Abstract
The idea that two objects can coincide—by sharing all their proper parts, or matter—yet be non-identical, results in the “Problem of Coincident Objects”: in what relation do objects stand if they are not identical but share all their proper parts? One solution is to introduce material constitution. In this paper, I argue that this is ad hoc since, first, this solution cannot be generalized to solve similar (real) problems, and, second, there are pseudo cases of coincidence that should not trigger the introduction of material constitution and these cannot be distinguished in any principled way from the allegedly real cases of coincidence.
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Notes
A similar principle is suggested by Rodríguez-Pereyra (2002, 216–217).
Strictly speaking, only such things as solutions, objections, or replies can be ad hoc—not objects, relations or other non-propositional entities. I use locutions as “constitution is ad hoc” in an elliptical manner for “postulating constitution is an ad hoc solution”; and “ad hoc entity” for “the postulation of the existence of this entity is ad hoc”. Thanks to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg and an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this.
One might object that constitution does not even solve the problem, but only labels coincidence as a case of constitution without explaining how two objects can share many properties while having different persistence conditions (Olson 1996, 375). I will not pursue this line of reasoning; I simply assume that constitution is a solution to PCO.
An alternative motivation for constitution might be that we have the intuition that in some cases there are two objects (a statue and its matter), and that constitution is introduced by stipulation to account for this intuition. But even if a notion is introduced because it “fleshes out” a certain intuition, it could still be that there are other (less ad hoc) ways to account for the intuition, or that this intuition should be abandoned because it leads to paradoxes or other problems (see also Sects. 4.3, 6). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
Complaining that it is not allegedly, but definitely, the case that we have two objects in PCO is question-begging against the constitution-denier who holds that PCO merely reflects how we use terms such as “Goliath” and “Lump”.
In the remainder of the paper I treat Lump as a mereological sum, but nothing hinges on this.
Claiming that Candle’s matter constitutes Candle does not solve PC, since this leaves unexplained how it can be that Candle has incompatible properties.
They even have different Wikipedia entries!
That I use fictional entities is irrelevant. I could have taken George Elliot and Mary Ann Evans: the former had a contract with a publisher, the latter did not; the latter could exist without the former existing. In a Fregean spirit I could have chosen Hesperus and Phosphorus; one is visible in the morning, the other is not.
That we seem to speak as if a statue is something different from its constituting matter, while we do not speak of a bent candle as being different from a candle is a reflection of this intuitive difference.
Compare Markosian (1998) on when brute answers may be justified.
Note how ad hoc-ness “spreads when pressed upon”. This is not that surprising: if a solution is ad hoc then no good defence can be given for it; hence some defences against the charge of being ad hoc will be ad hoc defences.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this objection. The view might be associated with Wiggins (2001).
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer whose comments led to a much-improved version of this reply.
I am not aware of anyone defending this view though.
Mereological essentialism as defended by Chisholm (1976) might be vulnerable to the same complaint of ad hoc-ness, since Chisholm does mention constitution (1976, 99–100). However, it is unclear—to me—what status Chisholm gives to constitution: is it a real relation, or is it simply a way of speaking to explain why we think of entia succesiva (fictional, non-existing entities) such as ships and statues as being related to real objects (mereological sums)? Only in the former case does my argument operate against Chisholm.
Special relativity may also provide a reason to believe that objects have both spatial and temporal parts (Balashov 1999).
I have assumed throughout this section that perdurantism does solve both PC and PCO. This seems warranted, since the perdurantism–endurantism debate focuses on theoretical virtues such as simplicity, intuitiveness, and ontological parsimony, and many philosophers of both sides seem to take for granted that the theories solve the relevant problems. A good example of this fact is that one complaint against perdurantism is its revisionary character (Simons 1987, 177). Again, perdurantism is only one of many alternatives to constitution theories, so even if it fails, the constitutionalist should still abandon constitution in favour of some other theory. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this objection to me.
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Arianna Betti, Erik J. Olsson, Frits Gåvertsson, and Tobias Hansson Wahlberg for discussion on ideas expressed in this paper and helpful comments on earlier versions. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for this journal whose comments greatly improved the paper.
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Smid, J. Material Constitution is Ad Hoc. Erkenn 82, 305–325 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9818-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9818-6