Abstract
What makes a food good, for you? With respect to food, the expression “good for you” usually refers to the effect of the food on the nutritional health of the eater, but it can also pertain more broadly. The expression is often used by a person who is concerned with another person’s well-being, as part of an exhortation. But when framed as a question and addressed to you, as an individual, the question can require a response, calling for accountability beyond the realm of nutrition or other material qualities of the food. Economic value may be considered as a ratio: goodness/price. In this paper, we examine the numerator, exploring a broad range of values domains related to food, attempting to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the meaning of goodness of food. We present a typology of values domains with respect to food, divided into three main categories: (1) material considerations, (2) psychological, psychosocial, and spiritual health, and (3) the well-being of society. This understanding that results from comprehensive consideration of these values domains has important implications for an individual for use in considering the question “what food is good for you?” in order to guide his or her future actions, helping to distinguish between what Dewey termed immediate good and reasonable good. A pragmatic approach to a fuller consideration of food-related values domains by individuals also has broad social, political, and economic implications. If, according to the FAO, food security involves both needs and preferences, consideration of what preferences are appropriate is fundamental to achieving food security. The questions about what is considered to be good food are central to questions about the sorts of food and agricultural systems human societies will seek to sustain. The approach to resolving this important aspect of sustainability might help inform a more general question as to appropriate limitations on preferences, a question fundamental to achieving sustainability in general.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In this paper we refer to food as what is ingested and considered food, following whatever preparation may have taken place. Although the immediate result of hunting, fishing, gathering, animal agriculture, or plant agriculture is sometimes referred to loosely as “food,” even in non-industrial societies preparation is typically required before the item is considered food to be eaten. This distinction is particularly important in industrial societies because if one takes an economic view of “the food system” in the US, more than 80 % of the food dollar may be considered “value added” through the economic activities following the procurement of the plant or animal. Although we use the term production to apply to the outcome of agricultural activities, we attempt to formally distinguish agricultural production of what may become food from food production per se, which would include steps in the preparation of food, whether in the home or not. Certainly an expansive view of the good with respect to food will take into account an evaluation of the activities (and their consequences) that led to procurement of the plant or animal. A failure to distinguish between “food” in the sense of a precursor to what is eaten and food as what is actually eaten is commonly observed in the literature.
If the product has goodness, the product can be referred to as a “good” among other “consumer goods.” For a commodity good, the market determines economic value at the level of a society. For an agricultural material that is often further processed, the additional value of the outcome as determined by the market is termed the "value added" by the process.
Nussbaum (2000) points out the troubling concept of “adaptive preferences,” formed unconsciously in response to obdurate adverse circumstances. She calls for “a critical scrutiny of preference and desire” in recognition of “the many ways in which habit, fear, low expectations, and unjust background conditions deform people’s choices and even their wishes for their own lives.”
In Experience and Nature, Dewey presents in the final chapter, "Existence, value, and criticism," a variety of contrasts similar to the contrast between immediate versus reasonable goods: immediate versus ulterior, given versus on reflection, now apparent versus eventual, de facto versus de jure, undeveloped versus cultivated, apparent versus real, natural versus valid for thought, bare liking versus enhanced and purified. These contrasts do similar work, emphasizing the importance of reflective thought and critical judgment in the light of the consequences of an action that pragmatically tests the good that motivated the action. To avoid confusion in the present paper we will refer primarily to immediate versus reasonable goods, even though the variety of contrasts serves to illustrate the contrast more fully.
Each of the listed values domains might include one or more of the following values dimensions: the aesthetic, ethical/moral, instrumental, and spiritual. All four are noted by Peirce (1998); only the first three are noted by Dewey (1958). In the context of the moral dimension of values we will consider how a values dimension might drive a possible food-related action according to the three main approaches to ethics: consequentialism (utilitarianism), rights/duties (deontology), and virtues/vices (virtue). In this paper we will comment when a particular domain appears to draw heavily on one or more of these approaches to ethics.
In Experience and Nature Dewey uses a series of metaphors to call attention to the maturity that may be required to exercise critical reflective judgment. He also speaks of the freeing and liberating effects of his critical method. The emphasis on full human development and maturity and the emphasis on the liberating consequences of the critical method are entirely consistent with Dewey's philosophy of education (presented elsewhere), with its goal of producing a citizenry able to engage fruitfully in a radically participatory democratic society (see Westbrook 1991).
An example of a narrow analysis of consequences is a paper by Stigler (1945), who as an economist determines the minimal cost of nutritional subsistence without any consideration of food preparation or of palatability, and even criticizes other such efforts when they take these “cultural” considerations into account.
Nussbaum (2000) quotes Amartya Sen: “If a person is unable to get the nourishment he or she needs, or is unable to lead a normal life due to some handicap, that failure… is itself important.” Sen argues that it is important regardless of whether preferences have become adapted in light of adverse circumstances. Nussbaum critiques such adaptive preferences according to a “theory of human capability.”
Nutrient density is the amount of a nutrient per calorie. The concept is quite complex, as for a food nutrient density varies according to specific nutrients. In fact, the problem of using nutrient density to establish whether a food is nutritious or not can be quite contentious and a very subtle calculation (Drenowski 2005). Some overall minimal nutrient density is required of the diet if both nutritional deficiency and weight gain are to be avoided.
Claims of what is required to express virtue are in the context of worldview, ideology, social identity, and cognitive/conative frameworks. Often such claims are made by a group to challenge the fundamental beliefs of others, and to change their behaviors as a result of altering their beliefs. In Fast Food Nation, Schlosser (2001) makes this point explicit in his preface, where he explains that his goal goes well beyond a critique of fast food, to a critique of industrial society in general. For another example, one argument for vegetarianism more fundamentally challenges our understanding of the proper relationship between humans and other sentient creatures (Singer and Mason 2006).
Cultural change in response to environmental change has been framed by some (e.g., Railton) as an example of cultural “evolution” or of cultural “development.” We reject these metaphors, preferring to limit the idea to one of adaptive change.
A motivation for the ascetic self discipline of a periodic "abstinence fast" might be conceived as purely spiritual. It might also be a way of making conscious the idea that all pleasure from food comes at the expense of living things, and thus a recognition that all food pleasure is properly tinged with regret. Ironically, recognition of this regret could lead to the enhanced pleasure of a periodic but less common feast.
References
Allen, P. (2004). Together at the table: Sustainability and sustenance in the American food system. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Boisvert, R. D. (2010). Convivialism: A philosophical manifesto. The Pluralist, 5(2), 57–68.
Borgmann, A. (1987). Technology and the character of contemporary life. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Borgmann, A. (2006). Real American ethics: Taking responsibility for our country. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction. A social critique of the judgment of taste (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brandt, M. B., Moss, J., Ellwood, K., Ferguson, M., & Asefa, A. (2010). Tracking label claims. Food Technology, 64(1), 34–40.
Brody, H. (2010). Ritual, medicine, and the placebo response. In W. S. Sax, J. Quack, & J. Weinhold (Eds.), The problem of ritual efficacy (pp. 151–167). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, L. (2011). The new geopolitics of food. Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food. Accessed July 8, 2011.
Cohen, J. (1996). Preferences, needs and QALYs. Journal of Medical Ethics, 22, 267–272.
Dewey, J. (1939). Theory of valuation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Dewey, J. (1948). Reconstruction in philosophy. New York: Mentor Books/The Beacon Press.
Dewey, J. (1958). Experience and nature (2nd ed.). New York: Dover Publications.
Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and danger. London: Routledge.
Douglas, M. (1982). Goods as a system of communication. In The active voice (pp. 16–33). London: Routledge.
Douglas, M. (2001). Leviticus as literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Drenowski, A. (2005). Concept of a nutritious food: Toward a nutrient density score. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 82(4), 721–732.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). (2010). The state of food insecurity in the world 2010: Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises. Rome: FAO.
Finkelstein, E., Trogdon, J. G., Cohen, J. W., & Dietz, W. (2009). Annual medical spending attributable to obesity: Payer- and service-specific estimates. Health Affairs, 28(5), 822–831.
Frankena, W. K. (1967). Value and valuation. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Encylopedia of philosophy (Vol. 4, pp. 229–232). New York: MacMillan Publishing Co.
Godfray, H., Beddington, J. R., Crute, I. R., Haddad, L., Lawrence, D., Muir, J. F., et al. (2010). Food security: The challenge of feeding 9 billion people. Science, 327(5967), 812–818.
Grignon, C. (2001). Commensality and social morphology: An essay of typology. In P. Scholliers (Ed.), Food, drink, and identity (pp. 23–33). Oxford: Berg.
Haila, Y., & Levins, R. (1992). Humanity and nature: Ecology, science and society. London: Pluto Press.
Hansson, S. O. & Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2011). Preferences. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/preferences/ Retrieved Nov 20, 2011.
Hinrichs, C., & Lyson, T. (Eds.). (2007). Remaking the North American food system: Strategies for sustainability. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Illich, I. (1973). Tools for conviviality (Vol. 47). New York: Harper and Row.
James, W. (1902/2002). Philosophy. In The varieties of religious experience (2nd ed., pp. 430–457). Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
Jonas, H. (1984). The imperative of responsibility. In search of an ethics for the technological age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kass, L. R. (1999). The hungry soul: Eating and the perfecting of our nature. New York: The Free Press.
Korsmeyer, C. (1999). Making sense of taste: Food and philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Leopold, A. (1949). The land ethic. In A sand county almanac, and sketches here and there. Oxford University Press: London.
Matthew, R., McDonald, B., & Goldsworthy, H. (2009). Environmental ethics. In A. Franceschet (Ed.), The ethics of global governance (pp. 141–157). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
McDonald, B. (2010). Food security. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miller, S.C. (2011). The moral significance of needs, Chapter 1. In The ethics of need: Agency, dignity, and obligation. Routledge: London.
Mission Readiness (2010). Too fat to fight: Retired military leaders want junk food out of America’s schools. http://cdn.missionreadiness.org/MR_Too_Fat_to_Fight-1.pdf. Accessed July 8, 2011.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and human development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Obama, B. (2010). National security strategy. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. Accessed July 8, 2011.
Peirce, W. S. (1998). Philosophy and the conduct of life. In N. Houser (Ed.), The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings (Vol. 2, pp. 27–41). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Railton, P. (1986). Facts and values. Philosophical Topics, XIV(2), 5–31.
Railton, P. (2003). Facts, values and norms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schiell, A., Hawe, P., & Seymour, J. (1997). Values and preferences are not necessarily the same. Health Economics, 6, 515–518.
Schlosser, E. (2001). Fast food nation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
Schroeder, M. (2008). Value Theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/value-theory/.
Shaw, J. (2007). World food security: A history since 1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Singer, P., & Mason, J. (2006). The ethics of what we eat: Why our food choices matter. New York: Rodale.
Smil, V. (2000). Feeding the world: A challenge for the twenty-first century. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Steiner, G. (1996). Two suppers. In No passion spent (pp. 390–419). Yale University Press: New Haven.
Stigler, G. J. (1945). The cost of subsistence. Journal of Farm Economics, 27(2), 303–314.
Taylor, C. (1991). The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Telfer, E. (1996). Food for thought: Philosophy and food. London: Routledge.
Thompson, P. (2010). The agrarian vision: Sustainability and environmental ethics. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
Thompson, D. (2011). Natural food and the pastoral: A sentimental notion? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 24, 165–194.
US Government (2010). Feed the future guide. http://www.feedthefuture.gov/guide.html. Accessed Feb 28, 2011.
WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development). (1987). Our common future: The world commission on environment and development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Westbrook, R. B. (1991). John Dewey and American democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wirzba, N. (2011). Food and faith. A theology of eating. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zimmerman, M. J. (2007). Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value. In E. N. Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic. Retrieved Dec 14, 2010.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Thompson, D.B., McDonald, B. What Food is “Good” for You? Toward a Pragmatic Consideration of Multiple Values Domains. J Agric Environ Ethics 26, 137–163 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-012-9387-x
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-012-9387-x