of the α and β parameters, because the f(i)t parameters are not functions of these.

Even if we alter the f(i)t functions such that they are a function of the α and β parameters in order to accommodate gametic selection prior to zygote formation, the result is that the α and β parameters can no longer quantify differential zygote viability: poor gametic performance may demand a low value for, say, α 2, while strong zygote performance among homozygotes for the dominant allele may demand a high value for the same quantity. Cases of antagonistic pleiotropy, in which gametic selection and zygotic selection favor rival alleles, cannot be modeled using a single set of fitness parameters: instead two sets of fitness parameters must quantify selection at each lifecycle phase, as are featured, in the form of both v’s and w’s, in the haplo-diplont model above.

Appendix 2

In their (2012) consideration of a trait-group model of altruism, an instance of a contextualist model, KGS consider a system in which groups of three particles are formed, individuals have a baseline fitness of 2, altruists contribute 2 extra offspring each to fellow group members, and incur a cost of 1 offspring for their altruism. KGS set out fixed fitness parameters for both the contextualist and the collectivist representations:

$$\begin{array}{*{20}c} {\alpha_{1} = 1} \hfill & {\alpha_{2} = 3} \hfill & {\alpha_{3} = 5} \hfill & {\beta_{0} = 2} \hfill & {\beta_{1} = 4} \hfill & {\beta_{2} = 6} \hfill \\ {\pi_{0} = 6} \hfill & {\pi_{1} = 9} \hfill & {\pi_{2} = 12} \hfill & {\phi_{1} = \frac{1}{9}} \hfill & {\phi_{2} = \frac{1}{2}} \hfill & {} \hfill \\ \end{array}$$

KGS next run their near-variant test on the trait-group model, changing things so that altruists provide a benefit of 4 to fellow group members and incur a cost of 2. They conclude from their test that both the contextualist and the collectivist parameterizations are on roughly equal footing since one must change the same number of parameters in each formalism to restore dynamical adequacy for the near-variant (Godfrey-Smith and Kerr 2012, 213).

KGS’s formal representation of the trait-group model uses fitness coefficients rather than fitness functions, such that their equations are not causally adequate. When their fitness coefficients are replaced by fitness functions that separate out the causal mechanisms into a baseline component, a benefit component, and a cost component, it becomes clear that KGS’s near variant test effectively involves changing multiple causal mechanisms at once, since they imagine altering both the benefit conferred by altruists (b) and the cost of altruism (c). Accordingly, the transformation they use to generate a near variant is not produced by an intervention. This is why KGS draw a different conclusion than the one drawn here with respect to contextualist representation of minor groups.

To see the case in detail, replace KGS’s fixed fitness coefficients for the α and β parameters in the contextualist model with the following fitness functions (with k as baseline fitness):

$$\begin{gathered} \alpha_{i} = k + b_{i} - c_{i} \hfill \\ \beta_{i} = k + b_{i} \hfill \\ k = 2 \hfill \\ b_{i} = 2i \hfill \\ c_{i} = 1 \hfill \\ \end{gathered}$$

KGS generate a near variant by means of two simultaneous interventions on the system, one setting b i  = 4, and another setting c i  = 2. If we contemplate running these interventions separately, then we get results that parallel the ones we got above for the D. dendriticum case: the contextualist formalism handles informally described interventions by means of changes to the values of single quantities, while the collectivist one does not do so. Indeed, KGS themselves note that “if costs alone, or benefits alone, are altered, then the contextual parametrization fares better” (2012, 214).

Appendix 3

Consider a contextualist representation of viability selection among diploids, where, if modeled using the collectivist formalism, π0 = wD = 4, π1 = wH = 5, π2 = wR = 6. A dynamically adequate version of the contextualist formalism for the same case, where f(i)t parameters are once again set by the Hardy–Weinberg rule, looks like this (from Eqs. 7):

$$\begin{gathered} \bar{p}(t + 1) = \frac{{\alpha_{2} p^{2} + \alpha_{1} 2pq}}{{\alpha_{2} p^{2} + \alpha_{1} 2pq + \beta_{1} 2pq + \beta_{0} q^{2} }} \hfill \\ \bar{q}(t + 1) = \frac{{\alpha_{1} 2pq + \beta_{0} q^{2} }}{{\alpha_{2} p^{2} + \alpha_{1} 2pq + \beta_{1} 2pq + \beta_{0} q^{2} }} \hfill \\ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {\alpha_{2} = 3} & {\alpha_{1} = 2.5} & {\beta_{1} = 2.5} & {\beta_{0} = 2} \\ \end{array} \hfill \\ \end{gathered} $$
(14)

If we use the haplo-diplont model (13) from “Appendix 1” above to infer the dynamics of our diploid system with zygote fitness parameters set as above, no selection prior to zygote formation (v1 = v2), some drive k = 3/5, and p = 0.5, we infer that, after a single generation, the frequency of the A allele grows to 0.6. Reproducing this result using the contextualist model requires bumping α 1 to 3 and reducing β 1 to 2 (Godfrey-Smith and Kerr 2012, 212). That both parameters must be altered shows the causal inadequacy of the contextualist formalism for the diploid selection case.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gildenhuys, P. Major and minor groups in evolution. Biol Philos 29, 1–32 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9381-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9381-3

Keywords

Navigation