Abstract
In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, it rejects the idea that there are different kinds of speciesism. Such an idea may result from confusion because there are (1) different ways in which speciesism can be defended; and (2) different speciesist positions, that is, different positions that assume speciesism among their premises. Depending on whether or not these views assume other criteria for moral consideration apart from speciesism, they can be combined or simple speciesist positions. But speciesism remains in all cases the same idea. Finally, the paper examines the concept of anthropocentrism, the disadvantageous treatment or consideration of those who are not members of the human species. This notion must be conceptually distinguished from speciesism and from misothery (aversion to nonhuman animals). Anthropocentrism is shown to be refuted because it either commits a petitio principia fallacy or it falls prey to two arguments: the argument from species overlap (widely but misleadingly known as “argument from marginal cases”) and the argument from relevance. This rebuttal identifies anthropocentrism as a speciesist view.
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Notes
The idea that species exist as given kinds is questionable—see on this Dupré (2002); also, a well-known book that contains several essays on the issue is Cavalieri and Singer (1993), see in particular the chapters by Dawkins (1993), Dunbar (1993), or Clark (1993). At any rate, in order to avoid unnecessary controversy I will not tackle this problem.
Discriminating against those who do not belong to any of several species can be seen as discrimination against those who do not belong to a certain species s plus discrimination against those who do not belong to another species s’, and so on. This is controversial, but if it were right, the wording in the definition I have presented would not be wrong, but redundant. I could just have written that speciesism affects those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. Speciesist discrimination against those who do not belong to several species would just be an aggregation of several speciesist discriminations.
Evelyn Pluhar—the theorist who has examined the question of the different defenses of anthropocentric speciesism in more detail so far—has used the term “full-personhood view” to name the idea that only those who have certain individual capacities possess what she calls maximum moral significance (Pluhar 1995, p. 61). She has rejected this view, but has not described it as speciesist.
In some way, this seems to be the view expressed in the “Declaration against Speciesism” proclaimed at Cambridge in 1977, which reads: “We do not accept that a difference in species alone (any more than a difference in race) can justify wanton exploitation or oppression.” See Paterson and Ryder (1979).
This idea is also defended by Dunayer (2004, pp. 2–3).
In fact, speciesism is a less recognized kind of discrimination, and this is why it can be more difficult to tell what those who use that term today exactly mean when they employ it.
Apart from this, there is another way in which this definition can be expressed. We can say that being treated disadvantageously with respect to others means being deprived of certain benefits (either intrinsic or extrinsic—such as the alleviation of a certain harm) that others do receive. Hence, the speech of “moral exclusion” can also be used to name discrimination. Therefore, speciesism can be characterized as the moral exclusion of those (and only of those) who are not classified as belonging to a certain species.
In fact, it seems that this is what makes the difference according to which it is interesting for us to appraise a situation in which oppression or domination may be occurring.
I have not used here the speech of “races,” which is very questionable. But it is important to bear in mind that, I as said, also the concept of “species” is. None of them can be clearly defined.
Of course, there might be the case that members of a certain species of social animals would be benefited if more members of their species existed, if they were in need of other animals of their same species to socialize. But in cases such as these the relevant point would not be the conservation of the species: from the point of view of the individuals we would not have less reason to provide company to lonely individuals of a very populated species than to those who belonged to one with less members.
The argument that humans are special because they were created on “God’s image” is an instance of this position.
According to this, we can see that (S2) would entail that only (1) would be a speciesist position sensu strictu—or perhaps that both (1) and (2.1.2) would—. (S2) would imply that (1), (2.1.2) and (2.2) would be speciesist. According to (S3)—or, for short, (S)—any of them may be so.
I will use the concept of “morally exclusion” profusely throughout this paper, with the meaning of “deprivation of moral consideration.” This need not imply total desconsideration, it can also mean some partial desconsideration, that is, a disadvantageous treatment.
“Moral anthropocentrism” thus defined must not be confused with three different ideas that have been also named with this term by some theorists working in the field of environmental ethics. As they use it, “anthropocentrism” would mean: (1) the view that only humans, or human interests, are valuable; (2) the idea that if nonhuman entities have value it is because humans assign it to them; or (3) the idea that if those entities have value this can be recognized only by humans.
Confusions regarding this point are far from uncommon. Hettinger (1983, p. 125) writes, “Since anti-speciesism allows for discriminating between animals, critics can consistently object to the raising, slaughtering, and consumption of veal valves while not objecting to commercial shrimp farming and shrimp consumption.”
Hence, whereas the fact of a certain premise being anthropocentric is something independent of the attitude of the one who may accept it, it is precisely intention and prejudice that count in order to claim that the assumption of a certain premise is anthropocentrist.
Lockwood (1979, p. 169) exemplifies this when he writes: “If we are concerned about puppies, but indifferent to the fate of, say, veal calves, this may well be because we, understandably but irrationally, accord the latter, but not the former, some sort of ‘associate membership in the family of men’.”
David Morton has drawn attention to another interesting instance of this kind of moral distinction. He has written (Morton 1998, p. 318): “Sizeism, a form of speciesism, specifically relates to the failure to empathize with… or give small animals the same consideration that would be given to larger animals.” Morton has also pointed out (ibid.) that “scientific procedures are carried out on them that would not be carried out on larger animals without an anaesthetic, for example, amputation of digits, docking of tails, castration, cardiac puncture, and intracerebral injections.”
A shorter definition can be found in Mason (1998b, p. 245).
Mason writes “We describe horrible human beings as ‘animals,’ ‘beasts’ or ‘brutes’ (an old word for ‘animal’) when we want to describe their egoism, insatiable greed, insatiable sexuality, cruelty, senseless slaughter of nonhuman beings, and the mass slaughter of human beings” (Mason (1998b, p.163).
The term “neo-speciesism” conveys the idea that these defenses of anthropocentrism have been presented later than those that appeal to individual capacities. Note, however, that already in the 17th, the 18th and the 19th centuries, theorists such as Spinoza (1989, 4/37e1[d]); Hume (1978, Sect. 3, part 1 [§152]); and Whewell (1852, pp. 223–25) defended this.
As the “if” in the argument clearly shows, the strength of this argument rests on a hypothesis. We will have to accept its conclusion if we assume a certain premise (that there should be a parallelism between moral and ontical relevance). But it seems that this is a premise that at least many of us would be compelled to accept.
Of course it could be possible to defend a conception of the good according to which suffering and pain would not be relevant, which may then imply that nonhuman animals would not be able to be benefited or harmed. Nonetheless, such a view seems hardly acceptable. (Just as the claim that nonhuman animals cannot feel suffering and pleasure is implausible).
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Acknowledgments
This work has been done with the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Ministerio de Innovación y Ciencia, exp. 2008-0423). For helpful comments I am grateful to David Sztybel, Lee Hall, an anonymous referee, and those who discussed the ideas included in this paper at the University of Santiago de Compostela.
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Horta, O. What is Speciesism?. J Agric Environ Ethics 23, 243–266 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9205-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9205-2