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Virtue Measurement: Theory and Applications

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Abstract

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory (WTT) from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms (cognitive/affective/motivational processes and dispositions) are triggered by the perception of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account.

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Notes

  1. Entitled, Understanding Virtue: Theory and Measurement.

  2. Snow (2010) took a similar approach in interpreting virtues as subsets of CAPS (cognitive-affective personality system) traits, drawing on the work of social-cognitive psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda to argue for her position. Some philosophers have critiqued the use of CAPS (see Papish 2017;Chapter 5; Alfano 2014, 78–79). Convinced by some of these critiques and prevailed upon by several psychologists, she has since come to view WTT as providing a more promising empirical framework within which to conceptualize virtue, as many of the same types of social-cognitive units that made CAPS attractive as an empirical framework for conceptualizing virtue are also integral to WTT (see Jayawickreme and Fleeson 2017b, 76; Fleeson and Jayawickreme 2015, 84).

  3. An example of an external stimulus for trait-relevant behavior is the sight of someone in need of help (relevant to compassion). An example of an internal stimulus is the thought that today is a friend’s birthday (relevant to considerateness or generosity).

  4. This explanation presupposes dual-processing theory, according to which the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of two systems: conscious and nonconscious processing (see, for example, Snow 2010, Chapter 2; Snow 2006; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Kahneman 2011). We recognize that dual-processing theories are not the only model available for explaining the division between effortful, conscious processing and automatic, unconscious processing (see Rangel et al. 2008). For our purposes, it is doubtful that anything significant hinges on which model we use.

  5. Referred to also as “characteristic adaptations” in Costa and McCrae (1994).

  6. We do not deny that other desires or goals – some not related to virtue -- could be relevant in motivating the person to return the change, such as the desire not to be caught pocketing the money. Our point is simply that motivation of some kind – not simply belief -- is needed to produce action. We realize that this commits us to motivational externalism, which is consistent with Aristotle’s view of motivation.

  7. We think that the terms ‘template’ and ‘schema’ can be used interchangeably. In other words, we do not think that anything significant depends on our usage of these different terms. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point, as well as for posing the question to which we respond in the next two paragraphs.

  8. WTT places schemas among the social cognitive mechanisms (along with values, beliefs, desires, needs, etc.) that help us move from the perception of virtue-relevant stimuli into virtue-appropriate responses. The bold claim of WTT is that “whole traits” consist of both a descriptive side (density distributions of trait enactments) as well as an explanatory side (social cognitive mechanisms), where the latter explains variations in the former. In other words, according to WTT both trait enactments and social cognitive mechanisms—including schemas—are constitutive of traits. We believe this view should be carefully reconsidered in the special case of virtues. Specifically, we are not fully willing to subscribe to the notion of schemas as internal to virtues, as they do not form the core of the virtues as consistently as we’d like. However, we do believe that certain social cognitive mechanisms (e.g., beliefs, desires) are constitutive of virtue, as their presence helps determine whether an action is in fact virtuous.

  9. We recognize that many other factors contribute to character building.

  10. Breadth can also serve as a useful gauge of the scope of people’s practical reasoning, insofar as their responses to different trait-relevant stimuli must be intelligent and flexible enough to adapt to situational differences in order to be appropriate.

  11. Someone might claim that other aspects of the Aristotelian framework should be investigated in our account: for example, the notion that the virtuous typically take pleasure in performing virtuous actions, and the idea that the virtuous agent knowingly chooses virtuous action for its own sake. We believe we do take the latter point into account, for example, by underscoring the importance of consciously endorsing the underlying virtue when virtuous behaviors have become habitual, as well as by emphasizing the importance of knowingly choosing virtuous action because it is virtuous in our section on motivation. However, we leave aside investigations of the pleasure that a virtuous agent might take in performing virtuous actions because pleasure, important though it is, is an added bonus of acting virtuously and of being virtuous. Pleasure is not intrinsic to virtue itself. Many virtuous actions, such as telling another a hard truth or courageously facing a bully, for example, are typically not accompanied by pleasure. One reluctantly tells another a hard truth because one knows the other’s feelings will be hurt; one needs to overcome fears in order to confront the bully – an encounter that will not be pleasant. After the fact, one might be satisfied with oneself for having done the virtuous but difficult thing, but this is different from taking pleasure in the action. Indeed, if one were to take pleasure in telling another a hard truth, we could question whether one’s motivation was in fact virtuous. Similar remarks apply to confronting the bully – if one takes pleasure in such an action, might this not indicate a lack of virtue in the form of aggressiveness or combativeness? We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising these points.

  12. We include a ceteris paribus clause – all else being equal, used in a philosophical sense – to register the idea that many factors other than repeated exposure to relevant stimuli affect virtue formation and strengthening, for example, whether we are in a position to act or otherwise respond to the stimuli in question, and whether we have the right kinds of motivations needed for the development of the virtue.

  13. We note that Aristotle thinks that part of becoming habituated to perform virtuous actions is coming to take pleasure in acting virtuously. We acknowledge Aristotle’s point, but do not dwell on it, as our main concern in our book is with measuring the extent and depth of habituation, not with the mechanisms by means of which habituation comes about.

  14. Given WTT’s emphasis on perception and interpretation, it can easily explain idiosyncrasies in the kinds of motivations that are associated with traits. For example, the somewhat idiosyncratic desire to avoid using public transportation could be explained by an extremely shy person’s perception and interpretation of public transportation as a site of possible physical and emotional discomfort that is worthy of avoidance.

  15. Snow (2010, chapter 4) elaborates and defends this structural claim about virtue. We continue to think this claim is essential for a correct understanding of virtue.

  16. We discuss our conception of character as integrated sets of virtues in our forthcoming book. The view of practical wisdom articulated here is indebted to work by Russell (2014, 2009). We believe his is the most exhaustive explanation to date of an Aristotelian conception of phronēsis. That said, we have also benefitted from an important recent paper by Darnell et al. (2019).

  17. Our first two senses roughly correspond to Darnell et al. (2019, 18–19)‘s discussion of the ‘constitutive’ and ‘integrative’ roles of practical wisdom. Their understanding, like ours, draws on Russell (2009) to some extent.

  18. We also believe that our conceptualization of practical wisdom is similar to Russell’s (2009, 20–25) understanding in another important respect, though we forego extensive discussion of this point here. Discussing Aristotle’s view of practical wisdom, Russell (2009, 21; 23) points out that practical wisdom is not a monolithic virtue, but is instead, a suite of virtues of the practical intellect: comprehension, sense, intelligence, deliberative excellence, and cleverness. Though each might be a virtue in its own right, we find it more useful to conceptualize them as a set of different functions of practical wisdom. This is an interesting question for empirical study.

  19. We think it is important to note the separate function of practical wisdom in regulating virtuous emotion, apart from its role in regulating virtuous action. In the expression of virtue, action and emotion often go hand in hand. However, there are cases in which virtuous action is not accompanied by virtuous emotion, and cases in which virtuous emotion is not accompanied by action. Practical wisdom regulates both.

  20. See also Broadie (1991, 198–202), and Segvic (2009, 105; 158), both cited in Darnell et al. (2019, 20).

  21. Furthermore, can these be measured, and if so, are the four roles getting at one core construct of practical wisdom, or are they getting at four empirically distinct processes? As with the question of whether practical wisdom is comprised of distinctive functions or is unified, the roles we have identified raise interesting empirical questions.

  22. We thank Claudia Navarini for inviting us to contribute to this volume, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Director of the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing, The University of Oklahoma, 620 Parrington Oval, Room 208, Norman, OK, 73019, USA

    Nancy E. Snow

  2. College of Charleston, 57 Coming Street, Charleston, SC, 29412, USA

    Jennifer Cole Wright

  3. The Human Early Learning Partnership, University of British Columbia, Suite 440, 2206 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z3, Canada

    Michael T. Warren

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  1. Nancy E. Snow
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Correspondence to Nancy E. Snow.

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Snow, N.E., Wright, J.C. & Warren, M.T. Virtue Measurement: Theory and Applications. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 23, 277–293 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10050-6

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