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Beyond corporate governance reporting: the usefulness of information on board member profiles

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Abstract

The literature investigating corporate governance (CG) disclosure has predominantly stressed the monitoring role of the board of directors, analysing the association between information about the board’s independence and firm market performance. Drawing from managerial studies, the governance literature has recently recognized corporate performance is affected by a wider set of directors’ personal traits. However, CG reporting does not currently require disclosure of most of these characteristics. We believe knowledge of directors’ personal traits is valuable for investors if these characteristics are indicators of company performance. Drawing on a sample of listed Italian family firms, we embrace a wide set of hand-collected information that captures directors’ profiles to verify their association with Tobin’s Q. Even if such associations are casual, we infer that information about board members’ profiles beyond CG report disclosures is useful for market participants. The results from the regression analyses show that information about directors’ personal details, educational backgrounds, and work experience in specific professional areas is predictive of market performance, and that the market evaluates board members’ personal information that is currently ignored in CG reports. The study offers practical contributions to standard setters, highlighting the need to extend CG reporting requirements for directors’ personal profiles. Further, the evidence contributes to drawing the attention of preparers and users to board of directors’ profile information that is currently not disclosed in CG reporting.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Verona, Via Cantarane, 24, 37129, Verona, Italy

    Francesca Rossignoli

  2. School of Banking, Finance and Insurance Sciences, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Largo Gemelli 1, 20123, Milan, Italy

    Andrea Lionzo & Bruno Buchetti

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  1. Francesca Rossignoli
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  2. Andrea Lionzo
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Correspondence to Francesca Rossignoli.

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Rossignoli, F., Lionzo, A. & Buchetti, B. Beyond corporate governance reporting: the usefulness of information on board member profiles. J Manag Gov 25, 27–60 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-020-09502-4

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