Abstract
This study investigates the establishment of new anticorruption structures arising from a radical regulatory shift experience. Rooted in a recent state-corporate crime scandal overlapping Quebec’s construction industry and political domain, we examine the organizational adaptation of regulatory entities across three major shifts: increased police resources; enhanced regulatory collaborations; and an overreliance on penal channels to prosecute wrongdoers. Based on interviews conducted with several police officials and regulatory agencies (inspectors, managers, and directors), this article presents the enforcement challenges experienced by anticorruption forces during this transition. Specific themes concern intra- and inter-agency struggles, media scrutiny, and prosecution. The study illustrates how heightened prosecution may come as a necessary step for many regulatory actors, albeit constituting a highly perilous road over the long-term. Such work remains critical in assessing contemporary anticorruption and regulatory progresses.
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Notes
L.Q. [53], c. 21.
L.Q. [58], c. 25.
L.R.Q. [57], c. L-6.1.
In French: Unité permanente anticorruption.
Include mostly middle-managers, team leaders and directors. Since the unit is a coordinating one, many employees are not part of the unit per se, but are resources loaned by all incorporated agencies to conduct investigations or verifications. When all loaned resources are considered, the unit consists of nearly 300 employees.
R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, 2002 SCC 73.
See for example Agence du revenu du Québec c. BT Céramiques inc.,
2015 QCCQ 14534.
A 2010 public inquiry found that the selection process to nominate a judge was permeable to various kind of political influences in Quebec [6].
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Cited laws
An Act respecting political party leadership campaigns, L.Q 2011, c. 38.
An Act to amend the Act respecting elections and referendums in municipalities with respect to financing, L.Q 2013, c. 7.
An Act to amend the Professional Code with respect to disciplinary justice, L.Q 2013, c. 12.
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Reeves-Latour, M., Morselli, C. Fighting corruption in a time of crisis: Lessons from a radical regulatory shift experience. Crime Law Soc Change 69, 349–370 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9741-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9741-z