Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience

  • Published:
Husserl Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, abstaining from use of any epistemic commitments about mind-transcendent reality, whereas conjunctive and disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, on the other hand, are both premised on some form of metaphysical realism. There seems to be a basic incompatibility between the former approach and the latter. I examine this line of thinking and argue that the incompatibility is only apparent.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. When citing works of Husserl, the English translation of which includes the pagination of the German source text, I cite the page numbers of the German source text first followed by a forward slash and then the page numbers of the English translation.

  2. For a general survey of the matter, see Fish (2009) and Robinson (1994).

  3. See Russell (1912), Broad (1925), and Price (1950).

  4. See Brogaard (2014).

  5. See Genone (2016) for an overview of the emergence and development of naïve realism in recent years.

  6. For a thorough discussion of disjunctivism considering both its strengths and weaknesses, see Soteriou (2016).

  7. I put “in” in scare quotes to indicate that Berkeley thinks ideas stand in a peculiar relation to the mind that has them, a sui generis relation distinct from the “inherence” of properties in a substance.

  8. See Richmond 2009, 37.

  9. See the bibliography Hanne Jacobs provides in Jacobs (2017) for further references on this matter.

  10. Husserl had developed these ideas already over a decade earlier in his lectures published in First Philosophy (Husserl, 2019, Lectures 46–48 and Supplemental Text 21) and refined them in drafts of his Encyclopedia Britannica article (Husserl, 1997b, Draft B, Part I, Sect. 2 and Part II, Section iii and Draft D, § 9) as well as in his Amsterdam Lectures on Phenomenological Psychology (Husserl, 1997b, § 13). See Moran (2012), 117–128 for discussion of the passages I have just referred to in the Crisis.

  11. See Kockelmans (1967, 1972) and Uhler (1987).

  12. That is not to say nothing Husserl held in his pre-transcendental works would exist in the same universe of discourse as that of his transcendentally inclined works. It is enough that his theory of intentionality and perception would be on the far side of a theoretical chasm if we were to apply the logic of the objection consistently.

References

  • Ali, R. (2018). Does hallucinating involve perceiving? Philosophical Studies, 175(3), 601–627.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, K. (2015). Hallucination and imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(2), 287–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berghofer, P. (2018). Why Husserl is a moderate foundationalist. Husserl Studies, 34, 1–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berkeley, G. (1996). In H. Robinson (Ed.), Principles of human knowledge and three dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berkeley, G. (2017). In T. Goldschmidt, & S. Stapleford (Eds.), Berkeley’s principles: Expanded and explained. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bower, M. (2020). Husserl on hallucination: A conjunctive reading. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 58(3), 549–579.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brewer, B. (2000). Perception and reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Broad, C. D. (1925). The mind and its place in nature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brogaard, B. (Ed.). (2014). Does perception have content? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Brown, C. S. (1990). Husserl, intentionality, and cognitive architecture. Southwest Philosophy Review, 6(1), 65–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, J., & Cassam, Q. (2014). Berkeley’s puzzle: What experience teaches us. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4(11), 20–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cimino, A. (2021). Husserl’s philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 20, 743–779. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09683-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doyon, M. (2022). “The normative turn of perceptual intentionality and its metaphysical consequences (or why Husserl was neither a disjunctivist nor a conjunctivist).” In Hanne Jacobs (Ed.), The Husserlian mind (pp. 172–183). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dicker, G. (2011). Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Drummond, J. (1985). Frege and Husserl: another look. Husserl Studies, 2, 245–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Drummond, J. (1990). Husserlian Intentionality and non-foundational realism: Noema and object. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Drummond, J. (2012). “Intentionality without representationalism.” In Dan Zahavi (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology (pp. 115–133). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fish, W. (2009). Perception, hallucination, and illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Føllesdal, D. (1988). “Husserl on evidence and justification.” In R. Sokolowski (Ed.), Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological tradition (pp. 107–129). Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Føllesdal, D. (1990). Noema and meaning in Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50, 263–271.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Genone, J. (2016). Recent work on naïve realism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(1), 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill, C. O., & Rosado Haddock, G. E. (2000). Husserl or Frege? Meaning, objectivity, and mathematics. La Salle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopp, W. (2008). Husserl, phenomenology and foundationalism. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51(2), 194–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hopp, W. (2011). Perception and knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hopp, W. (2020). Phenomenology: A contemporary introduction. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An Introduction to phenomenological philosophy. D. Carr (Trans. and Ed.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and judgment: Investigations in a genealogy of logic. L. Landgrebe (Ed.), J. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1977). Phenomenological psychology. Lectures, summer semester 1925. J. Scanlon (Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution. Trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1997a). Thing and space: Lectures of 1907. R. Rojcewicz (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1997b). Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931). T. Sheehan and R. Palmer (Eds. and Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1999). The idea of phenomenology. Lee Hardy (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (2001a). Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental Logic. A. Steinbock (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical Investigations, Vol. 2. John N. Findlay (Trans.) and Dermot Moran (Ed.). London: Routledge.

  • Husserl, E. (2004). Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912). T. Vongehr and R. Giuliani (Eds.). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (2014). Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. First book: General introduction to pure phenomenology. D. Dahlstrom (Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett.

  • Husserl, E. (2019). First Philosophy: Lectures 1923-24 and related texts from the manuscripts (1920–1925). S. Luft and T. Naberhaus (Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ingarden, R. (1975). On the motives which led Husserl to transcendental idealism. A. Hannibalsson (Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs, H. (2017). “From psychology to pure phenomenology.” In A. Staiti (Ed.), Husserl’s Ideen: A critical commentary (pp. 87–120). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jansen, J. (2016). “Husserl.” In A. Kind (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination (pp. 69–81). New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnston, M. (2004). The obscure object of hallucination. Philosophical Studies, 120(1–3), 113–183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnston, M. (2011). On a neglected epistemic virtue. Philosophical Issues, 21(1), 165–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, M. (2009). Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(3), 574–604.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kockelmans, J. (1967). A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

  • Kockelmans, J. (1972). "Phenomenologico-Psychological and Transcendental Reductions in Husserl's Crisis." Analecta Husserliana 2, 78-89.

  • Khlentzos, D. (2016). “Challenges to Metaphysical Realism.” In Zalta, E.N. (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/realism-sem-challenge/, Winter 2016 ed., Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

  • Luebcke, P. (1999). A semantic interpretation of Husserl’s Epoché. Synthese, 118, 1–12.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. (2002). The transparency of experience. Mind and Language, 17(4), 376–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mohanty, J. N. (1974). Husserl and Frege: A new look at their relationship. Research in Phenomenology, 4(1), 51–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moran, D. (2012). Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P. (1989). “Was Husserl a nominalist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49(4), 661–674.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mulligan, K. (2017). Brentano’s knowledge, Austrian verificationisms, and epistemic accounts of truth and value. The Monist, 100, 88–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Overgaard, S. (2018). Perceptual error, conjunctivism, and Husserl. Husserl Studies, 34(1), 25–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Price, H. H. (1950). Perception, 2nd edition. London: Methuen.

  • Philipse, H. (2004). "Edmund Husserl and the history of classical foundationalism." In Feist, R. (ed.), Husserl and the Sciences: Selected Perspectives (pp. 11-39). Ottowa, ON: University of Ottowa Press.

  • Richmond, A. (2009). Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge: A Reader's Guide. London: Continuum.

  • Robinson, H. (1994). Perception. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogerson, K. (1991). Verificationism and anti-realism. Southwest Philosophy Review, 7(1), 69–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Romano, C. (2012). Must phenomenology remain Cartesian? Continental Philosophy Review, 45(3), 425–445.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosado Haddock, G. E. (1987). Husserl’s epistemology of mathematics and the foundation of Platonism in mathematics. Husserl Studies, 4(2), 81–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1997 [1912]). The problems of philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Smith, A. D. (2008). Husserl and externalism. Synthese, 160(3), 313–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D. W., & McIntyre, R. (1975). Husserl’s identification of meaning and noema. The Monist, 59(1), 115–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Soteriou, M. (2016). Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Staiti, A. (2015). On Husserl’s alleged Cartesianism: A reply to Claude Romano. Husserl Studies, 31, 123–141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone, A. (2005). The Continental origins of verificationism. Angelaki, 10(1), 129–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tieszen, R. (2011). After Gödel: Platonism and rationalism in mathematics and logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Thomasson, A. (2017). Husserl on essences. Grazer philosophischer Studien, 94(3), 436–459.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Warren, N. (2020). Der Meister der Wesensschau. Acts of translation in Husserl’s Plato without Platonism. Husserl Studies, 36(3), 271–286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uhler, K. (1987). "A Clarification of Edmund Husserl's Distinction between Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology." Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 18 (1-2):1-17.

  • Zahavi, D. (2017). Husserl’s legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Texas State University, 601 University Drive, Comal Hall 102, 78666, San Marcos, TX, United States

    Matt E. M. Bower

Authors
  1. Matt E. M. Bower
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Matt E. M. Bower.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of Interest

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Bower, M.E. Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Husserl Stud 39, 161–178 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09324-w

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09324-w

Search

Navigation