Abstract
This paper considers dimensions of animate life that are readily “embodied” by phenomenologists and by other philosophy and science researchers as well. The paper demonstrates how the practice of “embodying” short-circuits veritable phenomenological accounts of experience through a neglect of attention to Husserl’s basic conception of, and consistent concern with, animate organism. The paper specifies how in doing so, the practice muddies a clear distinction between the body ‘I have’ and the body ‘I am’, and a clear account of their lived conjunction in existential fit. In turn, the paper shows how the practice falls short of recognizing synergies of meaningful movement created by animate organisms; how it is tethered to talk of posture and sensation over kinesthesia and dynamics; and how, in general, the practice of embodying generates static rather than dynamic understandings of everyday life. The paper then critically considers how such liabilities preclude in-depth phenomenological insights into topics such as ‘ownership’ and ‘agency,’ and why inquiries into the nature of animate organisms require nothing less than fine-tuned attention to foundational experiences of animate life, including foundational ontogenetical experiences that undergird adult proficiencies and abilities, and hence fine-tuned attention to learning and to retaining what is learned in kinesthetic memory.
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Notes
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012).
Gibbs (2006).
Gallagher (2005).
Zahavi (2005).
Gibbs (2006).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 8).
Gallagher (2005, p. 74).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 161).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, see e.g., p. 164).
Husserl (1989, p. 292).
Husserl (1989, p. 350).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 154).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 167).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 148).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 140).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 303).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 141).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 431).
Sheets-Johnstone (1986/2009).
Sheets-Johnstone (1986/2009).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 431).
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 141).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 162; italics added).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, pp. 110–111).
Husserl (1989, p. 13).
Sheets-Johnstone (1999/expanded 2nd ed. 2011).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, pp. 112–117).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 31). The four steps they list are: the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and intersubjective corroboration.
Husserl (1970, p. 362; italics in original).
Stern (1985, p. 181).
Sheets-Johnstone (2009).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 180).
Husserl (1989, p. 63).
Sheets-Johnstone (1990).
Husserl (e.g., 1989, p. 35, 61, 96, 185, 351).
Sheets-Johnstone (2011a).
Gallagher also refers to proprioception in terms of an “awareness of movement,” i.e., “proprioceptive awareness of movement may be the very first kind of consciousness to emerge in the developing nervous system” (Gallagher 2005, p. 105). However, he also goes on to question whether “proprioceptive awareness [is] really a form of consciousness” and concludes that it “functions only as part of an ecological structure,” hence that it is a matter of “ownership”: “the experiential differentiation between self and non-self” (ibid., pp. 105–106).
Sherrington (1953, p. 249).
Sheets-Johnstone (1999/expanded 2nd ed. 2011).
Luria (1966, 1973). We might note incidentally that while there are no academic departments of “proprioceptology,” there are departments of kinesiology, departments devoted to the study of the neuromuscular system. However transmogrified by a motorology, as in “motor control,” “motor skills,” and the like, what is being studied are realities of human movement, realities specified in the neurophysiological body but experienced in various ways as lived realities, both in normal and impaired movement (as in sport injuries and physical therapy after a stroke); realities that in other words resonate in living animate bodies, hence in kinesthesia and everyday kinesthetic melodies.
Jeannerod (2006, pp. 55–56).
Stern (1985, pp. 78–79).
Stern (1985, p. 71; italics in original).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 180).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 155).
To isolate a single muscle contraction, not to mention isolating a series or conjunction of muscle contractions, is indeed an extraordinary feat if mastered and accomplished at all.
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 44).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 44; see also pp. 179–180).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 180).
Sheets-Johnstone (1990, p. 286).
Nauta and Feirtag (1979, p. 88).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 180).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 162).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 163).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 164).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 180).
Husserl (1973, pp. 92–99).
Husserl (1973, p. 93; italics in original).
Husserl (1973, p. 93, note #1).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 44, 88, 179).
Husserl (1973, p. 97; italics in original). The phenomenological realities constitute singular characteristics of the non-alien and include the following five characteristics of the non-alien: (1) field of sensation, (2) an ‘I govern’, (3) a repertoire of ‘I cans’, (4) a reflexive relationship between organs of sense and objects of sense, and (5) a consummately and uniquely singular psychophysical unity (ibid.). For a discussion and amplification of these characteristics of the non-alien from a genetic perspective, i.e., a tracing back to ontogenetical grounds, see Sheets-Johnstone (1999).
Husserl (1973, p. 97; italics added).
See Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, pp. 179–180).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p. 180).
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, pp. 44, 179–180).
See Johnstone (2012).
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Sheets-Johnstone, M. Embodiment on trial: a phenomenological investigation. Cont Philos Rev 48, 23–39 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9315-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9315-z