Abstract
This paper argues against the view favored by many contemporary scholars that corrective justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially compensatory and in favor of a bifunctional account according to which corrective justice aims at equalizing inequalities of both goods and evils resulting from various interactions between persons. Not only does the account defended in this paper better explain the broad array of examples Aristotle provides than does the standard interpretation, it also better fits Aristotle’s general definition of what is just. In the last section, the paper argues, again against the standard interpretation, that proportional reciprocity, the kind of justice discussed in Nicomachean Ethics V.5, has two forms and is closely linked to corrective justice. Although corrective justice and proportional reciprocity are conceptually distinct and do different work in Aristotle’s political philosophy, instances of proportional reciprocity are instantiated by instances of corrective justice. This linkage, the paper concludes, helps to explain why Aristotle would assign corrective justice such a prominent place in his theory of justice.
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Notes
H. Joachim’s note is helpful. According to Joachim, a συνάλλαγμα, is any “legally cognizable relation which comes to exist between two private individuals… by the free act of one or both of them.” Interactions that are “by the free act of both parties” are called voluntary and those “by the free act of only one” are involuntary. (Joachim 1951, p. 136) Because these relations involve the possibility of gain and loss, they seem to be relations in which the material well-being of one or more of the parties is affected.
Bostock (2000, p. 61).
Young (2006, pp. 185–186).
Brown (2009, note on 1132a, p. 230).
Cruzer (2012, pp. 277, also 158).
See Burnet (1900, note on τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφοράν, pp. 218–219).
Burnet (Burnet 1900, note on έπάν γάρ κ.τ.λ., p. 221). For example, in a failed but attempted murder the actual injury may be minimal, or even nonexistent, though the moral harm is considerable. On the other hand, serious physical injury to one party may be the result of a moment of careless on the part of the agent.
Aristotle employs two terms during the discussion: “διορθωτικόν” (NE, 1131a1, 1131b25, 1132b4) and “έπανορθωτικόν” (NE, 1132a18, 1132b24). Burnet takes the former to be a broad term that refers to any “adjustment” and so to equalizing before an exchange of goods and to equalizing after an involuntary interaction. The latter refers to equalizing only after an involuntary interaction. (Burnet 1900, note on διορθωτικόν, p. 213.).
One notable exception is Joachim, who writes, “…I think that on the whole Burnet is on the right lines.” (Joachim 1951, p. 146).
Hardie (1968, p. 194).
For additional criticisms of Burnet, see Hardie (1968, p. 193–194).
Kraut (2002, p. 149).
Kraut (2002, p. 149). According to Kraut, we find Aristotle’s commitment to the notion of “equality under the law” in the discussion of corrective justice and not distribution justice. It is worth noting that the importance of “equality under the law” in Athens can be found in Pericles’ “Funeral Oration,” although, according to Pericles, the Athenians included under the notion the making distributions of various public goods (See Thucydides, Historiae, 37). I will argue, against Kraut, the notion of equality under the law applies to neither distributive nor corrective justice.
Kraut (2002, p. 154).
For other criticisms of Kraut, see Keyt (2003).
It will become clear that I think (a) both Burnet and Kraut are right in holding that the rectification of involuntary interactions calls for retributive punishment (b) that Kraut is right that corrective justice applied to voluntary interactions equalizes goods that were to have been exchanged, and (c) that Kraut is also right to point out the connection between the correction of injustices from voluntary interactions and proportional reciprocity. But I will argue that he is mistaken about how corrective justice applied to involuntary interactions yields equality and that his view of the relationship between corrective justice and proportional reciprocity is at best incomplete. Nonetheless, the view I defend is closer to his than to any other rival account.
Those who regard proportional reciprocity as a third sort of particular justice include Hardie (1968, p. 194), Ross (Ross 1923, p. 213), Miller (1995, note 14, p. 73), Pakaluk (2005, p. 195–196), and Irwin (1988, pp. 429–430). A more careful approach to the problem of how proportional reciprocity fits into Aristotle’s theory can be found in Young (2006, p. 186–187).
This is the way Bostock (2000, p. 61), a proponent of the standard interpretation, treats these examples.
Ross, reprinted in Brown (2009, note on 1132b, p. 230).
Whether Aristotle is being fair to the Pythagorean conception has been questioned. For discussion of the doubters, see Englard (2009, n. 30, p. 9).
Bostock (2000, p. 63) recognizes that the passage makes sense only if Aristotle is pointing out what response on the part of the judge would fit corrective justice. Bostock, a proponent of the standard interpretation, simply suggests that “Aristotle himself fails to notice this fact.” Brown, another proponent of the standard interpretation, also notices the problem and argues that the discussion of the assault of the officeholder is “an important qualification to the account in Chap. 4.” (See Brown 2009, note on 1132b, p. 231.) It is hard to see how punishment for this sort of wrongdoing can be a “qualification” of any sort of compensatory view of rectification.
Broadie (2002, p. 36) maintains that Aristotle recognizes rectification through punishment, but that he does not distinguish between that and rectification through “forced reparation.” It is hard to believe, however, that Aristotle would not recognize the important difference between the two. Moreover, Broadie states nothing about how Aristotle’s remarks in V.4 apply to the rectification of injustices from voluntary and involuntary interactions. Pakuluk (2005, p. 196) seems to hold the same view as Broadie: rectification can come “…by taking goods away from the offender and restoring them to the victim, or by simply punishing the offender.” But like Broadie, Pakaluk nowhere explains how Aristotle’s comments, especially the line analogies, are supposed to fit such very different ways of rectifying.
A similar objection is raised against Kraut by Keyt (2003), which, if valid, would also apply to my interpretation.
Brown (2009, comment on 1132b, p. 230).
See note 19.
As noted, I am agreement with Kraut that corrective justice and proportional reciprocity are linked. We differ about the extent of the linkage and the value such linkage provides the community. See note 18.
In spite of what is suggested in V.5, Aristotle cannot very well believe that the “goods for goods” that are one form of proportional reciprocity are limited to goods, such as houses and corn, that parties to a voluntary interaction can exchange. In Pol. II.2 1261a30-32, he mentions reciprocity again (τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός) and he makes it explicit that he is referring to the same notion discussed in the Ethics. What is different is that in the Politics passage he is referring to the awarding of offices to individuals from different stations in life presumably in return for the good they have done for their fellow citizens.
Kraut writes: “…in some sense evil should be returned with evil: those who do injustice deserve to suffer some punishment.” But Kraut does not link involuntary interactions to failures of a kind of reciprocity, nor does he see that the point of visiting evils with equal evils is to achieve justice, which is a kind of equality. (See Kraut 2002, p. 153).
In the Rhetoric (1369b12-14) Aristotle says that τιμωρία is undertaken to satisfy the anger of the person harmed.
Doubtless, many contemporary theorists will argue against Aristotle’s view that justice in rectification includes equalizing evils between wrongdoer and victim. Many contemporary theorists will also argue that Aristotle is mistaken if he really believes that the stability of the community requires that victims’ desires to be avenged be fulfilled. I would not attempt to defend Aristotle on either score. It is important, though, that we be clear that because corrective justice brings about proportional reciprocity and so provides the just satisfaction of a victim’s desire to have an evil requited, corrective justice itself aims at what is just, not at the satisfaction of the desires of the parties to an interaction.
References
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Acknowledgments
I am indebted to N.D. Smith and Angelo Corlett for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. It should not be assumed that either agrees with the theses defended here or with any of the arguments offered in their support.
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Brickhouse, T.C. Aristotle on Corrective Justice. J Ethics 18, 187–205 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9164-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-014-9164-3