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Human Rights and Human Dignity

An Appeal to Separate the Conjoined Twins

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Abstract

Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but rather aggravates it in secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity.

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Notes

  1. When I refer to human rights, I mean as laid down in the legal instruments listed in Table 1.

  2. R. v Kapp 2008 Supreme Court Canada 41 at § 22: “… human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four contextual factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.”

  3. For instance one could maintain: “Since Catholics generally believe in God-given human dignity, and may therefore accept human rights indirectly, I shall accept the term’s use in this legal instrument, even though I am only interested in human rights.”

  4. Thanks to AH Banisadr for this information.

  5. Foundationalism is the attempt to stop infinite justification regress by agreeing on basic beliefs that are self-evident. A foundationalist will therefore argue that one value or concept or belief, e.g. human dignity, can provide a justification for others, which are not self-evident.

  6. Rorty is writing about the right to access to health care. Hence, his reference to the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki rather than any of the human rights instruments from my Table 1. However, his general argument applies to both.

  7. This might have been Kant’s most likely position. According to Oliver Sensen (2009: 104), “Kant does not seem to give an argument that all human beings have an absolute worth”.

  8. Ein Kranz ist gar viel leichter binden, als ihm ein würdig Haupt zu finden. My translation.

  9. I take the Traditional Catholic understanding of dignity to be an example of religious understandings. Hence, my claim is not that only Traditional Catholics can justify human rights through human dignity. Other religions are likely to have equally tenable justifications at their disposal, as long as the justification is used only amongst believers.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire, Brook 317, Preston, PR1 2HE, England, UK

    Doris Schroeder

  2. Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, SHAPS, The University of Melbourne, Room G06, Ground floor, Old Quad Building (Building#150), Victoria, 3010, Australia

    Doris Schroeder

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  1. Doris Schroeder
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Correspondence to Doris Schroeder.

Additional information

Thanks to the CAPPE seminar at the Australian National University, especially Thomas Pogge, for feedback on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to John Tobin for discussions on the justifications for the human right to health care. Thanks to Julie Cook Lucas, Armin Schmidt and two anonymous referees for excellent comments on the first written draft.

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Schroeder, D. Human Rights and Human Dignity. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 323–335 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9326-3

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