Abstract
Companions in guilt arguments (CGAs) respond to moral error theory by pointing out that its philosophical rationale mandates the rejection of all categorical normative reasons, including epistemic reasons. A number of philosophers (including Christopher Cowie, Jonas Olson, Richard Rowland, and Ramon Das) have recently been engaging in a dialogue about the strength of this argumentative strategy and the significance of the criticisms that has been raised against it. In this paper, I identify a specific argument, which I dub the ‘bullet-biting response’ as a crucial element in some recent attacks on the CGA. I assess five objections to the bullet-biting response and conclude that only the fifth poses a significant problem. Specifically, I argue that the proponent of the bullet-biting response is at a dialectical disadvantage in this particular debate. While this disadvantage is not decisive, it has two implications (one theoretical and one practical) that raise serious concerns for the bullet-biting response.
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Notes
See Godlee et al. 2011.
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Clipsham, P. What’s Left for the Companions in Guilt Argument?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 22, 137–151 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09981-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09981-x