Abstract
Contemporary epistemologists assume a view I call ‘comparabilism.’ They do not, however, argue for this view. I claim that noncomparabilism is a viable alternative. I further argue that noncomparabilism has advantages over comparabilism.
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Notes
As Chisholm puts it, xPy =Df ∼(yAx). In this definition, ‘P’ and ‘A’ represent more justified than and at least as justified as, respectively, and ‘x’ and ‘y’ are variables ranging over believings and withholdings.
Sometimes epistemologists offer alternatives to replace ‘epistemic justification’ as the fundamental concept. Some epistemologists focus on ‘positive epistemic status’ or ‘reasonableness,’ for example. Though such preferences often signal radically different approaches to what makes a belief epistemically good, they are not important here. What is at issue is whether all beliefs are comparable under the fundamental epistemic comparative.
See also Sen (1981).
I have borrowed the phrase from Chang (1997b).
The project of constructing a reliability theory using sequences of reliability numbers was discussed in more detail in Wunderlich (2003).
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An ancestor of this paper was included as a chapter in my dissertation, which was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree at the University of Arizona in November of 2001. I am grateful for discussions of this material with audiences at the University of Arizona and Iowa State University; for comments from an anonymous referee; for comments, discussion, and encouragement from Tom Christiano, Heimir Geirsson, Scott Hendricks, Kristen Hessler, Keith Lehrer, Bill Robinson, Holly Smith, Peter Vranas and especially Alvin Goldman.
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Wunderlich, M.E. Noncomparabilism in epistemology. Philos Stud 142, 133–151 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9179-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9179-8