Abstract
Growing Block (GB) theorists are committed, roughly, to two theses: (1) that past and present events exist and that future events do not, and (2) that the present is dynamic and constantly changing. These two theses support a picture of the universe as growing, gaining in more and more things and events, as these recede into the past; but the two theses do not specify how the growth of the block is to be understood (Q1); what status the past is supposed to have compared to the present (Q2); and what should be taken to be the fundamental constituents of the spatio-temporal reality (Q3). In my paper I argue that getting clearer on these three questions—Q1, Q2, and Q3—will give us very different metaphysical pictures. I distinguish between three variants of the growing block theory: the Fourdimensional Growing Block which goes back to C.D. Broad; the Dead Past Growing Block which is currently defended by Forrest and Forbes; and the Growing Events theory, which draws on some of Whitehead’s ideas on processes. I flesh out each of these variants of the GB view, examine the most urgent challenges to their respective metaphysical pictures, and offer suggestions as to how these challenges can be positively addressed.
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Notes
Tooley (1997) is quite interesting in this respect. He talks of “instantaneous states of affairs” and events interchangeably, as if there is not even constitutive difference to be had between instantaneous entities such as slices and events, which are typically seen as occupying a longer temporal interval.
Broad is quite explicit about the fact that he does not want to analyze the change in events’ passage from present to past in the same way that change of things is analyzed. For him, the change of events is a change “of” time, whereas the change of things, is a change “in” time. He then adds that “we can hardly expect to reduce changes of Time to changes in Time, since Time would then need another Time to change in, and so on to infinity” (Broad 1923, p. 65). Here we see that Broad simply rejects the idea that there is passage of time that is somehow independent from the process of accumulation of events; the latter simply is the passage of time. The alternative which would treat time as something in which events pass, while it itself also changes, might lead one to adopt hypertime with respect to which the time passes. This is something that Broad is wisely trying to avoid.
This is how Tooley (1997) develops the view.
In a chapter on time and change in Scientific Thought (1923), Broad repeatedly denies that the future has any reality whatsoever. Given that there are no future existents of any sort to help act as truthmakers for statements about the future, Broad spends a fair amount of space in that chapter attempting to solve the truthmaker problem in some other way. He distinguishes between the reference of statements about the future and the content of such statements. The content of such statements should be treated in analogy with statements about fictional characters, according to Broad. So, for instance, “Puck exists” is to be understood as being about a set of characteristics that we associate with “Puck”. Such a set of characteristics are themselves “real”, says Broad, despite the fact that Puck is not. He then adds: “Similarly, the judgment, “To-morrow will be wet”, which is grammatically about “to-morrow”, is logically about the characteristic of wetness. The non-existence of to-morrow is therefore consistent with the fact that the judgment is about something” (Broad 1923, p.72). So, although judgments about how things will be in the future are indeed about something (they are about the properties), they do not refer to anything: “Thus judgments which profess to be about the future do not refer to any fact, whether positive or negative, at the time when they are made. They are therefore at that time neither true nor false. They will become true or false when there is a fact for them to refer to; and after this they will remain true or false, as the case may be, for ever and ever” (Broad 1923, p.73).
With “nowi” and “nowb” I am following Forrest’s (2004) terminology, which I find to be most helpful.
I am assuming here that (3), if it is to make sense at all, must be understood in the same way as (2) as reading: “The time that I take to be present “nowi” is at the edge of the block”.
In personal correspondence, Forbes was emphatic that on his view there aren’t different types of existence – things either exist or they don’t. I am sympathetic but fail to see how his version of the view can actually make good on this claim.
Forbes has confirmed in personal correspondence that he would indeed be inclined to respond along these lines.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my dear colleague Gregory Landini for helping me develop the minimizing strategy reply in Sect. 2.2. His views have also inspired what I call here “the growing events view” which may or may not be similar to his own ongoing events. Many thanks also go to Graeme Forbes, Michael Tooley, Jeff Rainwater, and the anonymous referees for helpful feedback on the previous drafts of this paper.
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Perović, K. Three Varieties of Growing Block Theory. Erkenn 86, 623–645 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00123-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00123-4